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This study focuses on four first-generation British Romantic writers and their 
misadventures in the highly-politicized public sphere of the 1790s, which was riven by 
class conflict and media war. I argue that as a result of their negative experiences with 
publicity, these writers—William Wordsworth, William Godwin, Mary Wollstonecraft, 
and William Blake—recoiled from the pressures of public engagement and developed in 
reaction a depoliticized aesthetic program aligned with various forms of privacy. 
However, a “spectral” form of publicity haunts the subsequent works of these writers, 
which troubles and complicates the traditional identification of Romanticism with 
privacy. All were forced, in different ways, to negotiate the discursive space between 
privacy and publicity, and this effort inflected their ideas concerning literature. Thus, in 
sociological terms, British Romantic literature emerged not from the private sphere but 
rather from the inchoate space between privacy and publicity. 
My understanding of both privacy and publicity is informed by Jürgen 
Habermas’s well-known model of the British public sphere in the eighteenth century. 
 
 
However, I broaden the discussion to include other models of publicity, such as those 
elaborated by feminist and Marxist critics. In my discussion of class conflict in late-
eighteenth-century Britain, I make use of the tools of class analysis, hegemony theory, 
and ideology critique, as used by new historicist literary critics. To explain media war in 
the 1790s, I utilize the media theory of Raymond Williams, particularly his conception of 
media as “material social practice.” All the writers in this study were profoundly engaged 
in the class conflict, media war, and politicized publicity of the British 1790s. They were 
similar in that they were negatively impacted by these phenomena, but different in their 
responses, depending on their discrete experiences and concerns. The various results 
were new conceptions of sensibility and the Gothic, new attitudes towards solitude and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In the fall of 1808, the young Thomas De Quincey moved into Dove Cottage in 
Grasmere, in the English Lake District. The former occupants—his idol William 
Wordsworth and William’s sister, Dorothy—were then domiciled nearby, at a nearly-
completed mansion called Allan Bank. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, another of De 
Quincey’s literary heroes, was a regular house-guest at Allan Bank. De Quincey’s 
reading of Lyrical Ballads, which was to him “an absolute revelation of untrodden worlds 
teeming with power and beauty as yet unsuspected amongst men,” enticed him to idyll 
where Wordsworth had been born and raised (19). Like Coleridge, De Quincey was 
drawn to the picturesque vistas and solitude of the Lake District, and to the domestic 
happiness shared by the Wordsworths. Reflecting on it after the fact, De Quincey 
wondered at the obscurity of his idols, their alienation from literary society, and plotted to 
bring them the attention they deserved. De Quincey claims he “paid an oriental homage” 
to Wordsworth, “at a time when the finger of scorn was pointed at Mr. W. from every 
journal in the land” (129).  
By the time his tenancy at Dove Cottage ended some seven years later, De 
Quincey was barely on speaking terms with Wordsworth and Coleridge. When De 
Quincey wrote about this period in his life, in the 1830s for Tait’s Magazine, his 
bitterness curdled his grudging admiration. He did indeed bring the poets the attention he 
thought they deserved, and most of it was negative. De Quincey depicted Coleridge as a 
serial plagiarist, opium addict, and book thief; Wordsworth he exposed as a blinkered and 




but also stuck his beak in the domestic affairs of others. De Quincey’s own struggle with 
opium and his affair with a local farmer’s daughter, while living at Dove Cottage, no 
doubt played a part in his tense relationship with the Wordsworths: De Quincey had 
dared to sully the sacred solitude that they had sedulously cultivated during their own 
seven years at Dove Cottage. In his articles for Tait’s, De Quincey demolished the 
romantic myth of Dove Cottage, showing that the new worlds of Wordsworth and 
Coleridge were in fact well-trodden, even run-down. De Quincey insinuated that in their 
precious rustic solitude the poets of Lyrical Ballads were as self-important, as petty, as 
contentious as any of the city dwellers they disdained in their writings. By making public 
the compromised privacy of the poets, De Quincey earned their enmity. But for De 
Quincey, such publicity acted as a necessary corrective to an idealized, “romanticized” 
privacy that ensnared admirers like himself.  
De Quincey’s sardonic and cynical take on the Lake poets anticipates many of the 
critical treatments of first-generation Romantic writers issued in the past thirty years, 
such as those of the new historicists. These critics have been as eager as De Quincey to 
dispel the myths of British Romanticism, particularly as they relate to privacy. They 
assail the Romantic idea that true art demands the rejection of the public sphere, and a 
retreat to the private sphere, ideally located in rustic environs, where the poet suffers the 
martyrdom of obscurity for the sake of enlightened posterity. New historicists argue that 
this myth obscures the once-radical politics of prominent Romantic writers. They point 
out, for instance, that William Wordsworth contributed to the French Revolution 
controversy with political poems, penned a republican pamphlet, and likely edited a 




and preacher in Bristol and edited an anti-government magazine. New historicists aver 
that Mary Wollstonecraft courted public controversy with her two vindications, which 
advocated republicanism and gender equality in education; and that William Godwin, 
with a pamphlet, saved radicals from the noose and wrote a best-selling anarchist treatise 
that suggested that public debate might replace government. They assert that William 
Blake wore the revolutionary cockade and authored illuminated prophecies that addressed 
the burning political topics of the day. In the more recent new historicist studies of these 
Romantic writers, this early commitment to public discourse is privileged and praised, 
then typically compared and contrasted with a later retreat to privacy, to the disadvantage 
of privacy, which many of these critics equate with political quietism or outright 
apostasy.   
 In this study, I continue this program of de-romanticization, while at the same 
time troubling the strict distinction between political publicity and apolitical privacy, 
which usually accompanies such a critique. I map the public activities and writings of the 
first-generation British writers listed above, arguing that each had a vexed relationship 
with the public sphere in the period following the French Revolution. More specifically I 
show how these writers became enthusiasts for publicity in the early 1790s but, after 
encountering class conflict and media war in the public sphere, became disillusioned with 
public debate and retreated to a private sphere associated with seclusion, domesticity and 
imaginative writing. Their anxieties about publicity remained, however, and these are 
represented in their writings by what I call “spectral publics.”1
                                                          
1 In this study, the term “publicity” will refer to activity within the public sphere. With Andrew Franta, I 
distinguish publicity from the public sphere itself, seeing the public sphere as “a realm of action or 
reflection,” and publicity, by contrast, as “a set of practices or mode of action…as a process rather than a 
space” (2). 




imply resistance to publicity, but also the continued, albeit ambivalent, engagement of 
these writers with the public sphere. I also consider the distinctive factors that made the 
experiences of each of these Romantic writers unique vis-à-vis publicity. All of them 
were forced, in different ways, to negotiate the discursive space between privacy and 
publicity. Indeed my study shows that, in sociological terms, British Romanticism 
emerged not from privacy but rather from the inchoate, in-between space between 
privacy and publicity. 
In this introductory chapter of my study, I examine the vectors that have 
collectively produced the problematic publicity of Romanticism. That is, I consider the 
ways that radical politics, class strife, and developments in print culture complicate our 
understanding of British publicity during the Romantic period. In making my argument, I 
draw upon the insights and methodology of public sphere theorists such as the German 
sociologist Jürgen Habermas, who in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
(1962) first popularized the phrase “public sphere.” I also retail the elaborations and 
contestations of Habermas’s critics, who challenge him on his flawed model.  
The new historicists I draw from to elucidate the radical politics of the era are 
many, and include such seminal critics as Marilyn Butler, Alan Liu, Marjorie Levinson, 
and Jerome McGann. However, their analysis tends to adhere to a strict public-private 
binary in which publicity is considered political activity and privacy is thought to be an 
abandonment of political reform, a kind of apostasy. I counter this schematic 
understanding of public/private relations with a more nuanced account of how first-
generation Romantic writers used their art to transform both publicity and privacy by 




As with new historicism more generally, my understanding of history has been 
influenced by Marxist cultural critique, which includes elements of class analysis, 
hegemony theory, and ideology critique. However, in my analysis of class, I am more 
likely to draw upon a previous generation of British historians, headed by the British 
Marxist writers E. P. Thompson and Raymond Williams, both of whom were engaged 
with Romanticism as literary critics. With the help of Thompson and Williams, I 
illuminate the ever-evolving conflict among the plebeian, bourgeois, and patrician classes 
in the Romantic-era public sphere, something left unexplored by Habermas, as well as by 
most public sphere theorists and Romanticists. 
Some critics have inquired into the role of print culture, or “the media,” in the 
conflicted public sphere of the Romantic period, but in general this has not been 
sufficiently theorized. I have attempted to make up for this insufficiency by incorporating 
the media theory of Williams, qualified by W. J. T. Mitchell, and showing its affinity 
with historicist and Romanticist scholarship. I contend that the class conflict in the public 
sphere of the 1790s was also a media conflict, as particular media came to be literally 
“classified” as plebeian, bourgeois, or patrician. I look at various media in historical and 
cultural context and examine how they both facilitated and problematized publicity. All 
the first-generation Romantic writers considered in this study were enlisted in this media 
war, which was another factor in their vexed and dysfunctional relationship to publicity.  
For the remainder of the present chapter, I elaborate the politics of publicity, 
class, and media and the role each had in the development of Romanticism, ending with 
descriptions of the chapters that follow this one, which show more concretely how first-




Habermasian Publicity and its Discontents 
 
Marilyn Butler notes that British Romantic “authors are not the solitaries of the 
Romantic myth, but citizens” (9-10). Similarly, Gillian Russell and Clara Tuite, in 
Romantic Sociability, contest a “solitary or interiorized Romanticism” and its “traditional 
identification with the lone poet, withdrawn into productive introspection” (4). What 
seems to trouble Butler, Russell, and Tuite is the traditional and highly ideological 
construction of Romanticism as private and anti-public, which derives largely from the 
writers I consider in this study. Andrew McCann puts it this way: “The development of 
Romantic thought in Britain . . . is informed by a . . . move away from the political to the 
aesthetic as the basis of redemption and emancipation” (4). The Romantics “demarcate 
the space of the aesthetic as one removed from the banal necessities of everyday life or 
the more destructive realm of public politics,” and their poetry “is premised on a rejection 
of public political life, conceptualized in a very abstract and impressionistic way to 
include city life, market economics, popular politics and popular entertainment, and a 
corresponding orientation to private feeling, virtue, sensibility and pleasure” (5). Or, as 
Raymond Williams observes in his classic essay on the Romantic artist in Culture and 
Society:  “the Poet, the Artist, is by nature indifferent to the crude worldliness and 
materialism of politics and social affairs; he is devoted, rather to the more substantial 
spheres of natural beauty and personal feeling” (30). Williams insists that this 
“dissociation is itself in part a product of the nature of the Romantic attempt” (30). Like a 
lot of critics, McCann and Williams seem to take for granted the affiliation of 




generation Romantic writers within the conflicted public sphere of the 1790s, we can see 
how they used literature to negotiate between publicity and privacy, rather than as an 
escape from one to the other.    
Any discussion of relationship between Romantic literature and publicity must 
begin with The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere by the German sociologist 
Jürgen Habermas. Habermas’s relatively detailed portrait of the eighteenth-century 
British public sphere—which he considered the most advanced in Europe—and his 
reading of key literary texts in relation to publicity, brought him to the attention of 
literary critics. Habermas argues that the bourgeois class initiated and sustained the 
public sphere. It was the means by which this class distinguished itself from the classes 
above and below them (patrician and plebeian, respectively), and it helped facilitate 
bourgeois hegemony in nineteenth-century Britain.2
Bourgeois publicity also confronted the “representative” or ceremonial publicity 
by which the patrician class maintained its hegemony throughout the eighteenth century. 
Seeing ceremonial publicity as a façade hiding the abuses of the ancien régime, bourgeois 
intellectuals replaced it with a free-floating forum, separate from the state. This bourgeois 
or “Enlightenment” public sphere was a discursive space for rational discourse, where 
“private people, come together to form a public, readied themselves to compel public 
  Regarding the plebs, Scarlet Bowen 
notes that “in the eighteenth century, the legitimation of new forms of public assembly as 
well as discursive sites—what Jürgen Habermas called the ‘public sphere’—entailed the 
relentless disavowal of popular and plebeian culture, including its associations with rude 
crowd behavior, noise and dirt, and bodily pleasures” (9-10).  
                                                          
2 In my discussion of class, I follow E. P. Thompson in using the terms patrician, plebeian, and bourgeois, 
to represent, respectively, the upper class, the lower class, and the middle class. I discuss these terms, and 




authority to legitimate itself before public opinion,” through the public use of reason (25). 
In doing so, the bourgeois implicitly derogates the patrician class—like the plebeian 
class—as irrational, non-transparent, and unjust. 
Concomitant to the public sphere was the “private sphere,” localized in the 
bourgeois home and family. Liberated from a public function, the private sphere “was the 
scene of a psychological emancipation,” marked by non-coercive relationships, a 
“community of love,” and the cultivation of the individual (46-47). It was where 
individuals became fulfilled and enlightened humans. But Habermas makes clear that this 
was an ideological projection of the bourgeoisie. What was really at stake was capital; 
what privacy denoted was, more properly, private enterprise. To protect this sphere of 
mercantile interests, in which the bourgeois family was implicated, the bourgeois created 
a public sphere, a zone of negotiation between the private sphere and the state, where the 
bourgeois used his critical reason to confront those authorities that would restrict the free 
exchange of commodities, and liberal institutions, such as the free press, which enabled 
it.  
Habermas’s compelling and detailed description of the British public sphere of 
the eighteenth century has been a blessing and a curse.3
                                                          
3 For the most recent critical overview of Habermas’s public sphere model, see Intellectual Politics and 
Cultural Conflict in the Romantic Period by Alex Benchimol (chapter 1). Nearly as recent is After 
Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere, a volume of essays edited by Nick Crossley and John 
Roberts. For a less current but no less valuable overview see Craig Calhoun’s introduction to Habermas 
and the Public Sphere or Bruce Robbin’s introduction to The Phantom Public Sphere. 
 His public sphere appears to be 
empirical, but it is really just a model, a heuristic. More importantly, by focusing 
exclusively on bourgeois actors and their Enlightenment-based rationality in the 
eighteenth-century British public sphere, Habermas ignores plebeian and patrician actors 




public sphere was a “variant that in a sense was suppressed in the historical process,” but 
some suggest that Habermas himself suppressed it (xviii). The problem is not just that he 
ignored non-bourgeois participation in the public sphere, but that he universalized the 
bourgeois as the “human pure and simple” (173).4
As some new historicist critics have made clear, plebeians were all too visible in 
the British public sphere of the late eighteenth century.
 In The Function of Criticism, Terry 
Eagleton argues that in privileging the bourgeois discourse of reason in the public sphere, 
Habermas obscured bourgeois ideology and the mystifications of market forces in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Eagleton also insists that even though the public 
sphere was potentially open to anyone, from the very beginning it was limited to male, 
bourgeois property-owners: “The public sphere . . . is at once universal and class-specific: 
all may in principle participate in it, but only because the class-determined criteria of 
what counts as significant participation are always unlodgeably in place” (26).  
5
                                                          
4 I should have said: “he universalizes the bourgeois male as the ‘human pure and simple.’” I will not be 
discussing the exclusion of women from the bourgeois public sphere in this introductory chapter, but 
feminist counter-publicity plays a large role in my chapter on Mary Wollstonecraft. 
 In the early 1790s, they were 
publicly present in the form of corresponding societies, tavern debating societies, or the 
voluminous street literature produced and consumed by radical plebeian activists. Kevin 
Gilmartin notes that “conflict in the public sphere, and competition for control of its 
resources, were crucial elements” of radical plebeian strategy in the early 1790s (Print 
Politics 3). Part of this plebeian strategy was counter-publicity, the development of 
alternate modes, media and publicity that resisted the dominance of the bourgeoisie in the 
public sphere. The term “counter-public” does not appear in Habermas’s treatise, but 




there are few critiques of Habermas that do not include it.6
I am not the first to consider counter-publics in relation to the first-generation 
Romantic writers of this study. In 1994, Studies in Romanticism published the papers 
from a special forum on Habermas and Romanticism. In his response, Orrin Wang notes 
that counter-publics seem particularly attractive for romanticists, who tend to be 
“oppositional critics” (580). For Wang, the counter-public is not only a “sign of the 
heterogeneity” of publicity in the Romantic period, but “a marker for the class volatility 
that subtends cries for both reform and radical change” (583-4). The problem with this 
conception of counter-publicity is that it provides critics the opportunity to invent their 
own counter-publics, which puts us “in danger of merely multiplying alternative counter-
public spheres, which inevitably remain in a competitive relation to the over-arching 
concepts of the dominant bourgeois public sphere” (Eger et al 9). While I do use the term 
“counter-publicity” to denote opposition to bourgeois publicity, I tend to avoid the term 
“counter-public” because it reinforces the problematic privileging of bourgeois publicity 
in Habermas’s model. I prefer instead to think of a public sphere in which the bourgeois 
public was one public amongst many (such as plebeian and patrician publics). Thus, there 
was no plebeian counter-public per se: there was instead a plebeian public in a larger, 
conflicted public sphere. 
 Nancy Fraser observes that 
“virtually from the beginning, counter-publics contested the exclusionary norms of the 
bourgeois public, elaborating alternative styles of political behavior and alternative norms 
of public speech” (61).  
                                                          
6 See, for instance, Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics; Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public 
Sphere”; Kevin Gilmartin, Print Politics, chapter 1; Ian Haywood, The Revolution in Popular Literature, 




Some critics contend that Habermas’s public sphere was never anything but an 
ideal, a fiction. For instance, Bruce Robbins describes the “phantom” public sphere as a 
“phantasmagoria” as Allan Bloom defines that term: an “agora” (public forum) that is a 
“phantasm” (ix). Jon Klancher argues that by 1790 the public sphere in Britain had 
become “a representation instead of a practice,” or “an image to be consumed by readers 
who did not frequent it” (23, 24). For Klancher, the public sphere had become nothing 
but rhetoric and ideology, completely disconnected to praxis. I follow the more nuanced 
view of Gilmartin, who argues that in the 1790s the public sphere “was both 
representation and practice, elusive phantom and material body” (Print Politics 5). It was 
an arena of competing practices and representations of publicity, which implies 
competing rhetorical strategies and ideologies.  
  
History, Class, and Media as They Relate to Romantic-Era Publicity 
 
There are other gaps in Habermas’s model that bear on this study. In Habermas’s 
version of the eighteenth-century public sphere in Britain, neither the French Revolution 
nor Romanticism ever happened, there was no class conflict, and medium was a neutral 
factor. These same gaps appear in the works of many of Habermas’s critics. My study 
purports to fill in some of these lacunae, by showing the effects of the French Revolution 
and British reaction on public discourse, by examining the clash of classes in the public 
sphere of the 1790s, and by revealing the ways various parties utilized print media for 
propaganda purposes. I also adumbrate the close interconnections among history, class, 




In terms of history, I draw from new historicists to show how much revolution 
and reaction inflected publicity in the 1790s. When I speak of this critical cohort, I mean 
the group of new historicist scholars who, beginning in the early 1980s, countered both 
New Critic formalism and Yale School deconstruction with materialist historiography. 
This historiography is materialist in that it tends to be preoccupied with the production 
and reception of texts, and considers the effects of political conflict and cultural change 
upon these processes. New historicists also tend to privilege marginal cultural figures—
many of whom are largely effaced from history—over prominent authors. Kenneth R. 
Johnson speaks to this. In “Whose History? My Place or Yours?” Johnston takes account 
of the “often invisible tensions between literature and history” during the 1790s (79). He 
does so in an effort to memorialize, and retrieve, those lost to history as a result of 
William Pitt’s “Reign of Terror,” which Johnston describes as “an interlocking system of 
spies, informers, packed juries, compliant magistrates, and ‘hegemonic’ vigilante forces,” 
such as John Reeves’s Association for the Preservation of Liberty and Property from 
Republicans and Levelers (81).7
                                                          
7 Johnston’s eloquent and chilling “litany” of repression (on pages 90-91) is worth reading in itself.  
 With Johnston, I argue in my study that “British 
Romanticism was shaped, created, altered—whatever—by the French Revolution, the 
positive liberal British response to it, and the subsequent quashing of that response” (82). 
Johnston makes very clear what that quashing looked like; he takes new historicists to 
task for soft-pedaling it, writing of displacement when destruction of body and mind 





However, just as Habermas tends to neglect Romantic-era history, new historicist 
Romantic studies tend to politicize privacy, characterizing it as historical displacement.8
Class struggle was a significant factor contributing to the politically-conflicted 
publicity of the 1790s, as plebeian, bourgeois, and patrician vied for hegemony in society 
and in the public sphere. When I write of class, I distinguish between the eighteenth-
century and nineteenth-century sense of this term. In the eighteenth century, both the 
working class and the bourgeois (or middle) class were in the process of formation, 
confronting a well-established patrician class in Britain. That is, the working class and 
the bourgeoisie cannot properly be said to exist in the way that they do in the nineteenth 
century. And yet the signs of bourgeois and working class dynamics, and of class 
conflict, are evident in the eighteenth century. Thus, with E. P. Thompson, I am 
“employing the terminology of class conflict while resisting the attribution of identity to 
 
For instance, Alan Liu remarks of Romantic poetry: “What is there in a poem is precisely 
what is not there: all the history that has been displaced, erased, suppressed, elided, 
overlooked, overwritten, omitted, obscured, expunged, repudiated, excluded, annihilated, 
and denied” (xvii). This is not a far cry from what Johnston asserts, but when new 
historicists map this displacement onto publicity they equate the removal of the writer 
from the public to the private sphere with political apostasy. As we will see repeatedly in 
this study, the radical/apostate binary has as much integrity as the public/private binary—
which is to say not much. For the writers I examine, the border between public and 
private is permeable and navigable, and the traffic goes both ways. If it did not, British 
Romanticism as we know it would be quite different.    
                                                          
8 There are exceptions, of course, including Jon Klancher’s The Making of English Reading Audiences and 




a class” (Customs 73). I use terms of class proleptically because what I describe are the 
first skirmishes between the classes that would later vie for hegemony in the nineteenth 
century. More specifically, I use “bourgeois” as Habermas and Marx understand the term: 
as the social group that owns the means of production—the capitalist class. I use 
“patrician” and “plebeian” as Thompson uses these terms in his analysis of class in the 
eighteenth century. That is, I reserve the term “plebeian” to describe the incipient 
working class, including artisans and the rural peasantry; and “patrician” to describe the 
combination of court, aristocracy, and gentry, or the ruling class.  
Thompson does not much use the term bourgeois; in fact, in his “bi-polar” 
argument in Customs in Common, the patricians and the plebs compete for control in the 
eighteenth century. For Thompson, the bourgeoisie was enmeshed in a mostly uncritical 
patron/client relationship with the patrician class during the century, and thus a non-
factor until the 1790s, when this relationship began to fray. However, Thompson does 
acknowledge the formation of a bourgeois public in the late eighteenth century, and 
allows that “when the ideological break with paternalism came, in the 1790s, it came in 
the first place less from the plebeian culture than from the intellectual culture of the 
dissenting middle class, and from thence it was carried to the urban artisans” (Customs 
86). But, focused as he is on patricians and plebeians, Thompson does not expand upon 
how the bourgeoisie challenged patrician hegemony in the 1790s.9
                                                          
9 Or I should say that he does not do so in The Making of the English Working Class and in its de facto 
sequel, Customs in Common. In his posthumously published work (The Romantics and Witness Against the 
Beast), Thompson does more with the British bourgeoisie in the 1790s, though only in piecemeal fashion.   
 In my account, the 
bourgeoisie posed a significant challenge during the early 1790s, but after 1795—because 
of patrician-encouraged class conflict in the public sphere—this class was much less of a 




of the public sphere, and a stranglehold upon public debate—the public sphere cannot 
really be said to function at all, at least not as a zone of rational-critical challenge to 
“Church and King.”10
I use the term “hegemony” as Thompson uses it, referring to the theory of cultural 
hegemony of Antonio Gramsci. Raymond Williams contends that Gramsci’s theory is a 
vigorous re-thinking of Marxist determinism, but it has been used by Marxist hard-liners 
to perpetuate the deterministic understanding of dialectical materialism. Williams sees 
cultural hegemony as a dynamic process, as something that is continually “renewed, 
recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, 
challenged by pressures not at all its own” (Marxism and Literature 112). Thompson also 
argues for a more dynamic conception of hegemony, claiming that “there is nothing 
determined or automatic about” it: “Such hegemony can be sustained by the rulers only 
by the constant exercise of skill, or theatre and of concession . . . such hegemony, even 
when imposed successfully, does not impose an all-embracing view of life; rather, it 




                                                          
10 While I focus on the conflict between the plebeian, bourgeois, and patrician classes, and cite Thompson’s 
account of eighteenth-century class development to argue for a plebeian-patrician alliance at the end of the 
1790s, I have to acknowledge that there was much fluidity between classes at this time. In The Struggle for 
the Breeches, Anna Clark makes this point, describing the blurred boundaries between the bourgeois class 
and the entrepreneurial plebeian class in the eighteenth century (7). There were also blurred boundaries 
between the “gentrified” bourgeois and patrician classes in the eighteenth century. Clark admits that these 
boundaries were less blurred in the nineteenth century, due to intensified class conflict.  
 Like Thompson, I discuss hegemonic struggle in the eighteenth 
century (whereas Gramsci focused mostly on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries), but 
unlike Thompson I see three classes involved in this struggle: plebeian, bourgeois, and 
patrician.  
11 For more on Williams’s views on cultural hegemony, see Marxism and Literature, 108-114; and Culture 




In terms of ideology critique, I follow McGann’s lead in The Romantic Ideology. 
According to McGann, the British Romantics tended to “occlude and disguise their own 
involvement in a certain nexus of historical relations,” including the importunities of 
money and power (82). This makes Romanticism a form of false consciousness, in the 
Marxist sense; that is, it is “a fortiori seen as a body of illusions” (12). The claims put 
forth in The Romantic Ideology, more than thirty years after McGann’s book was 
originally published, are admittedly getting threadbare. But ideology critique, as part of a 
larger program of historicist class analysis used to analyze Romantic publicity, still has 
its uses and benefits. Along these lines, James Treadwell suggests that “history is the 
antidote to Romantic ideologies of literature” (par. 3). That is, “the critical act is almost 
an ‘outing’ of the text, moving it into the public domain and simultaneously making 
public (or making explicit) its secret ties to this wider contextual world” (par. 2). Such 
criticism shows us “a literary artifact caught oddly in the process of emerging into the 
public sphere while apparently also trying to withdraw into the secrecy of aesthetic 
space” (par. 3). In Romantic ideology critique, the aesthetic is often depicted as the 
antagonist to history. What concerns me in this study—and what seems to concern 
Treadwell above—is not the aesthetic as a general category, but rather the privatization of 
the aesthetic in the Romantic period. By this I mean the sequestration of Romantic 
literature in the private sphere. I also mean the new historicist politicization of privacy, 
which is as ideological as anything written by the British Romantics. I counter that the 
writers of this study refuse to be immured in this ideologized privacy, and that British 





Though the floating debate that was the public sphere occurred in public spaces 
such as coffeehouses, it achieved its greatest extent and impact in print. This suggests the 
importance of media to publicity; as in previous periods of revolutionary tumult, print 
production exploded during the 1790s. As I show in this study, during the French 
Revolution debate and in its wake, the medium of a text signaled a certain political 
position and class standing. Some kinds of media were used by the bourgeoisie in their 
attempt to maintain the rationalist ethos of the public sphere, and other forms of media 
were used by plebeians (both radical plebeians and plebeian loyalists, proxies of 
patricians) to contest bourgeois control of the public sphere. All three classes were 
involved in the ways in which, according to John Feather, “the published word works as 
an instrument of information and propaganda” (3). The medium used was part of this 
propaganda effort, such that bourgeois stakeholders in the public sphere made ideological 
distinctions between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” print media, associated with 
“legitimate” and “illegitimate” class interests (that is, with the bourgeoisie and plebs 
respectively). That is, some media were proscribed as inherently subversive, and others—
considered more conducive to social order—prescribed. Historicist media theory enables 
us to make these important distinctions. 
Raymond Williams, the critic who exemplifies historicist media theory, maintains 
that “media” is a notoriously variable and vague term, as reflected in his overlapping and 
variant definitions in Keywords (169-170). Two main definitions seem to be in tension. 
On the one hand, a medium might be considered as a material construct for conveying 
information, for communication. On the other hand, it might be seen as a social practice, 




the dangers of seeing media as only a reified and purely material technology, leading to 
technological determinism, a fallacy epitomized by Marshall McLuhan (Marxism and 
Literature 159). Williams the sociologist seems much more comfortable with the second 
definition, though he attempts a compromise between both definitions, describing media 
as a “material social practice” (Marxism and Literature 164).12
To illustrate the distinction between the material and the social aspects of media, I 
would point to broadsides and books. In the eighteenth century, broadsides were cheap 
(generally a pence or cheaper), ephemeral squibs of one page often used by plebeian 
radicals to propagate their causes; they could serve this function because they were so 
inexpensive. By contrast, books were expensive commodities, affordable only to the 
upper classes and affluent bourgeoisie. Particularly when bound, books exuded a sense of 
 W. J. T. Mitchell has a 
similar understanding, stating that “a medium . . . is not just a set of materials, an 
apparatus, or a code that ‘mediates’ between individuals. It is a complex social institution 
that contains individuals within it, and is constituted by a history of practices, rituals, and 
habits, skills and techniques, as well as by a set of material objects and spaces” (What Do 
Pictures Want? 213). Mitchell, like Williams, prefers a Gramscian, hegemonic 
understanding of media, and consequently critiques the Marxist media determinism he 
finds in Friedrich Kittler’s Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (Critical Terms xxi). The 
Williams/Mitchell definition of media as material social practice is close to my own 
understanding. It is first of all important to consider the material, or technological, factors 
of the medium that help determine the production, distribution, and reception of print 
texts. But there are also social—and class—factors to consider.  
                                                          
12 Media as “material social practice” would include the idea that media are a means of social production, 
including class formation. This is something Williams discusses in “Means of Communication as Means of 




permanence and authority, of being above the fray. In terms of materiality, differences 
between broadside and book were significant, affecting production, price and 
distribution. These same factors affected social function—including class affiliation—
such that a person was much more likely to be prosecuted for publishing broadsides than 
for books, because broadsides were affordable to plebeians and books were safely out of 
their price range.13 In similar ways, other print media associated with the plebs—such as 
the cheap pamphlet, the chapbook, and the radical miscellany—were thought dangerous 
to social order during the Romantic period.14
This class/media conflict is further illustrated by The Rights of Man controversy 
of 1791-92. Thomas Paine published the first part of The Rights of Man in 1791 as a 
riposte to Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France. Though the 
publisher Joseph Johnson had issued other replies to Burke, and agreed to publish 
Paine’s, on the day of publication he transferred ownership of Rights of Man Part 1 to the 
radical plebeian printer Jeremiah Jordan. For the bourgeois bookseller, Paine’s tract was 




                                                          
13 In a letter to Thomas Cooper, who penned one of the many replies to Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the 
Revolution in France, Attorney-General John Scott admits such selective prosecutions: Scott writes: 
“Continue if you please to publish your reply to Mr. Burke in an octavo form, so as to confine it probably 
to that class of readers who may consider it coolly: so soon as it is published cheaply for dissemination 
among the populace, it will be my duty to prosecute”(Qtd. in Gerald Tyson, 124). 
 After publishing Part 2 of The Rights of Man in 1792, Paine escalated the 
provocation by issuing the entire work as a cheap, sixpenny pamphlet, in order to make it 
accessible to plebeian activists. Ian Haywood notes that “as thousands of sixpenny issues 
14 In The Reading Nation in the Romantic Period, William St. Clair attests to the power (economic, 
political, ideological, cultural) of the print book in Britain during the Romantic period, and the media 
conflict between the print book and other, including plebeian, forms of print.  
15 In Romanticism, Publishing, and Dissent, Helen Braithwaite argues that Johnson “most probably 
withdrew from The Rights of Man because he was apprised of the legal and political damage that might 




of The Rights of Man began to roll from the presses, and varieties of cheap-format 
editions flooded the nation, government supporters and ‘moderates’ realized that a sea-
change in popular political sensibility was occurring” (21). To counter Paine’s enormous 
influence, indicated by the huge circulation of The Rights of Man (estimated by 
Thompson to be as many as 200,000), King George III issued a proclamation in 1792 
against “wicked and seditious” writings that cited Paine in particular. Shortly thereafter 
John Reeves formed the Association for Preserving Liberty and Property Against 
Republicans and Levelers, whose express mission was to eliminate the texts of radical 
plebeian writers such as Paine, supplanting them with patrician-approved, patriotic texts. 
This campaign succeeded brilliantly, prompting “an avalanche of counter-revolutionary 
propaganda,” using such plebeian media as broadsides, ballad-sheets, chapbooks, 
prints—as well as imprinted cream-ware, mugs, coinage, and handkerchiefs (Brewer 22, 
Bindman 109-203). Partly because of such efforts, by the end of the 1790s plebeians as a 
class were decidedly more loyalist than radical, and patrician hegemony was temporarily 
secure. 
As Thompson notes, patrician hegemony in the eighteenth century was supported 
and supplemented by older forms of public expression such as oral/aural exchange and 
manuscript, as well as the media of public display and performance, integral to both 
aristocratic “representative” publicity and plebeian “rough music.” Another factor was 
patrician loyalists co-opting plebeian media in order to wean plebeians from reform and 
revolution during the 1790s. This was seen most pointedly in the Cheap Repository Tract 
movement spearheaded by Hannah More. Gilmartin avers that longstanding “suspicions 




conditions introduced by Tom Paine. More was certainly not unique among Evangelical 
activists in her conviction that the available principles and institutions of moral reform 
could be mobilized against a Jacobin political challenge” (Writing Against Revolution 
67).16
tensions between revision and tradition; between a desire to confront radicalism 
on its own terms, and a deep-seated skepticism about the political legitimacy of 
print culture and public opinion; between an unyielding confidence in the viability 
of the old regime, and a realization that new social forces and cultural forms must 
be enlisted in its defence. And of course conditioning every dimension of the 
response to radical protest there is a framing tension between 
counterrevolutionary public expression and coercive state action. (Writing Against 
Revolution 10). 
 At the same time, Gilmartin adds, patrician efforts to subvert plebeian radicalism 
evinced 
In their hostile take-over of the public sphere at the end of the 1790s, patricians not only 
co-opted plebeian media: they also wrested control of such bourgeois print media as the 
book review magazine (e.g. Anti-Jacobin Review), and the print book itself (e.g. Anti-
Jacobin novels).17
All the writers in this study began the 1790s immersed in a vibrant public sphere 
that debated the efficacy of liberty, equality, and fraternity for Britain. Once war with 
   
                                                          
16 William St. Clair’s treatment of the Cheap Repository Tract campaign shows not only the development 
of sophisticated propaganda techniques, but also predatory business practices. More took over the old 
chapman network in order “to use it to distribute a type of print, mainly newly composed by herself, which 
would drive out both the old chapbooks and the radical pamphlets” (352). And since the tracts were 
financed by subscriptions from the wealthy, they were “sold at a price which undercut the commercial 
chapbooks and ballads. The older print was to be driven out by predatory pricing” (Reading Nation 353). 
17 For details, see Gilmartin’s Writing Against Revolution. He discusses the Reeves Association in chapter 
1, the Cheap Repository Tract movement in chapter 2, review magazines in chapter 3, and Anti-Jacobin 




France was underway in early 1793, these values were trampled in the panicked traffic of the 
public sphere, which became a site of class conflict and media war. The works of William 
Wordsworth, William Godwin, Mary Wollstonecraft, and William Blake are scarred by these 
conflicts. All these writers responded negatively to the conflicted publicity of the 1790s; 
however, their responses to publicity were quite discrete. In the final section of this 
introductory chapter, I briefly describe the author chapters that follow, showing how these 





My next chapter chronicles Wordsworth’s relations with the public sphere 
between the years 1793 and 1815, as he transitioned from republican radical to 
reactionary recluse. It begins with Wordsworth’s “retreat” to the West Country in 1795, 
focusing on some of the poetry he produced for Lyrical Ballads. For Wordsworth, rustic 
retirement was not an escape from public responsibilities but rather an embrace of 
universal benevolence, which was the basis of reform. The ethic of universal benevolence 
included engagement with the natural world, which for Wordsworth reflected rather than 
hid social suffering. Wordsworth’s use of the ballad, known as a plebeian medium, 
shaped his rustic poetry of this period, and was integral to the counter-publicity he 
practiced in the West Country. The second half of the chapter examines Wordsworth’s 
transition from republican retiree to Tory recluse by tracking his progress on his proposed 
magnum opus, The Recluse. I uncover incipient reaction, in which reformist retirement 




includes the transformation of nature from a public space into a refuge from society’s 
conflicts. The only part of The Recluse to be published during Wordsworth’s lifetime, 
The Excursion, evinces Wordsworth’s ambivalence about his own reclusion in the Lake 
District. In this work Wordsworth introduces a recluse named “the Solitary,” who is beset 
by a poet, a peddler, and a pastor, all of whom attempt to re-introduce the Solitary to a 
public sphere circa 1814 that is reactionary rather than reformist. I contend that the failed 
attempt to reclaim the Solitary reflects Wordsworth’s resistance to the patrician-
dominated, legitimate, reactionary publicity of the nineteenth century.  
My third chapter focuses on William Godwin, who was both a theorist and critic 
of the British public sphere, as well a writer of Gothic novels. My reading of these novels 
explores how Godwin used alienated, misanthropic heroes to trouble the relationship 
between the Gothic mode and Enlightenment philosophy in the public sphere of the 
Romantic period. My reading of Caleb Williams explicates Godwin’s understanding of 
Enlightenment publicity, and how it was threatened in the 1790s by patrician 
reactionaries and plebeian radicals. Godwin “Gothicizes” this loyalist publicity, showing 
it to be spectral force that inhibits rational public debate and benevolent action in society. 
St. Leon (1799), written just five years after Caleb Williams, responds to a public sphere 
that had become dominated by the patrician-plebeian alliance that Godwin suspected in 
Caleb Williams. St. Leon also presents Godwin’s exploration and qualification of 
Enlightenment historiography, which at the end of the 1790s was troubled by its unstable 
relationship to the Gothic. In Mandeville (1817), which is my primary focus in the 
chapter, Godwin reaffirms his progressive publicity without reverting to the hyper-




an indigenous, British context; he complicates it by utilizing an unreliable narrator—
another misanthrope—to create an ironic, self-conscious, alienated romance. Thus in his 
fiction, and particularly in his use of alienated misanthropes, Godwin contributes to a 
dyadic conception of Romanticism in which public and private are in continual 
conversation.  
Mary Wollstonecraft is the subject of chapter four, which looks at the figure of 
the “unsex’d female” in Wollstonecraft’s works and those of her critics, scrutinizing her 
ambivalent relationship to the literary tradition of sensibility in the 1790s. Specifically, I 
look at how the debate concerning sensibility intersected those involving revolutionary 
politics, class conflict, and media war in the British public sphere of the 1790s. In the 
polemical works she wrote at this time, Wollstonecraft distinguished between two 
different kinds of sensibility: chivalric sensibility, which was politically conservative, 
misogynistic, and threatened by public debate; and civic sensibility, where reason was 
used to order the passions and cultivate the social feelings necessary for public 
engagement. The argument between chivalric and civic sensibility plays out in her two 
vindications. In A Vindication of the Rights of Men, Wollstonecraft assails the anti-public 
chivalric sensibility that pervades the writings of the conservative Edmund Burke; in A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman, she attacks the proto-republican Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, who she considers equally paternalistic and publicity-phobic. My discussion of 
the two vindications takes issue with those feminist critics who claim the “unsex’d” 
Wollstonecraft favored a masculine conception of reason in her model of civic 
sensibility. My examination of Wollstonecraft’s two vindications is followed by a reading 




which Wollstonecraft disavowed a strict dichotomy between chivalric and civic 
sensibility and attempted to recuperate private emotion and domesticity from a politicized 
public sphere. However, this effort was complicated and mitigated by a sensibility that 
inchoately combines public and private concerns. Wollstonecraft’s re-fashioned 
sensibility infuses what would later be denoted the Romantic structure of feeling, and 
posits the chimerical “unsex’d” female as the ideal go-between mediating the private and 
public spheres. 
My fifth and final chapter on William Blake explores his plebeian-based religious 
antinomianism in relation to publicity, in an attempt to explain his legendary obscurity. In 
his early texts, Blake consistently violated customary textual construction as part of his 
antinomian media practice. Blake used ephemeral, plebeian forms of print in an attempt 
to subvert Enlightenment-derived rationalist hegemony in the public sphere, which was 
enabled and maintained by the print book. Blake targets holy writ and its exegetes, both 
religious and secular, in his “Bible of Hell.” In my reading of The Book of Urizen, the 
first chapter of this bible, I retail Blake’s antinomian book-busting techniques and 
scrutinize the figure of the book in his book, making clear Blake’s antipathy to a 
bibliography that compromised spiritual freedom and hampered the prophetic mission of 
the antinomian prophet. I follow this reading with one of Blake’s magnum opus, 
Jerusalem, which I consider as the final book of Blake’s Bible of Hell, his Book of 
Revelation.  
However, Jerusalem—composed and executed some twenty years after the other 
books in his Bible of Hell—fails as the final chapter of Blake’s anti-bible because it is too 




in the form of the print book, Blake created his own testament to the book, building 
Jerusalem into a bibliographic monument that resists critique. In this work, Blake 
employed his antinomian tactics of textual obscurity to damn the public sphere of his day, 
and to offer salvation instead to the public of futurity, the priesthood of believers willing 
to passionately engage, and preserve, his texts. And yet in these same texts Blake 
continues to interrogate his readers, particularly those who would relegate him 
exclusively to either the private or the public sphere. Like all the writers in this study, 
Blake found the tension between the contraries of publicity and privacy more productive 
than any possible resolution. For him, Romanticism was not either/or but both/and; it was 




Chapter 2: William Wordsworth, Vexed Publicity, and Reclusion 
 
When William Wordsworth published The Excursion, the first installment of his 
proposed epic The Recluse, his critical nemesis Francis Jeffrey famously opined that it 
would never do. Jeffrey’s mordant diagnosis of Wordsworth and his “system” in 1814 is 
well known, but one aspect of Jeffrey’s review is not often discussed. It is the passage 
where Jeffrey takes the author of The Recluse to task for actually being a recluse.1
Jeffrey must have surmised that one of the main reasons Wordsworth shunned his 
public was because of negative notices by Jeffrey and other reviewers. Since the 
beginning of his career as a poet, Wordsworth had been reading reviews that took him to 
task for various political malfeasances and social solecisms. As a result, he withdrew 
from the public sphere of his time. Wordsworth’s vaunted love of nature, and his 
celebration of the dalesmen’s “republic” in the Lake District, characterized this 
withdrawal.  Associated with it was the myth of the solitary poet, who must be content to 
work in obscurity and solitude, eschewing involvement with public concerns, debates, 
and politics. 
 Jeffrey  
writes: “Long habits of seclusion, and an excessive ambition of originality, can alone 
account for the disproportion which seems to exist between this author's taste and his 
genius.” Wordsworth needed “the collision of equal minds” to check his redundancies, 
extravagances, puerility, self-indulgence and self-admiration. Like “all the greater poets,” 
Wordsworth needed to live “in the full current of society.” In other words, Wordsworth 
must come out of the woods and attend to his public.  
                                                          
1 All quotations by Francis Jeffrey are taken from Spenser and the Tradition. Full citation and URL are in 




However, all this was just a pose. When Wordsworth published The Excursion in 
1814, he was very much engaged with public affairs, particularly those that concerned his 
patrician patrons. In 1813 he had been named the Distributor of Stamps for 
Westmoreland County, a reward for his support of Lord Lonsdale, the son of the man 
who had ruined Wordsworth’s father. Wordsworth was also a supporter of the 
controversial and ultra-conservative former radical Robert Southey, named Poet Laureate 
in 1813. Wordsworth was himself, of course, a former radical, a once-ardent supporter of 
the French Revolution who had abandoned his youthful radicalism. In short, like Southey 
and Wordsworth’s erstwhile friend Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Wordsworth had become a 
political apostate—he had publicly disavowed his revolutionary youth.  
Wordsworth’s apostasy is complicated, and obscured, by what I call his 
reclusion—his abandonment of the public sphere of the cities for a solitary life in the 
country. Reclusion was arguably the central issue for Wordsworth during his poetic 
career, as it is the subject of his projected magnum opus, The Recluse (of which The 
Excursion was the only part ever published). In the 1790s, the radical reformer 
Wordsworth associated reclusion with political reaction, and resisted it. In the early 
nineteenth century, when he had forsworn his radical allegiances and become politically 
conservative, he embraced it. Then in 1814, when The Excursion was published, 
Wordsworth attacked reclusion again, this time from the other end of the political 
spectrum, urging public conformity to the re-established patrician hegemony in Britain. 
However, The Recluse also shows Wordsworth’s self-consciousness and ambivalence 
about reclusion, and political involvement generally. 




light of his vexed relationship to the conflicted public sphere of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. In the wake of the French Revolution, the British public 
sphere was riven by class conflict and media war. Wordsworth at first was an ardent 
participant in the political debates of the early 1790s, but he was bothered by the conflict 
he experienced in the public sphere.2
This conflict haunts Wordsworth’s nineteenth-century poetry in the form of 
spectral publicity, which evinces his anxious attempts to exorcise the ghost of the 
factitious and fractious public sphere. The Excursion dramatizes Wordsworth’s attempt to 
be rid of this spectral publicity, and reclusion itself, by “curing” the character of the 
Solitary and bringing him back into the fold. Wordsworth failed in this mission: at the 
end of the poem the Solitary departs unconvinced and unreconstructed. However, this 
failure was productive (and perhaps intentional) in that it allowed Wordsworth to work 
through his reluctance about becoming a full-throated bard of reaction at a time when the 
 As a result he became disillusioned by contentious 
publicity engendered by reformist politics and subsequent reaction. He “retired” from 
urban-based political activism and moved to rural England, where he could be closer to 
nature. Here he experimented with an alternative, rustic form of reformist “counter-
publicity.” However, in Wordsworth’s writing this reformist, counter-public retirement 
had its anti-public shadow-side in the form of reactionary reclusion. In his poetry 
between 1798 and 1814, Wordsworth attempted to resolve this conflict between 
retirement and reclusion, but without definitive result.  
                                                          
2 Wordsworth’s disgruntlement with class conflict and contentious media may be illustrated by his vexed 
association with the radical plebeian published Daniel Eaton, who issued The Philanthropist, a political 
miscellany that likely employed Wordsworth as an editor. For an extensive discussion of The 
Philanthropist and Wordsworth, see Kenneth Johnston, The Hidden Wordsworth, chapter 18. See also 
Nicholas Roe’s discussion of the same subject, in an appendix to Wordsworth and Coleridge: The Radical 




British upper class had come to dominate the public sphere. That is, even as late as 1814 
Wordsworth was calling into question his apostasy and harboring doubts about the 
restoration of the ancien régime in Britain. 
 




It is the first mild day of March 
Each minute sweeter than before, 
The redbreast sings from the tall larch 
That stands beside our door. 
 
There is a blessing in the air, 
Which seems a sense of joy to yield. 
To the bare trees, and mountains bare, 
And grass in the green field. 
 
(“Lines written at a small distance from my house” ll. 1-8). 
 
This joyous exclamation in praise of spring, from Lyrical Ballads, was written by 
Wordsworth in early 1798. It is the kind of poem that we expect from the “nature poet” 
Wordsworth, but it is a far cry from the agonized, politically-oriented poetry and prose 
(all of it unpublished) that he had written earlier in the 1790s. The sense of joy and relief 
the poem registers may be explained by Wordsworth’s retirement to the country in 1795. 
Wordsworth was not alone in his retirement. He lived with his sister Dorothy at 
Racedown; when they moved to the West Country in 1797, their mutual charge, young 
Basil Montague, joined them. Coleridge lived nearby in Nether Stowey, and there was a 
steady stream of visitors to the poets in the West Country, the most prominent being John 
Thelwall, Charles Lamb, and William Hazlitt. In his retirement, Wordsworth was in fact 




neighbors and the local authorities that a spy was sent from London to monitor their 
activities. This was dubbed by Coleridge the “Spy Nozy” incident.3
Many critics assert that by moving out of the city, Wordsworth was abandoning 
political activism and progressive politics in general. As New Historicists like Jerome 
McGann, Marjorie Levinson, Alan Liu, David Simpson, and James Chandler would have 
it, in his early retirement poetry Wordsworth begins to exhibit Burkean traditionalism, the 
evasion of history, and the displacement of political concerns to a beneficent nature and a 
privatized literary realm. But I argue, with E. P. Thompson, that Wordsworth’s retirement 
at this time was not yet apostasy; it was radical “disenchantment” rather than reactionary 
“default.”
   
4
These three authors wrote the lyrics of the late 1790s not to retreat from, but to 
think through the problem of political duty. Rather than embarking on a mystified 
project, they examined the absence of options available to them, the stark limits of 
either heroic resistance or domestic retreat. . . . In varying ways, they were thus 
fashioning a new kind of discourse, written from within radical traditions, that 
asked what one should be willing to bear or desire for the sake of social 
transformation. (58). 
 David Collings reaches a similar conclusion, writing of Wordsworth, 
Coleridge, and Thelwall in the West Country:  
Wordsworth was retired but still a reformer during his so-called “annus mirabilis” of 
1797-98. For Wordsworth, rustic retirement in the 1790s was not in any way an escape 
from public responsibilities. 
                                                          
3 Recounted in Biographia Literaria, chapter 10. Thompson also discusses the incident in The Romantics, 
pp. 41-50.  





John Rieder notes that in eighteenth-century retirement poetry, the traditional 
opposition of rural estate and court had been replaced by a new opposition between 
country and city (194). Rieder sees this opposition at play in Wordsworth’s early poetry. 
Similarly, David Simpson argues that “Wordsworth’s views on civil society are much 
more coherent as an attack on urbanization than as a positive alternative in country life” 
(77). However, I would qualify the position of both these critics by saying that while 
Wordsworth shows an anti-urban animus in his poetry in the 1790s, he is not anti-public. 
In the retirement poetry he wrote during this time, he actively engaged the British public 
sphere, from an oppositional, counter-public perspective. That is, in this poetry 
Wordsworth was engaged in an effort to reform the contentious and dysfunctional public 
sphere in the 1790s. 
In eighteenth-century Britain, rustic retirement was a political and ideological 
stance. John Williams shows that during the century, Old Whigs and Commonwealthmen 
used rustic retirement as a marginal space from which to counter the dominant, urban-
based discourse of the time (“Revolution Politics” 80). Included in this group would be 
publicly-engaged “Whiggish” nature poets such as James Thomson, William Cowper, 
and George Crabbe. This is the poetic tradition that Wordsworth embraced in his move to 
the provinces in the mid-1790s. Says Williams: “Fully to understand Wordsworth, we 
must recognise evidence in his work of the continuation of a specifically dissident Whig 
strain of pastoral, ‘republican’ zeal which owed its vigour primarily to the survival of a 
Commonwealthman political tradition throughout the century” (“Critical Issues” 18). 
Though he had abandoned urban-based activism, in his rustic retirement Wordsworth was 




indigenous British traditions of republicanism (the Commonwealth), rather than the 
republicanism espoused by French and British “Jacobins,” inspired by the French 
Enlightenment. The philosophy of benevolence was one of those indigenous traditions.  
In “Arguing Benevolence,” Evan Radcliffe notes that benevolence became a “hot 
button” philosophical issue in Britain in the 1790s.5 Liberal and radical commentators 
(following Jonathan Edwards, Francis Hutcheson, and William Godwin) argued that 
universal benevolence (what we might also call “public” benevolence) was the ultimate 
ideal which could and should be used to ameliorate the supposedly narrow, “selfish” 
sympathies represented by domestic affections. Conservative commentators (following 
David Hume, Adam Smith, and Edmund Burke) contended that universal benevolence 
was a chimera and that benevolence rarely extended beyond the circle of those near and 
dear. This debate became politicized and polarizing in the late 1790s when “anti-Jacobin” 
critics attacked the adherents of universal benevolence for being anti-family and 
unpatriotic, and successfully associated benevolence with the French Enlightenment, and 
by extension the French republic.6
                                                          
5 Chris Jones, in Radical Sensibility, makes similar claims about benevolence (or more broadly sensibility) 
in the 1790s and in the work of Wordsworth. See particularly chapter 7, his chapter on Wordsworth. 
 This made the preachers of benevolence like 
Godwin—and one-time disciples of Godwin like Wordsworth—look like leering, fifth-
columnist “Jacobins.” Radcliffe argues convincingly, however, that even after 
Wordsworth rejected Godwin, the poet continued to be favorably inclined towards the 
progressive philosophy of universal benevolence, based on the ideas of liberal British 
6 This was accomplished most effectively (and amusingly) by means of the withering satire of the Anti-
Jacobin Review. George Canning’s poem “New Morality,” published in July 1798, followed the next 
month by James Gillray’s famous satirical print of the same name, sends up the theophilanthropy 
movement sponsored by Louis-Marie de La Révellière-Lepaux, a leading member of the French 
Directorate. What Canning and Gillray do not make clear is that theophilanthropy was a system originally 
developed by an Englishman, David Williams, based on the writings and ideas of eighteenth-century 




moral philosophers. Wordsworth replaced reason with nature in the equation: the natural 
world was the seedbed of universal benevolence, not rationalism (or “political justice”), 
as Godwin argued.  
Immersion in the natural world was an important element in Wordsworth’s 
conception of rustic retirement. But nature provided no escape from the human, social 
world. This is the sentiment of “Lines Written in Early Spring”:  
To her fair works did Nature link 
The human soul that through me ran; 
And much it grieved my heart to think 
What man has made of man. 
 
The poem suggests that nature not only binds us to the natural world but also to human 
society; and when human society is in crisis, it is reflected in nature. In The Politics of 
Nature, Nicholas Roe asserts that in the 1790s ideas of nature and political revolution 
were closely related. He adds that “any appeal to nature entailed reflection upon the 
moral, social, and historical realities of the day” (11). Alan Bewell comes to a similar 
conclusion, writing: “Wordsworth’s turn to nature was not motivated from a desire to 
avoid or evade politics, but from the belief that nature and the narratives it supports have 
historically been the very medium of political argument and social control” (141). 
Similarly, Ralph Pite claims that “Wordsworth’s explorations of nature are constantly 
inquiries into social relations. Neither apolitical nor anti-radical, they continue to seek a 
form of social life which allows personhood and community to exist” (184). Liu adds that 
in eighteenth-century nature poetry “there is no nature except as it is constituted by acts 
of political definition made possible by particular forms of government” (104). Instead of 
providing refuge and escape, nature, according to Wordsworth in his rustic retirement, 




the public sphere, as both a subject of, and location for, political discourse that impacted 
the nation.  
I have already mentioned Wordsworth’s rejection of Godwin, including Godwin’s 
rationalist approach to benevolence, which was too beholden to French Enlightenment 
writers. Wordsworth’s animus towards the ideas of “enlightened” French philosophers, 
and British fellow travelers like William Godwin, has been a critical commonplace for 
some time.7
Our meddling intellect 
 This animus is quite explicit in poems like “The Tables Turned,” where the 
poet grouses that  
Misshapes the beauteous forms of things;  
— We murder to dissect” (ll. 26-28).  
 
Wordsworth moved out to the country to escape the milieu of this meddling, murdering 
reason, which he associated with pro-French partisans in the urban public sphere. “The 
Tables Turned” also makes clear that the print media used by writers inspired by the 
Enlightenment were also suspect. The narrator, “William,” urges “Matthew” to quit his 
books. He exclaims: “Books! ‘Tis a dull and endless strife” (ll. 3, 9). By “books” 
Wordsworth most likely also meant pamphlets, which were used to spark and stoke 
public controversies in the 1790s. Most print books and pamphlets were too expensive for 
the hoi-polloi in the eighteenth century, and were for the most part restricted to the 
affluent, keeping those without money out of the discussion. Wordsworth countered this 
                                                          
7 A couple exceptions would be Marilyn Butler and Alan Bewell. In Romantics, Rebels, and Reactionaries, 
Butler claims Wordsworth for the Enlightenment, saying he exhibited neo-classical values in his 
“simplicity of language and truth to personal experience” (60). However, Wordsworth’s simple language 
and subjective point of view could easily be seen as anti-intellectual and anti-Enlightenment. In 
Wordsworth and the Enlightenment, Bewell cites the influence of Enlightenment anthropology on 
Wordsworth’s writing. While Bewell’s work is valuable, to argue that Wordsworth was an Enlightenment 
thinker based merely on his anticipation of some of the particulars of classical anthropology is not 
convincing, because in so many other ways Wordsworth was antagonistic towards Enlightenment thinking, 




with his rustic counter-public, which used media available to everyone, including the 
poor rustics he encountered in the country.  
The publicity of Wordsworth’s counter-public was largely based on oral 
discussion, rather than print. Wordsworth, his sister Dorothy, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
and whoever was visiting were wont to have intense conversations about politics and art; 
they also regularly shared their works in progress, reading them aloud. According to Paul 
Magnuson, discussions and oral readings are legitimate forms of publication, suggesting 
a small-scale public, a self-contained or closed communications circuit (13-14). 
However, some print media, particularly those not far removed from oral culture, were 
also utilized. Thompson says of popular, plebeian media in the eighteenth century: 
“Where oral tradition is supplemented by growing literacy, the most widely circulated 
printed products, such as chapbooks, almanacs, broadsides, ‘last dying speeches’ and 
anecdotal accounts of crime, tend to be subdued to the expectations of the oral culture 
rather than challenging it with alternatives” (Customs in Common 8).  
There is one important omission in Thompson’s list of popular media: the ballad. 
Though ballad-collecting had become fashionable in elite circles in the eighteenth 
century, the ballad was still largely a plebeian form, and in the form of broadsheets 
affordable to those who had literacy (or sometimes just ears) but little money.8
                                                          
8 For more on the ballad craze in eighteenth-century Britain, and its socio-political implications, see Anne 
Janowitz, chapter 2, and Thomas Pfau, pp. 205-215. 
 James 
Chandler asserts that Wordsworth used ballads, and the rustic language of ballads, to 
counter “the encroaching ethos of letters” associated with French Enlightenment praxis in 
the public sphere (144). I agree with his assessment; however, this does not necessarily 




culture and media with custom, and custom with Burke. Thompson complicates this by 
showing that “custom” was a changeable and contested term in the eighteenth century, 
and by illustrating the many ways plebeian rural dwellers rebelled against patrician-
imposed custom in that century (3, 9). Thompson also suggests how one could use the 
largely-plebeian media that he mentions to attack the “enlightened,” urban-based public 
sphere from the left; indeed, many plebeian activists did so.9
All of the issues discussed above provide the subtext for “Lines left upon a Seat in 
a Yew-tree which stands near the Lake of Esthwaite,” in Lyrical Ballads. This poem 
epitomizes counter-public, republican, rustic retirement as conceived by Wordsworth; at 
the same time, it evinces Wordsworth’s struggle with the idea of political and public 
disengagement, which takes the form of incipient reclusion. Though most consider 
“Yew-tree” a nature poem, some find the poem to be critical of the picturesque tradition 
in poetry, which offers for visual enjoyment lonely nature scenes (that were often 
artificially manufactured by patrician land-owners).
 
10
The “lonely yew-tree” standing “far from human dwelling” meets the primary 
criteria of the picturesque—a lonely nature scene—but the poet undercuts this by 
emphasizing the meager pleasure garnered from the view. There is no “verdant herb” 
because there is no “sparkling rivulet” to spread it; the “barren boughs” of the tree “the 
bee not loves” (ll. 3-4). Following P. D. Sheats, Michael Mason notes that “these lines are 
  
                                                          
9 One of the best examples would be Thomas Spence, a radical plebeian land reformer who, Marcus Wood 
tells us, “edited two journals, Pig’s Meat and The Giant Killer, and his numerous chapbooks, broadsides, 
pamphlets, and handbills contained songs, hymns, poems, showman’s notices, marginalia, advertisements, 
letters, declarations, and constitutions” (66-67). This list does not include Spence’s production of token 
coinage, used as radical propaganda, which Woods discusses at some length in Radical Satire and Print 
Culture, chapter 2, from which the quote above is taken.  
10 “Lines left upon a Seat in a Yew-tree” describes an actual landmark in the Lake District which had been 
frequented by the reverend William Braithwaite in his retirement. Braithwaite was one of Wordsworth’s 
masters at Hawkshead school, but as with Wordsworth’s reclusive Solitary in The Excursion, the recluse in 




parodically artificial and ostentatious in a manner designed to undermine the reader’s 
conventional attitude to a landscape” (112). The picturesque elements of the scene are not 
intentionally marred, as in other Wordsworth poems, by decidedly un-picturesque 
vagrants, but in the poem Wordsworth does liken this kind of picturesque spectatorship to 
mental vacancy, or a trance-like “appreciation” of nature as dictated by taste-makers and 
landscape designers. The world, and the public sphere, intrude and trample upon the 
picturesque in this poem.  
The poem, as Geoffrey Hartman points out, is a nature inscription, and one that is 
not that dissimilar to other inscription poems in later editions of Lyrical Ballads.11
                                                          
11  Such as “Inscription for the Spot where the Hermitage stood on St. Herbert’s Island, Derwent Water,” 
“Inscription for the House on the island of Grasmere,” “Lines Written with a Slate-pencil upon a Stone,” 
“Lines Written on a Tablet in a School,” and “A Poet’s Epitaph.” 
 It is 
not clear whether the inscription has been carved into, or written upon, the seat, but no 
matter: whether carved or written, inscriptions of this sort were not uncommon in rural 
Britain in Wordsworth’s time. The nature inscription can be considered a viable form of 
rustic communication, “knowable media” in the “knowable community” of Grasmere, 
available to anyone who passed by. At the same time, the poem assails the print media 
associated with bourgeois-dominated, Enlightenment-based publicity. It does so by 
implying that the young recluse has given up the kind of books—such as Godwin’s—
which reformers are reading in the city, choosing in the country to read the “book” of 
nature, which includes inscriptions. In short, the nature inscription is a counter-public 
form set against the Enlightenment-inspired, book-based “ethos of letters” of urban 
centers. It is public but not urban; much closer to oral sources than to print; and 
something of a reprimand to the recluse described in the poem, who would prefer to 




The “Yew-tree” recluse, as described in the poem, was once an idealistic young 
man from the country who went to the big city,  
A favoured being, knowing no desire  
Which genius did not hallow, ’gainst the taint  
Of dissolute tongues, and jealousy, and hate,  
And scorn, against all enemies prepared,  
All but neglect” (ll. 15-19). 
 
But neglect is his fate, from which the young man recoils, becomes disillusioned, moves 
back to the country (the Lake District), and becomes a recluse. For Kenneth Johnston, the 
poem describes Wordsworth’s difficult experience of the public sphere of the early 
1790s, which haunted the poet all his life.12
Stranger! henceforth be warned; and know, that pride,  
 However, Wordsworth clearly does not 
advocate reclusion, but in fact condemns it in the poem. The poet chastises the recluse for 
his pride:  
Howe’er disguised in its own majesty,  
Is littleness; that he, who feels contempt 
For any living thing, hath faculties 
Which he has never used” (ll. 46-50).  
 
Pride and contempt were all too evident in Wordsworth’s experience of urban publicity, 
if we are to believe just about anything Wordsworth wrote about cities. However, 
Wordsworth would likely assert at this juncture, this is no excuse for withdrawal from 
public concerns. Benevolence towards nature, and towards others, leading to universal 
benevolence, is still an option. The yew-tree recluse, however, did not think so. 
Benevolence remained, for him, only in a spectral, nostalgic form. The recluse was 
haunted by  
. . . beings, to whose minds,  
                                                          
12 Johnston bases this on Wordsworth’s difficult experience with The Philanthropist in 1795, and even 
finds reference to this experience in “Tintern Abbey.” For a more extensive discussion of this period in 




Warm from the labours of benevolence,  
The world, and man himself, appeared a scene  
Of kindred loveliness” (ll. 33-36). 
 
This is a scene from which the recluse has absented himself, though he clearly has 
regrets. He sighs “with mournful joy, to think that others felt / What he must never feel” 
(ll. 41-43). He “on visionary views would fancy feed, till his eye streamed with tears” (ll. 
44-45). A strange and perverse man: he feels deeply his lack of feelings; his dearth of 
sympathy fills his eyes with tears. Here Wordsworth seems to be sending up the 
fashionable man of sensibility and his penchant for taking parasitic pleasure in the 
powerful feelings of others. For Wordsworth, this is perverted, selfish benevolence. The 
yew-tree recluse traded in universal benevolence for the spectral spectacle, the 
simulacrum, of human feeling.   
 The yew-tree recluse had abandoned the struggle. The question is: had 
Wordsworth done so? Based on my reading of the poem, I would say no. Benevolence 
and idealism are described in positive terms and the young recluse’s abandonment of the 
world in negative terms. Wordsworth says of the recluse:  
. . . with rash disdain he turned away,  
And with the food of pride sustained his soul 
In solitude” (ll.19-21).  
 
Clearly the poet disapproves of this kind of solitude. For this recluse, abandoning the city 
and absconding to the country is a “cop out.” He is not living in oppositional retirement, 
like Wordsworth, but rather reclusion; he does not practice counter-publicity, like 
Wordsworth, but is rather anti-public.  
Once a definitive reading, Ernest de Selincourt and Helen Darbishire argued in 




Godwin and his rationalist philosophy, following his break with Godwin in 1796. 
According to de Selincourt and Darbishire, the poem reveals Wordsworth’s “revulsion 
from the intellectual arrogance and self-sufficiency of Godwinism, from which he 
recovered during his years at Racedown” (I 329). But this would imply that Wordsworth 
was the recluse in the poem, escaping to the country to put some distance between 
himself and urban reformers like Godwin. As I mentioned above, the poem does not 
support such a reading since the poet clearly disapproves of this kind of reclusion, and the 
abandonment of public engagement it implies. Nor can the recluse stand for Godwin, 
who was a vilified but still very public figure in 1798, and had not abandoned his 
principles nor sought out a rustic retreat. A rejection of Godwinism is indeed prevalent in 
Wordsworth’s Lyrical Ballads poetry, but I do not see it here.13 I agree with Mary 
Jacobus, who contends that “the lesson preached by the Yew-tree lines is a Godwinian 
one of altruistic, self-rewarding involvement in society” (33). But, as Radcliffe argues, 
even if it were anti-Godwinian, it does not follow that the poem is necessarily regressive 
or reactionary.14
However, the poem certainly decries the state of the urban public sphere at the 
end of the 1790s, characterized by “dissolute tongues, and jealousy, and hate, / And 
scorn,” a climate which Godwin played no small part in creating by attempting to align 
  
                                                          
13 Joseph Viscomi, in his reading of this poem, also challenges the anti-Godwin interpretation of de 
Selincourt, suggesting instead that it was written to contest Edmund Burke’s idea of the sublime and 
William Gilpin’s conception of the picturesque (aligned with patrician interests). I find Viscomi’s 
interpretation convincing; however, I would assert that Wordsworth is specifically assailing an anti-public 
picturesque, one that does not shy away from human suffering. Later in the nineteenth century, of course, 
Wordsworth adopts this anti-public picturesque himself, which became a key component of his apostasy. 
14 Thompson also argues, more generally, that Wordsworth’s rejection of Godwin in 1796 need not signal 
reaction or apostasy. He writes: “The rejection of Godwin was accompanied by a rejection of a mechanical 
psychology and an abstract enthronement of reason, but not by any rejection of republican ardor. . . . It is a 
move away from the déraciné Godwinian intelligentsia but towards the common people” (The Romantics 




British publicity with its French, republican counterpart. “Yew-tree” is a critique of how 
the picturesque tradition had erased human suffering from the natural landscape, how 
“enlightened” urban-based discourse and media were superseding and co-opting rustic 
forms, how benevolence had become bathos. The poem also suggests an alternative to 
this state of affairs in the form of a counter-public rustic community where nature teaches 
man to love man. All that said, there are indications in the “Yew-tree” poem that the 
recluse represents an unwelcome aspect of Wordsworth’s personality with which he 
struggled even then. This struggle between the public and anti-public Wordsworth 
became much more intense in the years that following the publication of Lyrical Ballads, 
particularly in The Recluse. I turn to that work now. 
 
Wordsworth’s Reluctant Reclusion in the Early Recluse 
 
 William Wordsworth considered The Recluse as his magnum opus. Wordsworth’s 
family and Coleridge concurred, often taking Wordsworth to task for his dilatory attitude 
towards the never-completed project. Like the 1798 Lyrical Ballads, The Recluse was 
originally conceived as a co-production of Wordsworth and Coleridge. Coleridge thought 
that they should  
write a poem, in blank verse, addressed to those who, in consequence of the 
complete failure of the French Revolution, have thrown up all hopes of 
amelioration of mankind, and are sinking into an almost Epicurean selfishness, 
disguising the same under the soft titles of domestic attachment and contempt for 




What Coleridge describes is close to what he himself became shortly thereafter, if we 
consider his use of opium an expression of “Epicurean selfishness.”  
I would strongly suggest that the radical lecturer and poet John Thelwall also 
contributed to the conception of The Recluse. Thelwall visited Wordsworth and Coleridge 
in the Quantocks in 1797 and, like the other two poets, did so to flee the contentious 
publicity of the British cities, seeking to “retire” to the Quantocks without completely 
abandoning his radical politics. In the end, like the other two poets, he found the West 
Country inhospitable and became instead the self-styled “new Recluse” of Liswyn Farm, 
in Wales. All three of these poets experienced a similar political and existential crisis in 
the mid-1790s, so it seems quite likely that they discussed the situation and artistic 
responses to it that would not compromise their ideals, such as The Recluse as it was 
originally conceived.15
In the end, only Wordsworth contributed to the project, which may be one reason 
why it was never finished—or barely even started. The central issue that Wordsworth 
grapples with in the Recluse project is: what do we do when “the world is too much with 
us”? How can the poet save his soul in seclusion and help save the world at the same 
time? That is, how can one help reform the world without doing so publicly, as part of a 
contentious, highly ideological public sphere? At its conception The Recluse was a 
reformist project which attempted to circumvent a dysfunctional public sphere. However, 
in the only portion of The Recluse ever published—The Excursion, in 1814—this original 
 
                                                          
15 It is also quite possible that Thelwall read to Wordsworth and Coleridge his work in progress, the poem 
entitled “Pedestrian Excursion,” which he was composing as he made his way west to the Quantocks. In the 
poem, Thelwall deals with issues such as reclusion (what he calls “sequestration”), the degradation of rural 
poverty, and the picturesque—all of which Wordsworth discusses in his own excursion poem. Nicholas 
Roe discusses this in more depth in “John Thelwall and the West Country: The Road to Nether Stowey 
Revisited.” See also Mary Faircloth, “John Thelwall and the Politics of the Picturesque”; Michael 
Scrivener, “Jacobin Romanticism: John Thelwall's 'Wye' Essay and 'Pedestrian Excursion’”; and E. P. 




intention was subverted, even inverted, as it was a profoundly reactionary work, in a 
decidedly public way. In other poems that Wordsworth wrote for the project, but never 
published, the lineaments of the original reformist project can be discerned.16
  An example would be “Home at Grasmere,” which Wordsworth intended to be 
the first book of the first part of the three-part poem The Recluse. “Home at Grasmere” is 
an encomium to rustic retirement, an ecstatic paean to shared solitude. It relates 
Wordsworth’s joyful return, with his sister, to the Lake District, after their lonely sojourn 
in Germany. The poet and his Emma (Dorothy) were “a pair seceding from the common 
world” to find  
 
. . . a portion of the blessedness which love  
And knowledge will, we trust, hereafter give  
To all the Vales of earth and all mankind” (ll. 249, 254-56).  
 
In this and in other ways the poem can be read as a sequel to “Tintern Abbey”: the 
vagrant Wordsworths had found a home, and along with it “blessedness” and “love.” 
Grasmere valley, in the poem, is “a small abiding-place of many men, / A termination 
and a last retreat”—that is, “A Whole without dependence or defect”—a self-sufficient 
community, and public (ll. 165-66).  
Yet in the poem Wordsworth doth protest too much about the perfection of the 
people and the place, as if engaging urban interlocutors (like William Hazlitt for instance) 
who considered the provinces bastions of ignorance. Or Wordsworth may be arguing 
with himself, with his own doubts about rustic society and the people who live there. For 
instance, he tells of a pair of swans—which he identifies with himself and Dorothy—that 
                                                          
16 In my discussion of The Recluse, I only consider “Home at Grasmere,” “A Tuft of Primroses,” and The 
Excursion. Critics over the years have suggested other poems for inclusion in The Recluse project. For an 
overview of the various possible configurations for The Recluse, see Kenneth Johnston’s Wordsworth and 




disappear one day from the valley. For a moment he suspects one of his neighbors of 
shooting the swans, but then chastises himself for harboring such an uncharitable thought. 
For  
They who are dwellers in this holy place  
Must needs themselves be hallowed. They require  
No benediction from the Stranger’s lips,  
For they are blessed already” (ll. 352-369).  
 
Later he acknowledges drunken shepherds who make “sounds articulate / Of ribaldry and 
blasphemy and wrath,” but again refuses to condemn them (ll. 426-27). The shepherd of 
Grasmere is “a Freeman, therefore sound and unenslaved; / That extreme penury is here 
unknown” (ll. 444-45). In this Dalesmen’s Republic, in  
. . . this enclosure many of the old  
Substantial virtues have a firmer tone  
Than in the base and ordinary world” (ll. 466-468).  
 
Ignoring his doubts, Wordsworth describes Grasmere valley as a microcosm and a model 
of the kind of republic Britain could be. In this republic, nature is not merely a 
playground for the rich tourist. The poet attests to the “sober truth” that nature here  
. . . yields no exemption, but her awful rights,  
Enforces to the utmost and exacts  
Her tribute of inevitable pain” (ll. 837-41).  
 
In doing so, nature, as public space, mirrors the social conflicts that ravage Britain. And 
yet living close to nature also yields pleasure, knowledge, peace, joy, and fruitful 
solitude. Compared to fruitful solitude in the provinces, there is the unfruitful solitude of 
the cities, the loneliness one encounters amongst the urban crowd.  
. . . . He truly is alone,  
He of the multitude, whose eyes are doomed  
To hold a vacant commerce day by day  





Here Wordsworth describes that most unnatural of things, the urban recluse.  
Wordsworth certainly extols nature in the poem but it is not escapist. I would 
attest, once again, that Wordsworth had not yet become a reactionary, or an apostate, 
when he began composing “Home at Grasmere” in 1800. “First nature” had not yet 
become “second nature.” Karl Kroeber acknowledges that “the poet’s retreat to Grasmere 
is no evasive action. . . . Grasmere is no vacation spot, no mere place in respite from the 
fragmented restlessness of modern life. Nor is it a symbol of utopian existence. It is an 
authentic alternative” (1820). Similarly, in “Fields of Liberty,” Tim Fulford asserts that 
the poem “disturbs, rather than confirms, the Romantic ideology”; that is, it “is not a 
discourse which simply retreats from politics to nature to the inner self but a political act 
in the tradition of Thomson and Cowper, an eighteenth-century tradition in which the 
poet’s view of landscape is already political because it forms a critique of the 
landowners” (81). Grasmere seclusion is the kind of reformist retirement that 
Wordsworth extols in Lyrical Ballads. In particular, Fulford reads the poem as an 
excoriation of Lord Lonsdale, the employer of Wordsworth’s father, for political 
corruption and economic exploitation in the form of the enclosure and engrossment of 
land. The poem is reflective of Wordsworth’s republican retirement in the Lake District, 
his solidarity with the dispossessed and with the simple Dalesmen, his belief that nature 
is public space, and his resistance to politically-fraught, combative urban publicity. 
What the poet describes in “Home at Grasmere” is rustic, republican retirement 
rather than reclusion; and counter-publicity, rather than a retreat from public concerns. 
But Wordsworth also voices some doubts and concerns about the reformist sentiment in 




were not necessarily paragons of virtue always and forever. These tentative doubts and 
concerns are voiced much more emphatically in The Excursion, as we will see.   
The first draft of “Home at Grasmere” was composed in 1800, and then finished 
in 1806. By 1806, Wordsworth’s rustic republicanism had been mostly effaced by, and 
then replaced with, incipient reaction. Publicly-engaged retirement had made way for 
anti-public reclusion.17
Nature is neither benevolent nor public in “A Tuft of Primroses.” There is no love 
of nature leading to love of man. There is instead disregard of nature leading to ignorance 
 This can be seen in “The Tuft of Primroses,” composed in 1808. 
Both Johnston and Beth Darlington claim this poem was intended as another book in the 
first part of The Recluse. “The Tuft of Primroses” was written in the spring and summer 
of 1808 as a follow-up to “Home at Grasmere.” After a few months away, William and 
Dorothy Wordsworth had returned to Grasmere valley to find lamentable changes. Due to 
a dispute over timber rights, many trees had been cut down, destroying quite a few 
picturesque views. This sad mutability is registered in the poem; it is countered by the 
primrose, which becomes a symbol of something that survives such changes. Frail as it is, 
it will “maintain conspicuously” its “solitary state / In Splendour unimpaired” (ll. 11-14). 
And yet, after the poet relates the environmental destruction of the valley, he ends this 
portion of the poem mourning how “dearest resting places of the heart / Vanish beneath 
an unrelenting doom” (ll. 262-63). Grasmere was not the haven he hoped it would be; the 
contentious world had intruded upon and disrupted the sweet solitude of the 
Wordsworths. 
                                                          
17 Arguably this change, this turn from reform to reaction, is reflected in the writing and editing of the 
poem between 1800 and 1806. However, I have not the time nor space to go over previous iterations. For 
that, I refer you to the Cornell edition of “Home at Grasmere,” edited by Beth Darlington, or even better 
Johnston’s Wordsworth and The Recluse, where he compares the 1800 poem to the 1806 version in two 




of man. Rather than mediating and meliorating social conflict, nature naturalizes social 
inequality, covers it up and over. Instead of public space, nature is now a relentless, but 
apolitical, avenger of all the destructiveness of man. When all the works of man have 
crumbled into dust, the primroses will still be there, transforming the dust into foliage and 
flowers.  
Wordsworth compares this mutable landscape with an ideal one. He relates the 
story of St. Basil, nobleman and founder of monasticism in the Eastern Christian Church. 
For the first time in his poetry, Wordsworth strongly defends recluses like Basil, and 
reclusion itself. He writes that it was not due to “dread of the persecuting sword, remorse 
/ Wrongs unredressed, and insults unavenged” that a person flees populated places; it is 
not “as a refuge from distress or pain / A breathing time, vacation, or a truce” that a 
person seeks solitude; rather it is “for its absolute self, a life of peace” that a recluse 
withdraws from the world (ll. 267-68; 276-78). But then Wordsworth goes on to write 
that Basil had the “vain felicities of Athens, left / Her throng of Sophists glorying in their 
snares, / Her Poets, and conflicting Orators” in order to enjoy “his delicious Pontic 
solitude” (ll. 299-301, 304). In other words, he had to abandon the public sphere of his 
day, with its myriad conflicts, in order to find a little peace. And he does so not in a 
desert but a “blest Arcadia,” where “majestic beds of diverse foliage, fruits, / And a 
thousand laughing blossoms” (ll. 350, 332-33). The setting of St. Basil’s “delicious 
Pontic solitude” seems much like Grasmere valley. In this section, nature, transformed 
into pastoral perfection, becomes a haven from urban conflicts and public controversy, 
where there is  
. . . no loss lamenting, no privation felt,  




By civil faction, by religious broils  
Unplagued, forgetting and forgotten” (ll. 364-67).  
 
Unlike the Yew-tree poem in Lyrical Ballads, or the first version of “Home at Grasmere,” 
Wordsworth calls for renunciation of the troublesome world, and embraces reclusion, in 
“A Tuft of Primroses.”  
According to David Bromwich, behind the “gorgeous drapery” of Wordsworth’s 
language, the specter of Burke—in the form of his Reflections on the Revolution in 
France—can be discerned. In his discussion of the hermit in “Tintern Abbey,” Bromwich 
writes: “The Reflections, in its argument against republican innovation, had spoken of 
monks and monasteries as fit subjects of natural piety” (79). Bromwich continues: 
“Burke in the Reflections goes on to say that the practices of monks, strange and 
superstitious as they appear to the Protestant mind, are among the ancient growths by 
which the mind of man has come to know its own nature; so that they now seem, as any 
human practice may seem after sufficient duration, part of the spirit that incorporates 
humanity” (79-80).18
So yes, now we can say it: when Wordsworth was composing “A Tuft of 
Primroses” in 1808 he had fallen under the baleful influence of Burke, as Chandler would 
 Monks and monasteries, in other words, are emblems of naturalized 
custom, of “second nature.” This is not how Wordsworth viewed monasticism when he 
critiqued it in early works such as Descriptive Sketches, in which he characterized the 
Grand Chartreuse in the Savoy as a haven for superstition and ignorance. Monasticism 
still represents “second nature” in “A Tuft of Primroses,” but in this later poem he 
“romanticizes” it rather than call it into question.  
                                                          
18 Bromwich is not convinced that this makes Wordsworth a Burkean in “Tintern Abbey.” I suspect he 
would be convinced, as I am, that the Wordsworth of “A Tuft of Primroses” was now definitely in Burke’s 




have it; he had fallen back “within the traditional frame of paternalism,” as Thompson 
argues; he had learned to erase political commitments and displace history, as New 
Historicists like Levinson and McGann claim. One excellent example of the last was the 
fact that Wordsworth wrote “A Tuft of Primroses” at Allan Bank, a mansion newly built 
in Grasmere valley by a family based in Liverpool (the Crumps), and rented by the 
Wordsworths while it was being finished. When Allan Bank was first being built both 
William and Dorothy thought it an atrocity—yet another example of how nouveau riche 
outsiders from the cities were despoiling their beloved valley. And yet they moved in 
when given the opportunity, with nary a mention of their resplendent new residence in 
Wordsworth’s poetry. It is also pertinent that Wordsworth had spent eight months 
between October 1806 and June 1807 at the Coleorton estate as a guest of Lord and Lady 
Beaumont, and while there, for the first time since his childhood, he had become a 
regular churchgoer. Wordsworth had also accepted gifts of land and employment from 
the new Lord Lowther in 1805 and 1806.19
 
 At this time, Wordsworth was a client to, and 
increasingly a spokesman for, the patrician class. The publication of The Excursion in 
1814 would make his political tergiversation very clear. 
Wordsworth’s Return to Publicity: Sycophant vs. Solitary in The Excursion  
 
Reflecting on Wordsworth’s evident apostasy in The Excursion, Lord Byron 
called Wordsworth a “poetical charlatan” and “political parasite,” a “converted Jacobin 
having long subsided into the clownish sycophant of the worst prejudices of aristocracy.” 
                                                          
19 This is reported by Fulford. He adds: Wordsworth’s “letter to his noble patron emphasised his lack of 
success with the reading public and signaled his shift to a conservative position of support for the 




In Peter Bell the Third, Percy Shelley compares Wordsworth to a chameleon, and calls 
him a defender of “ultra-legitimate dullness.” After reading The Excursion, Mary Shelley 
simply noted in her journal: “He is a slave.”20 This seems more than a matter of an 
“anxiety of influence” for the second generation Romantics, as Harold Bloom would 
have it. These comments register a sense of betrayal: the champion of rustic language and 
culture now defended the reactionary status quo.21
This is quite evident when one opens the book and sees on the first page 
Wordsworth’s fawning dedication to Lord Lonsdale, his patron. It is no different when 
one moves on to the prospectus, which reflects Wordsworth’s capitulation to the patrician 
status quo. In the prospectus (taken from the last part of “Home at Grasmere” and moved 
to the end of the Preface to The Excursion), the poet announces that his “haunt, and the 
main region of [his] Song” is “the mind of Man” (ll. 40-41). The poet exclaims: “How 
exquisitely the individual Mind / … / . . . to the external World is fitted:—and how 
exquisitely, too, / … / The external World is fitted to the Mind” (ll. 63-68). If the external 
world consists of the estate of the Beaumonts, the estates of Lord Lonsdale, or even the 
mansions of the nouveau riche, what Wordsworth is describing is “fitting” the mind to 
paternalism. “Fitting the mind” is another way of describing false consciousness, in 
 Jonathan Bate seems to speak to this 
when he writes: “A major count in the critical indictment of Wordsworth is that he was 
among the many conspirators in the Great Pastoral Con Trick” (18). His persona of rustic 
republican retiree was now apparently just a pose, a cover for reactionary ideas and 
actions. The crypto-Jacobin was now clearly a virulent anti-Jacobin.  
                                                          
20 The quotes from Byron and the Shelleys are taken from Allison Hickey, pp. 4-5.  
21 Wordsworth’s slavishness is also indicated by the fact that The Excursion was issued in quarto and cost 
two guineas. In the print marketplace of the time, this was an exorbitant sum, in a format that was clearly 




which the person is “haunted” by spectral overlords. Certainly the world Wordsworth 
conjures does not include urban areas, where “madding passions” are “mutually 
inflamed” within “the tribes / And fellowships of men” who are “barricadoed evermore / 
Within the walls of Cities” (ll. 73-75, 79-80). As with his Lyrical Ballads poems, urban 
publicity and media are renounced. But there is no rustic republican counter-public 
alternative here. Instead Wordsworth embraces the world of his patrons, the patrician 
public, and the dependency upon the great that this implies.  
The Excursion begins, in Book I, with the doleful tale of Margaret, another in the 
long line of Wordsworth’s abandoned or vagrant women. Book I has as its basis 
Wordsworth’s poem “The Ruined Cottage,” originally composed in 1795-96 and later 
expanded into “The Pedlar.”22
                                                          
22 To sort out the many and various iterations of “The Ruined Cottage,” including Jonathan Wordsworth’s 
controversial attempt to canonize the Ms D. version of the poem, see John Rieder, Wordsworth’s 
Counterrevolutionary Turn, chapter 6; and James Butler’s introduction to The Ruined Cottage and The 
Pedlar. 
 Like the vagrant women who continually appear in 
Wordsworth’s early poetry, most famously in “The Female Vagrant” in Lyrical Ballads, 
Margaret’s sufferings are largely due to an economy destroyed by war; unlike previous 
iterations, this war was clearly the one with France. However, New Historicists Liu, 
McGann, and Chandler argue that in the first book of The Excursion Wordsworth 
undercuts any kind of anti-war or social critique. Liu writes: “The ‘Ruined Cottage’, I 
fear, is not a poem of humanity. It is a capitalization upon inhumanity. A specific kind of 
capitalization, that is, is the historical form of Wordsworthian humanity. . . . ‘The Ruined 
Cottage’ is one of the strongest cases of the denial, the overdetermined and precise 
absence, that is the poet’s sense of history” (325). McGann writes that in the 1797-98 




sufferer rather than, as in 1793-4, a sense of outrage, and an overflow of angry judgment 
upon those whom Wordsworth at the time held accountable” (85). Chandler, similarly, 
reads “The Ruined Cottage” as a movement away from political outrage and towards 
depoliticized sympathy: the poem “leaves us with no sense whatever of human 
complicity in the causes of [Margaret’s] suffering and death” (135). Unlike 
Wordsworth’s earlier “female vagrant” poems An Evening Walk and “The Female 
Vagrant,” war is not the root cause of Margaret’s problems in “The Ruined Cottage.” The 
downfall of Margaret’s husband Robert, which leads to her own slide into depression and 
death, is an inopportune illness, which leads to the impoverishment of his family and 
eventually to his joining a regiment headed to war. 
Book I of The Excursion also reflects a very different conception of publicity than 
the other iterations of the vagrant/abandoned woman narrative. Wordsworth suggests this 
in his description of the small library that Margaret owns. The neat library that is 
cherished by the unnamed female vagrant in the poem by that name in Lyrical Ballads is 
nowhere to be seen in Margaret’s cottage; instead there is only a meager collection of 
deteriorating chapbooks and cheap books. Her small lot of books,  
Which, in the Cottage window, heretofore  
Had been piled up against the corner panes  
In seemly order, now, with straggling leaves  
Lay scattered here and there, open or shut,  
As they had chanced to fall” (I:859-64).  
 
The loose leaves of her deteriorating books match the leaves of the trees which carpet the 
abandoned cottage and its garden. As he often does in his poetry, Wordsworth uses print 
objects to represent the state of health or ill-health of the public sphere. The rustic public 





Nature in similar ways will, in time, erase all vestiges of human society. The 
narrator of Margaret’s story, the Wanderer, describes how he comes upon her cottage 
some time after being abandoned by her husband, and finds it being slowly taken over by 
honeysuckle and yellow stone-crop. He finds other flowers and weeds “straggling forth” 
in the once-neat garden, strangling the plants that had been sown there (I:753-764). In 
short, he finds nothing but devastation, reflecting the disordered mind of the occupant 
and the relentless ministrations of nature, which transforms devastation into picturesque 
beauty. Nature now reflects personal rather than sociopolitical concerns.  
 Nature, the poet suggests, is inexorably reclaiming the print materials created out 
of nature, out of trees and ink.  
The Wanderer concludes his recollection of Margaret with an ode to Mother 
Nature, who turns human suffering into fecund compost:  
Those weeds, and the high spear-grass on that wall,  
By mist and silent rain-drops silver’d o’er,  
As once I passed, did to my heart convey  
So still an image of tranquility,  
. . .  
That what we feel of sorrow and despair  
From ruin and from change, and all the grief  
The passing shews of Being leave behind,  
Appeared an idle dream that could not live  
Where mediation was” (I:973-83).  
 
As in “A Tuft of Primroses,” nature does not encourage or reflect active benevolence 
towards suffering human beings, but rather naturalizes their suffering, makes it 
                                                          
23 In “Suffering and Sensation in The Ruined Cottage,” Karen Swann argues that Margaret’s library shows 
that she has fallen victim to the kind of sensational, Gothic literature that characterized the literary 
marketplace at the time. Her evidence is sparse, however. I contend that her library reflects more 
wholesome fare, in fact the kind of “old canon” literature that was at that time being replaced by such 
things as sensational, Gothic literature. For more on the “old canon”— often in the form of broadsheets, 
ballads, and chapbooks—and its replacement by a new canon, derived from the newly industrialized and 
capitalized print market of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, see William St. Clair, The 




acceptable and inevitable. Nature is figured as a transcendent force, the agent of 
mutability, rather than a space that reflects social conflict and allows public discourse. 
History is displaced by nature, buried under blossoms and burgeoning greenery; suffering 
(for the onlooker) is assuaged and forgotten, reflecting quite literally an organicism that 
would make Burke proud.  
Wordsworth makes this affinity for Burkean organicism even more evident in the 
rest of The Excursion. In fact, he comes right out and proclaims himself a servant of 
Church and King, at the beginning of Book 6 (“The Churchyard Among the Mountains”). 
In an obsequiousness that no doubt curdled the stomachs of the second-generation 
Romantic poets, Wordsworth, speaking in the persona of the Poet, exclaims: 
Hail to the Crown by Freedom shaped—to gird 
An English Sovereign’s brow! and to the Throne 
Whereon he sits! Whose deep foundations lie 
In veneration and the People’s love, 
Whose steps are equity, whose seat is law. 
—Hail to the State of England! And conjoin 
With this a salutation as devout, 
Made to the spiritual Fabric of her Church; 
Founded in truth; by blood of Martyrdom 
Cemented; by the hands of Wisdom reared  
In beauty of Holiness, with order’d pomp, 
Decent, and unreproved. (VI:1-12).  
 
Coming from the former republican poet of nature, this is apostasy, made very public. 
Simpson writes that the character of the Poet here “voices a strangely disembodied paean 
to British liberty and the established church; the lack of response to this makes him seem 
indeed the spokesman of authorial dogma rather than a participant in a dramatic 
exchange” (204). There is good reason to mistrust Wordsworth’s blatant statement of 
reaction in these lines, and the character of the Poet as well, in the light of Wordworth’s 





In his review of The Excursion, William Hazlitt famously noted that in the poem 
“the recluse, the pastor, and the pedlar, are three persons in one poet,” referring to the 
three main speakers in the poem, and Wordsworth’s difficulty in distinguishing their 
voices (Qtd. in The Excursion, “Introduction,” 4). However, perhaps because it marred 
his Trinitarian pun, Hazlitt leaves out one character: the Poet himself. As similar-
sounding as their voices are in the poem, these four figures nonetheless represent 
different aspects of Wordsworth’s personality, namely: Burkean organicism (the Pedlar, 
or here called the Wanderer), the Church of England (the Pastor), the arts acclimatized to 
legitimacy (the Poet), the disillusioned Jacobin (the Solitary). The Solitary most concerns 
me in this section, for in him we can see how Wordsworth is equivocal about, and 
resistant to, his own apostasy. More importantly this figure is used to show how the 
private-public debate continued to both energize and enervate Wordsworth’s ideological 
orientation circa 1814. 
 His endorsement of Church and King rings hollow because something of the 
Jacobin—represented by the character of the Solitary—still occupies his imagination, and 
invades his poem. 
Even before we meet the Solitary in The Excursion, in fact after it is suggested 
that he might be dead, we encounter his ghostly print double in the form of Voltaire’s 
Candide. The Solitary had left it in a “recess” that closely resembles the yew-tree seat in 
the Lyrical Ballads poem by that name. In The Excursion, however, the recess is an area 
                                                          
24 This passage reflects what Marjorie Levinson refers to as the “deepened conception of Wordsworthian 
‘irony,’ according to which the idealized surfaces of the poet’s texts are ‘ruptured’ by moments of 
ideological self-contradiction or ‘logical scandal,’ moments at which a latent or ‘repressed’ awareness of 
historical or political actuality is said to become manifest to the trained critical eye” (11). William 
Galperin, in Revision and Authority in Wordsworth, argues for a similar kind of Wordsworthian irony, 




frequented by children, who had incorporated the book into one of the play houses they 
had built there. The Wanderer describes the book as a  
. . . dull product of a Scoffer’s pen,  
Impure conceits discharging from a heart  
Hardened by impious pride!” (II:510-12).  
 
This suggests that such works have turned the Solitary into an embittered recluse. Yet the 
Wanderer and the Poet find that the work is “swoln / With searching damp, and 
seemingly had lain / To the injurious elements exposed” (II:462-64). Later the Wanderer 
suggests that the Solitary had left the book there on purpose, “through malice, as might 
seem,” to indoctrinate the children in French republican and anti-clerical ideas, as 
adherents of Thomas Paine supposedly attempted to corrupt the youth by bundling The 
Rights of Man in “sweet-meat wrappers” (IV:1005).25 But the fact that the Solitary has 
carelessly left the book out of doors suggests his loss of respect for the author, and for the 
Enlightenment-based public sphere. It is similar in this regard to the deteriorating library 
of Margaret, and indicates a public that has died and become spectral. The abandoned 
Candide represents the disorder and dysfunction afflicting the British public sphere in the 
1790s, and the nefarious (though waning) influence of the French Enlightenment upon 
British publicity, all of which the Solitary now rejects.26
Shortly after finding the book, the Wanderer and the Poet find the Solitary very 
much alive. Thereafter we learn the import of the search for the Solitary: the Wanderer 
and the Poet intend to dislodge the Solitary from his lonely perch high above Grasmere 
valley, to coax him out of his bitter reclusion and back out into the world. Thus far I have 
been arguing that Wordsworth’s conflicted relationship with publicity in the late 1790s 
  
                                                          
25 Discussed by Ian Haywood in The Revolution in Popular Literature, 17.  
26 So too the disorder of the Solitary’s cottage, in which books are slovenly mixed in with “maps, fossils, 




led him to first counter and then reject the public sphere, which included a rejection of 
political reform. Now I am saying that, in The Excursion, Wordsworth re-engages with 
publicity. The difference is that the public sphere he re-engages in 1814 is very different 
than that of 1793. In the early 1790s it had been dominated by reformers influenced by 
the Enlightenment, but by 1814 the public sphere had been almost completely co-opted 
by reactionary patricians. The reclamation project of the Solitary was an effort to get the 
Solitary to give up his objections to legitimacy—and legitimating, Burkean custom—to 
declare, in a sense, his own apostasy. But this never happens in the poem; the Solitary 
rebuffs the attempt to draw him out.  
Critics usually focus on the Solitary’s pitiable history—described in Book II by 
the Wanderer and then the Solitary himself—in which his wife and children die within a 
year, plunging the Solitary into despondency, until the French Revolution, “the glorious 
opening, the unlooked-for dawn, / that promised everlasting joy to France,” draws him 
out again (II.224-5). In due course, the Solitary became disillusioned with the French 
Revolution, went to the republican United States and became more disillusioned, and 
finally returned to Grasmere valley to become a recluse. However, I will not re-cross this 
well-covered ground; it is another kind of ground that I wish to cover—or rather uncover.  
A central component of the Solitary’s dissenting reclusion involves nature. In the 
poem the Solitary relentlessly assails one of the cherished shibboleths of Wordsworth the 
“nature poet”: that the love of nature, in the form of rustic community, inexorably leads 
to the love of man. Nor will he countenance the idea that nature tidies up, prettifies and 
erases—that is, naturalizes—human suffering. The Solitary tells the Wanderer and the 




homeless beggar that few would mourn and most thought a nuisance (II:620-655). The 
narrating Poet suggests that the Solitary himself is insensitive and uncompassionate, but 
based on his words in Books XIII and IX, the Solitary clearly cares very much about the 
fate of his rustic neighbors. The Wanderer seems to acknowledge this in the last book, 
Book IX, as he speaks of “a wide compassion which with you [the Solitary] I share” 
(IX:156). The Solitary knows his neighbors quite well, and assists them when he can, in 
the spirit of mutual aid. Despite his negativity about the state of the world, the Solitary is 
far from a misanthrope. But he has no illusions about the supposed benevolence of 
nature, and has no stomach for the pieties of the Wanderer and the Poet on this subject.  
For instance, when the Solitary takes the Wanderer and the Poet up to visit one of 
his haunts, a “nook” with interesting rock formations and a waterfall, the Wanderer 
rhapsodizes:  
—Hail Contemplation! from the stately towers 
Reared by the industrious hand of human Art 
To lift thee high above the misty air,  
And turbulence, of murmuring cities vast; 
From academic groves that have for thee 
Been planted, hither come and find a Lodge 
Top which thou mayest resort for holier peace,— 
From whose calm center Thou, through height or depth,  
Mayest penetrate, wherever Truth shall lead; 
Measuring through all degrees, until the scale 
Of time and conscious Nature disappear, 
Lost in unsearchable Eternity! (III.105-116). 
 
The Solitary responds by pointing out the rock formations—which, reflecting his 
“antiquarian humour,” he facetiously gives names such as Pompey’s Pillar, Theban 
Obelisk, and Druid Cromlech—and says:  
The shapes before our eyes,  
And their arrangement, doubtless must be deemed  




Rudely to mock the works of toiling man. (III.128-31) 
 
Amidst these “freaks of Nature / and her blind helper Chance,” benevolence is not to be 
found. Instead “blind” and “freakish” nature prevails over human culture and civilization. 
  Then there is the Solitary’s “vision.” The deceased old man mentioned above 
goes missing in the midst of a storm. The Solitary joins the party that goes out looking for 
him, though he fears they are too late because the woman who sent the old man forth 
tarried in getting help. “Inhuman!” the Solitary complains. “Was an Old Man’s life / Not 
worth the trouble of a thought?” (II.817-818). The search party finds the old man barely 
alive and brings him back to the village. While this is happening, the Solitary has a vision 
of a dazzling, celestial city in the clouds above the mountains: 
O, ’twas an unimaginable sight!  
Clouds, mists, streams, watery rocks and emerald turf 
Confused, commingled, mutually inflamed, 
Molten together, and composing thus, 
Each lost in each, that marvelous array 
Of temple, place, citadel, and huge 
Fantastic pomp of structure without a name (II.887-894). 
 
This is the kind of vision, and description, that we find in many of Wordsworth’s poems. 
But here the Solitary immediately discounts his vision. Relating his vision to the 
Wanderer and the Poet, the Solitary says “I forgot our Charge [the old man], as utterly / I 
then forgot him:—there I stood and gazed; / The apparition faded not away, / And I 
descended” to tend to the old man. The Solitary relates that the old man died shortly 
thereafter and was the dead man the two visitors thought was the Solitary. The Solitary, 
in effect, abandons his life-altering vision-in-progress in order to enquire after a dying 
man, who after his night out of doors during a storm would be unlikely to sing in praise 




that for the Solitary suffering people took priority over pretty vistas and transforming 
visions. Bates writes: “For the Solitary, the apparition is but an interlude in the course of 
a narration that is focused on humanity rather than nature and on suffering rather than 
glory” (70). 
Throughout the poem the Solitary argues that immersion in the natural world does 
not necessarily make better people. On two occasions in the poem, he points out an 
“easy-hearted” or “thriving” churl, a local rustic, whom the Solitary insists has only been 
made more ignorant and insensitive by his isolation from society and his tutelage by 
“nature” (V:231-50; VIII: 406-19). Or rather “second nature”: what the Solitary resists is 
nature as custom, nature that indoctrinates the rustic in the changeless, hierarchical 
structure of paternalistic society. By contrast, the Wanderer avoids the question of the 
ignorance-breeding poverty in the provinces of “merry England” and instead generalizes, 
and naturalizes, this poverty. “The poor you will have with you always,” he seems to say, 
echoing Jesus in the Christian Gospels (and the apostate Bishop of Llandaff in his 
infamous pamphlet of 1798, a reprint of a sermon based on that text). Like the sun that 
shines on the just and the unjust, “the generous inclination, the just rule, / Kind wishes, 
and good actions, and pure thoughts,” are possible for all (IX:241-42).  
No mystery is here; no special boon  
For high and not for low, for proudly graced  
And not for meek of heart. (IX:243-45).  
 
This mutability of grace and sorrow the Wanderer calls “true equality” (IX:248). This is 
an equality that does not disturb class distinctions; it is a leveling that Burke would bless. 
These are sentiments similar to those the Wanderer uttered in regards to the tragic 




For the Wanderer, personal virtue combined with conservative custom, rather than 
political reform or revolution, is the answer to England’s social ills. Thus, for him, the 
importance of national education, which is the subject of one of his longer harangues in 
The Excursion. Critics note that what Wordsworth likely had in mind here was the 
Madras system of the Anglican educator Andrew Bell, distinguished from a rival system 
developed by the Quaker educator Joseph Lancaster. The Madras system consisted of 
pupils being taught to teach other pupils in the lower forms. Simpson calls it “a strange 
mixture of Rousseau and Gradgrind; enlightened self-dependence and utilitarian 
efficiency constantly supporting each other” (196). Allison Hickey notes that “Bell’s 
monitorial system is based on a hierarchy of supervision,” which encourages students to 
discipline themselves and each other (109). Hickey continues: “The parallel to Jeremy 
Bentham’s ‘Panopticon’ is noteworthy, and it is not surprising that Bentham later looked 
to Bell and his competitor Lancaster in planning his own monitorial day school based on 
‘the Panopticon principle’” (109). The Madras system, according to Alan Richardson, 
was “a radical cure for England’s social ills and political unrest, a means for facilitating 
and justifying colonial expansion, and . . . a prop for that great edifice of stability, the 
Established Church” (95). Indeed, the Wanderer acknowledges that the purpose of such a 
system was to prevent “wild disorder,” to root out the “savage Horde among the civilized, 
/ A servile Band among the lordly free” (IX:305, 308-09). This system of national 
education will also lead to British colonial expansion, as Britain will ineluctably “cast off 
/ Her swarms, and in succession send them forth,” until  
. . . the smallest habitable Rock,  
Beaten by lonely billows, hear the songs  
Of humanized society; and bloom  





Hickey points out that the Wanderer’s harangues on industry, education, and 
imperial expansion “sometimes sound as though they have been lifted verbatim from 
tracts of the day (as some of them were)” (15). This is an important point. Wordsworth 
was not only making his apostasy public, but also addressing vital public issues in The 
Excursion. He was no longer hiding out in the hills and hollows of Grasmere valley, but 
engaging the public sphere. But the public sphere he addressed was one dominated by 
patricians and their proxies, eager to restore legitimacy in Britain. Whereas in earlier 
poems Wordsworth characterizes reclusion as something negative and anti-social, in The 
Excursion it represents the last vestige of republicanism and counter-publicity in 
Wordsworth, and his ambivalent dissent from the patrician project of legitimacy and the 
sycophancy this demanded, in the person of the Solitary.  
This was a point of controversy in the more conservative reviews: in the end, the 
Wanderer, the Poet, and the Pastor are unsuccessful in their attempt to coax the Solitary 
out of his reclusion and to reconcile him to the new, old order of Church and King. 
Wordsworth might have become a conservative Burkean, but the Solitary would not 
succumb to the mental virus, the “meme” of custom, as defined by the patrician class. 
Nature was not a haven from social conflict for the Solitary; it was instead, as it was for 
the republican Wordsworth, a signifier of suffering humanity. The Solitary, unlike the 
Poet and the Wanderer, rejects the public sphere, but only because by 1814 it had become 
a reactionary echo chamber, a space that encouraged conformity and demonized dissent 






The Supplement of Publicity: Wordsworth’s “Essay Supplemental” 
 
After The Excursion (and the bad notices) Wordsworth issued no additional 
segments of The Recluse, or any other major poems, but instead re-issued previously 
published poems, or published fugitive pieces written long before. In his 1815 collected 
works, especially, Wordsworth monumentalized himself in the form of a medium he once 
attacked—the print book—issued in multiple volumes, and priced for patricians. The 
ballad-monger became the bête blanc of elite bibliophiles. However his “Essay 
Supplemental” to Lyrical Ballads, inserted into the 1815 collected works, indicates a 
continued, albeit vexed, engagement with publicity. 
 With the “Essay Supplemental” Wordsworth used the public sphere to decry past 
attacks upon him (and other poets) in the public sphere.27
For Wordsworth, this idealized public is based on posterity—a visitation of the 
 He railed against the “senseless 
outcry” raised against his poetry: “I am not wholly unacquainted with the spirit in which 
my most active and persevering Adversaries have maintained their hostility; nor with the 
impudent falsehoods and base artifices to which they had recourse” (62). Wordsworth 
then offers a catalogue of other writers in the British literary canon who, Wordsworth 
claims, suffered similar treatment during their life-times. The solution to such neglect, 
according to Wordsworth, was for the poet to create his own idealized public: “Every 
author, as far as he is great and at the same time original, has had the task of creating the 
taste by which he is to be enjoyed; so has it been, so will it continue to be” (80).  
                                                          
27 Paul Magnuson notes that paratexts—such as Wordsworth’s “Essay Supplemental”—are inherently 
public. He writes: “Paratext as used in the Romantic period is much more than an entrance. It is also an 
exit, the road of allusion to other works; it points to and responds to a public discourse that indicates 
subjects of social and political concern” (5). Wordsworth was just one of many writers who used paratext 




present by the past. Wordsworth writes:  
lamentable is his error who can believe that there is any thing of divine 
infallibility in the clamour of that small though loud portion of the community, 
ever governed by factitious influence, which, under the name of the PUBLIC, 
passes itself, upon the unthinking, for the PEOPLE. Towards the Public, the 
Writer hopes that he feels as much deference as it is entitled to: but to the People, 
philosophically characterised, and to the embodied spirit of their knowledge, so 
far as it exists and moves, at the present, faithfully supported by its two wings, the 
past and the future, his devout respect, his reverence, is due. (82). 
The Public is spectral and factitious; by contrast the People, though representing 
“embodied spirit,” are real and will live on forever. The People are more or less a church 
with Wordsworth as the high priest; the Public is the contentious and carnal world 
doomed to destruction. But there are many indications in the essay that Wordsworth was 
not as Manichean as his words above suggest. He strove to be in the world but not of it. 
Or rather, as this chapter suggests, he strove to be in the public sphere but not of it. 
Jon Klancher remarks that in the 1815 “Essay Supplemental” “Wordsworth 
imagined a readership that may arise only by renouncing its place among the Public that 
never ceases to crave” (148). Andrew Franta argues that Wordsworth’s “rejection of ‘the 
Public’ in favor of an image of ‘the People’ strives to preserve the poet’s authority in the 
face of the emergence of a public world which makes it increasingly difficult to imagine 
the face-to-face encounter between poet and reader as anything more than an impossible 
ideal” (75). Both of these comments shed light on Wordsworth’s alienation from the 




Wordsworth was certainly not renouncing his place among the Public when he chose to 
publish his essay. And I would contend, in answer to Franta, that the People, 
“philosophically characterised,” are no more accessible to the poet than the no-longer-
knowable-community of readers. 
Andrew Bennett argues that Wordsworth replaces publicity with posterity, or 
what he calls “the Romantic culture of posterity.” Bennett cites the “Essay Supplemental” 
as a key text in this culture.28
This ambivalent reclusion was one of Wordsworth’s unique contributions to 
Romanticism, and the ambivalence more than the reclusion made it significant. By 1815 
Wordsworth was clearly a political apostate, but—as my reading of The Excursion should 
have made clear—he was not an un-conflicted, un-reconstructed recluse: he continued to 
engage publicity, albeit in spectral form. Simpson claims that in his poetry and prose 
Wordsworth addressed “some conscious and urgent questions to his contemporaries 
about the critical issues of his times. The private resolutions that so many of his poems 
seem to propose had a recognizable public import, against which privacy became 
variously a triumph and a defeat, at times something of both” (Historical Imagination 2). 
The same might be said about the public intentions of much of Wordsworth’s poetry: its 
 I do not contest that Wordsworth was a central figure in this 
culture of posterity,” or that this culture was Romantic. But what made it Romantic for 
Wordsworth was not a complete break with publicity, or a final retreat into privacy, with 
the understanding that the readers of the future would vindicate the poet. That is, 
Wordsworth’s ambivalent reclusion must be taken into account.  
                                                          
28 Bennett’s assessment of Shelley’s position on posterity also applies to Wordsworth. Bennett says of 
Shelley: “The poet’s engagement with a future life, with life after death, is bound up with his convulsive 
and hysterical reaction to or vision of ghosts. . . . Shelley’s cult of posterity . . . is also a ghost: his faith in 




publicity also “became variously a triumph and a defeat, at times something of both.” 
Wordsworth was an exemplar of a Romanticism that is both triumph and defeat because 
it is both public and private.  
By 1815 Wordsworth had seemingly retired from the public sphere—but not 
completely; he had ensconced himself in the private sphere, as prophet and patriarch of 
Rydal Mount—but not completely. He hovered—physically, mentally, existentially—
between public and private spheres. Wordsworth’s triumph (and defeat) was to make this 
inchoate, in-between discursive space not the habitation of the ghosts of past or future, 
but rather the home of flesh-and-blood denizens of a perpetual present. His Romantic 
contribution to literature (as well as his literary contribution to Romanticism) was to 
show that it is an engagement with this amorphous “both-and” slippage between public 





Chapter 3: Embattled Publicity in the Gothic Novels of William Godwin 
 
In The Spirit of the Age, William Hazlitt writes of the still-living William Godwin 
as if he were a ghost. Hazlitt declares that Godwin had achieved posthumous fame in his 
life-time, and that “he is to all ordinary intents and purposes dead and buried” (180). 
Hazlitt uses language and imagery reminiscent of the Gothic to describe how the 
reputation of Godwin, the prominent philosopher and epitome of reason, had deteriorated 
since the zenith of his fame in the early 1790s. Hazlitt writes: “Is the vaunted edifice of 
Reason . . . gorgeous in front, and dazzling to approach, while ‘its hinder parts are 
ruinous, decayed, and old’? . . . Now scarce a shadow of it remains, it is crumbled to dust, 
nor is it even talked of” (182). Godwin’s brain had become a haunted castle. But then 
Hazlitt suggests that perhaps the British public sphere had become a haunted castle, not 
Godwin: “Is this sun of intellect blotted from the sky? Or has it suffered total eclipse? Or 
is it we who make the fancied gloom, by looking at it through the paltry, broken, stained 
fragments of our own interests and prejudices?” (184). How then does the ghostly 
Godwin represent the spirit of the age? As a symbol of the decline of reason and the 
withering of publicity, expressed in Gothic terms.   
 It might seem strange that Hazlitt would associate Godwin the Enlightenment 
philosopher with the Gothic mode, which typically deals with the overthrow of rationality 
and the malevolent play of supernatural forces. But then Hazlitt was an admirer of 
Godwin’s Caleb Williams (1794) and St. Leon (1799), both considered Gothic novels. 
Godwin engaged the Gothic in other works as well, using the tropes and images of this 




relationship to the Gothic in the British public sphere in the 1790s and early nineteenth 
century, looking at the ways in which the Gothic was both a subject and a vehicle of 
public debate, and Godwin’s participation in that debate.  
In my reading of Caleb Williams, I explicate Godwin’s understanding of 
Enlightenment publicity, and how it was threatened in the 1790s by patrician 
reactionaries and plebeian radicals. Despite their different political orientations, Godwin 
saw the furtive activities of these groups in the public sphere as signs of the customary 
patrician-plebeian dynamic in eighteenth-century Britain, by which the British aristocracy 
maintained its hegemony. This publicity Godwin regarded anxiously as a spectral force, a 
Gothicized haunting of the public sphere. Godwin suggests that the powerful and their 
proxies—by co-opting popular media—were able to influence and inhibit rational public 
debate from the shadowy margins in the 1790s.  
St. Leon (1799), considered by critics as Godwin’s most conventional Gothic 
novel, reflects his exacerbated fears about patrician-plebeian publicity at the end of the 
1790s, when loyalist reactionaries had routed reformers from the public sphere. St. Leon 
was written in reply to the attacks of these reactionary critics following the publication of 
his Memoirs of the Author of the Vindication of the Rights of Woman, in 1798. St Leon 
also exhibits Godwin’s interest in Enlightenment historiography, which at the end of the 
1790s was problematized by its unstable relationship to the Gothic, the political attacks 
upon it following the French Revolution, and dysfunctional publicity. More importantly, 
in St Leon Godwin reconsidered some of the most important components of his version of 
Enlightenment publicity, including his belief in the progressive power of disinterested 




Next I look at Mandeville (1817), a historical novel that gestures towards the 
Gothic. I make the case that, with this conflicted novel, Godwin queried and contested 
many of his previous Enlightenment principles, including his conception of publicity. 
While I argue that in the end he did not abandon his principles, I contend that Godwin did 
use his novel to call into question the whole idea of political apostasy, which had become 
controversial the year Godwin published Mandeville. More importantly, Mandeville 
evinces a Godwin who is willing to cede space to the irrational in his fictions. Mandeville 
is an example of Godwin’s version of a new kind of “romantic” Gothic mode, by means 
of which he responded to the cultural conflicts of the early nineteenth century, and 
attempted to engage Walter Scott and Lord Byron, who also experimented with the 
Gothic. In this chapter, then, I show how in the early 1790s Godwin utilized the Gothic 
mode to intervene in debates in the public sphere between reformers and reactionaries, 
then later in the decade used it to reconsider some of his Enlightenment principles, and 
eventually publicly re-cast them in the nineteenth century, affiliating himself with what 
we now call Romanticism. 
 
Publicity, Enlightenment, and the Gothic, as they relate to Godwin 
 
Godwin’s political treatise of 1793, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, 
argued for the replacement of the old feudal order in Britain by a society of free 
individuals that used reason to discuss and settle shared concerns and disputes. In other 
words, he advocated that government be replaced by a public sphere based on 




Jürgen Habermas describes, in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, as the 
“classical” bourgeois public sphere. This public sphere challenges, and eventually 
replaces, the patrician “publicity of representation,” characterized by the rituals and 
divertissements of the nobility and the royal court (5-15). Habermas cites the eighteenth-
century British public sphere as the best example of his model of an enlightened public 
sphere.1
 Though his version of the public sphere closely resembles that of Habermas, 
Godwin’s version of enlightened publicity is based on three central Enlightenment 
concepts that Habermas does not discuss: benevolence, sincerity, and necessity. 
Benevolence, or acting on behalf of the greater good, was central to Godwin’s philosophy 
and was derived primarily from writers of the British Enlightenment such as Anthony 
Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, and Francis Hutcheson. In Political Justice, 
Godwin also calls it “disinterestedness,” “virtue,” or “justice.” He writes: “If justice is to 
have any meaning, it is just that I should contribute every thing in my power to the 
benefit of the whole” (I:81). Sincerity and necessity are related to Godwin’s cardinal 
principle of benevolence. Sincerity is scrupulous truth-telling, and in Political Justice 
Godwin posits the usual objections to this standard, and refutes them all. He shows how 
the principle of sincerity would encourage benevolent dealings in society, and discourage 
malevolent interventions.  
  
                                                          
1 In the first chapter of this study I listed some of the critical objections to Habermas’s model. I will not 
repeat them here, but I will assert that Godwin had many of the same blind-spots in regards to publicity. 
For Godwin, as it is for Habermas, the bourgeois public sphere was the public sphere, rather than just one 
public amongst others. And for Godwin, as it is for Habermas, it is Enlightenment rationality that guides 
the quest for truth in the public sphere. What this means is that, for both Godwin and Habermas, those who 





 Necessity is the idea, taken from John Locke and David Hartley, that the 
individual is determined by his or her sensations, experiences, and opinions. Godwin put 
it thus in Political Justice: “He who affirms that all actions are necessary, means that if 
we form a just and complete view of all the circumstances in which a living or intelligent 
being is placed, we shall find that he could not in any moment of his existence have acted 
otherwise than he has acted” (I:285). This means that people raised in squalor, if they are 
without instruction or hope of improvement, are much more likely to be thieves than 
philosophers. But, according to necessity, if people learn to identify their mistakes and 
change their habits—and if they are taught to read the right things—they can become 
perfect. Such perfectibility is “part of the natural and regular progress of mind,” and will 
lead to general enlightenment and social progress (I:50).  
 These three interconnected principles form the basis of Godwin’s conception of 
enlightened publicity. Without benevolence, enlightened discourse in the public sphere is 
not possible; mean-spirited attacks make a mockery of disinterested exchange. Similarly, 
public discourse that is not candid is counter-productive, and destructive of social comity. 
And, according to the doctrine of necessity, opinion is an integral building-block of the 
individual, and public opinion or publicity is an essential aspect of an enlightened 
society.  
 In his writings of the 1790s, Godwin suggests that this enlightened publicity was 
under attack. Following the lead of Edmund Burke in his Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, loyalists assailed French republicans and British fellow-travelers, associating 
them with the French Enlightenment. At the other end of the political spectrum, plebeian 




suggested the rise of indigenous sans culottes in Britain. This clearly disturbed Godwin 
as he wrote Political Justice; he especially feared the co-optation of the “mob” by 
patricians, who on more than one occasion in the eighteenth century were able to re-
direct the rage of the masses towards the bourgeois intelligentsia. For instance, there were 
the Gordon riots in London in 1780, which targeted Catholics and dissenters; and there 
were the Birmingham riots in 1791, in which the home and laboratory of Joseph 
Priestley—a dissenter who acclaimed the French Revolution—was destroyed. In both 
these cases, members of the patrician establishment were implicated in either spurring a 
plebeian mob to action, or turning a blind eye on the rampant destruction of property and 
person.  
For Godwin, because of their potential for “rough justice” and rioting, even 
plebeian reformers were suspect. Referring to such activists in Political Justice, Godwin 
expresses the fear that “the conviviality of a feast may lead to the depredations of a riot” 
(I:208). The rapidity with which many plebeians went from pro-Paine activists in 1792 to 
anti-Paine loyalists in 1793 was proof, to bourgeois writers such as Godwin, that plebeian 
activists could become patrician proxies. That is, Godwin thought that because of their 
penchant for violence, plebeian activists impeded reform and thus, wittingly or not, did 
the work of patricians threatened by reform. In short, Godwin considered patricians and 
plebeians—both loyalist and radical—as potential enemies of free, informed, and rational 
publicity.  
His attacks on plebeian activists made Godwin a divisive figure in the British 
public sphere at the end of the eighteenth century. As Ian Haywood notes, during the 




mass identity” (38). Haywood continues: “As a political philosopher and Dissenting 
intellectual, Godwin is prepared to risk prosecution for the radicalism of his ideas, but he 
distances himself from practical politics by invoking the stereotypical image of the mob. . 
. . [His] attack on the ‘multitude’ is as vicious as any loyalist smear: it presents plebeian 
politics in purely negative terms, as a politics of the baser sensations” (41). Similarly, 
Andrew McCann asserts that according to Godwin, the public sphere had become 
“pathological,” largely because of the increasing control of the press by reactionary state 
agents, and the rallies and writings of radical plebeian activists. 
What McCann refers to as pathological publicity I call “spectral publicity.” 
Spectral publicity is the anxious representation, in writing, of certain kinds of 
“illegitimate” public discourse that proceed under the cloak of secrecy. For Godwin, in 
Political Justice, it is the furtive infiltration of the public sphere, leading to the 
subversion of rational discourse. This socially destructive pseudo-publicity took various 
forms. There was John Reeves’s Association for Preserving Liberty and Property against 
Republicans and Levellers, a patrician front that harassed radical and liberal booksellers 
and the establishments that allowed reformist groups to meet. There were also periodicals 
in the pay of the state treasury that regularly attacked liberal publications. Godwin 
implies there are plebeian sources of spectral publicity. In an open letter to John Reeves, 
published in the Morning Chronicle in February 1793, Godwin (using the pseudonym 
“Mucius”) mentions some of these plebeian sources: “Pamphlets, tending to produce 
rancour and dissension, have been both sold at a trivial price, and distributed gratis. 
Hand-bills have been pasted upon the walls and dispersed in the streets. Absurd and 




buildings” (Uncollected Writings 115). He condemns Reeves for making use of “sneaky” 
plebeian media in his reactionary crusade. Godwin also suggests in his Mucius letters and 
other publications that both patricians and plebeians made use of rumor and innuendo to 
anonymously attack their enemies in the public sphere. This aspect of illegitimate 
publicity is described by Jon Klancher, in a reading of Arthur Young’s Travels in France, 
as dissemination. It is “a kind of negative circulation” in which words and ideas “flood 
through the interstices of the social network” (Making 34). Klancher adds: “What is 
disseminated ‘propagates’ or reproduces itself without the orderly expansion of 
circulation,” which makes it propaganda (Making 34). Circulation was legitimate 
publicity, dissemination was illegitimate.  
Informing Klancher’s conception of uncontrollable dissemination, and my own 
idea of spectral publicity as it relates to Godwin, is the Gothic. The Gothic informed the 
reactionary attacks upon reformers in the 1790s, many of whom were demonized, made 
monstrous, in loyalist tracts and reviews. It was also used to assail political reactionaries, 
standard-bearers of the old order. That opposing parties in public debates would use the 
Gothic to attack each other was not strange or anomalous in eighteenth-century Britain. 
Carole Margaret Davison notes that “‘Gothic’ was a much contested term that was 
undergoing a significant shift in meaning and value in eighteenth-century Britain” (25). 
Fred Botting elaborates that “the continuing ambivalence and polarisation of the word 
Gothic at the end of the eighteenth century was significant not only in the changes of 
meaning that it underwent but in its function in a network of associations whose positive 




Gothic figures were associated” (89). The Gothic could be popular or polite, conservative 
or liberal, reactionary or liberal. 
The uneasy nexus of Enlightenment and Gothic made the use of the Gothic 
problematic in the 1790s. Reactionaries and reformers alike used the slippery conceptions 
of the Gothic and the Enlightenment, and the slippage between them, for propaganda 
purposes. In terms of the reactionary uses of the Gothic, Edmund Burke was an 
exemplary figure. He was the leading promulgator of what Orrin Wang calls a “spectral 
poetics of revolution” or a “hauntology of revolution” (144, 147). According to Wang, in 
works such as Reflections on the Revolution in France Burke “both articulated and 
expelled, simultaneously” the Gothic ghost of revolution (144). That is, “Burke’s spectral 
descriptions of revolutionary reason are juxtaposed with his expression of the phantasmic 
logic of prejudices’s supplementary relation to the feudal era” (146). This “phantasmic 
logic” was as much satire as jeremiad, with Burke using the sensational plots and violent 
imagery of popular Gothic novels to mock and malign reformers. This is how many 
critics explain Burke’s famous account, in Reflections, of the journée to Versailles in 
1789, when a mob invaded the bed-chamber of Queen Marie Antoinette. In Burke’s 
account, the queen was the helpless victim assailed by monstrous, unsexed poissardes. 
This double-edged use of the Gothic to defend the feudal order and to smear reformers as 
violent interlopers I call “feudal Gothic.”2
On the other hand, Botting notes that British reformers who “responded to 
Burke’s revolutionary polemics with accusations directed at his Gothic ideas” used the 
  
                                                          
2 Because they tend to feature aristocratic protagonists and generally support aristocratic hegemony, I also 
classify more popular Gothic fictions (such as those of Anne Radcliffe) as iterations of feudal Gothic. 
Marilyn Butler, in Jane Austen and the War of Ideas, would agree with my characterization of Anne 
Radcliffe as conservative, but other critics, such as E.J. Clery and Robert Miles, would not. They regard 




Gothic to signify “everything that was old-fashioned, barbaric, feudal and irrationally 
ungrounded” (88). Gothic, for reformers in the early 1790s, meant the mystification of 
feudal power arrangements in ancien régime Britain. Godwin uses the Gothic in this way 
in Political Justice. In his novels, however, he suggests that the Gothic can be a vehicle 
of progressive reform, and welcomes the challenges offered to rationality by irrationality, 
acknowledging that only by such “collisions” in the public sphere is society reformed. 
This I refer to as “enlightened Gothic.”3
  
  
Caleb Williams  
 
When it was published in 1794, Things as They Are; or, The Adventures of Caleb 
Williams was widely regarded as an example of the Gothic mode, which made it all the 
more intriguing because the previous work issued by the author was a philosophical 
treatise. Frederick Frank claims that in Caleb Williams Godwin “contemporized the 
devices of Gothic fiction, horror, terror, incarceration, pursuit, harassment, nightmares, 
and intellectual villainy to expose a decadent society’s victimization of the individual” 
(116). Kenneth W. Graham elaborates on this: “In Caleb Williams, Godwin’s fearful 
Gothic reality is almost entirely generated internally. He demonstrates his creative grasp 
of the psychological Gothic by founding a series of Gothic motifs and images on the 
swarming thought and impressions of his characters. We find the hauntings, the demonic 
villains, the fearful threatenings, the passion and the violence that we expect in a Gothic 
                                                          
3 Godwin’s distinction between “feudal” and “enlightened” Gothic is similar to Mary Wollstonecraft’s 
distinction between “feudal” and “civic” sensibility, which I discuss in my chapter on Wollstonecraft. 
Given that the Gothic is often considered an outgrowth of the literature of sensibility, and that both Godwin 





novel, but all are psychologically generated” (132). Ann Maria Jones adds that “one of 
the cornerstones of Godwin’s political theory is the idea that political systems are 
inextricably linked to and formative of individual psychology—a main difficulty he seeks 
to address is how individuals, who are produced by their current flawed sociopolitical 
systems, might learn to move beyond the prejudices and misconceptions they have 
internalized” (139). 
My reading is similar to the critics mentioned above, though I would put it 
another way: in Caleb Williams Godwin uses the psychological preoccupations of the 
Gothic to examine, and expose, false consciousness. That is, Godwin uses the Gothic to 
dramatize how individuals—and, by extension, society—are prey to the “darker forces” 
of government and aristocracy, including the surveillance and harassment of the 
populace. Godwin intended to expose false consciousness, not mystify it the way many 
popular Gothic fictions did. In order to do this, he sets his story in the precarious present 
rather than the much safer past, and uses the conventions of the Gothic to parody the 
pretensions of the British ancien regime; Godwin also uses the Gothic to show the extent 
to which the corrupt values of the aristocracy had been internalized by the British 
populace. The former concern is represented by Count Ferdinand Falkland, and the latter 
by the plebeian Caleb Williams.  
In the novel Falkland is depicted, in his young adulthood, as the paragon of 
knightly virtue and honor. Speaking of him in the novel, Mr. Collins remarks that “there 
is a mysterious sort of divinity annexed to the person of a true knight” (166). Falkland 
exhibits what Habermas calls “representative publicity.” He is a god-like being that 




hear Falkland’s story, in which he shows gallantry in defending the honor of a young 
woman. He comes to the aid of another damsel in distress after he returns to Britain, but 
is humiliated by the ungallant, dishonorable squire Barnabas Tyrrel. Eventually 
Falkland’s nemesis, Tyrrel, is found murdered. Godwin writes of Falkland: “From this 
moment, his pride, and the lofty adventurousness of his spirit, were effectually subdued. 
From an object of envy he was changed into an object of compassion” (166). Referring 
particularly to Tyrrel’s physical attack upon Falkland (which preceded Tyrrel’s murder), 
Mr. Collins says that Falkland “was too deeply pervaded with the idle and groundless 
romances of chivalry, even to forget the situation, humiliating and dishonourable 
according to his ideas in which he had been placed” (166). That Falkland suffers from a 
grievous and secret wound is obvious to all, and just about everyone in the novel 
sympathizes with him. All of this makes Falkland a feudal Gothic hero.   
Then we discover, as the result of Williams’s detective work, that Falkland not 
only killed Tyrrel by stabbing him in the back, but also framed two innocent people for 
the murder, leading to their execution. This was done to preserve the honor of his noble 
name, which was apparently far more valuable than the lives of two peasants (and one 
squire). Then after Williams finds out that Falkland is an ignominious murderer, Falkland 
frames Williams for a robbery he did not commit, as a way to dispose of this 
inconvenient snoop. The feudal hero of volume one becomes the reactionary villain of 
volume two and three. But for most of the characters in the novel, Falkland is only a hero. 
When Williams attempts to expose Falkland’s crimes, no one will believe him, not even 
plebeian rustics or thieves. The integrity of the lord is sacrosanct and any that question 




Falkland is an instance of a type which concerned Godwin in his Gothic fictions: 
the misanthrope. This makes him the antithesis of Godwin’s conception of enlightened 
publicity. Having been frustrated in his benevolent actions, he becomes malevolent, 
particularly towards plebeians who resist his hegemonic power. In order to protect 
himself from scandal, Falkland abandons any pretense of sincerity and lies repeatedly, 
then commands others to lie to cover his own dishonesty. Falkland’s mission in life is to 
preserve “things as they are”; that is, he will do anything within his considerable power to 
protect feudal privilege. Thus he represents necessity in its darker aspect, as the process 
by which the old order is eternally preserved, and reform suppressed. And as an extension 
of his aggrandizing, aristocratic power, Falkland secretly co-opts plebeian publicity in 
order to control others and to inhibit enlightened publicity. This, for Godwin, is a 
pernicious form of spectral publicity. 
Falkland’s use of spectral publicity is depicted by Godwin as panoptical, 
suggesting that he is all-knowing and all-powerful.4
                                                          
4 More than one critic has analyzed Caleb Williams by making use of Michel Foucault’s evocation of 
Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon. While Bentham’s concept may be useful in this regard, Foucault’s use of it 
in Discipline and Punish is not. For Foucault the panopticon epitomized over-reaching, intrusive, hubristic 
Enlightenment instrumentality. For Godwin it represented the repressive power of the old feudal order that 
would be replaced by an egalitarian society based on Enlightenment principles. For instructive discussions 
of Foucault and the Gothic, see James P. Carson and Stuart Townshend. For a Foucauldian reading of 
Caleb Williams, see McCann (chapter 2).  
 Falkland’s panopticon is built not 
with bricks but with texts; and many of these texts can be found in Falkland’s library. In 
the novel, the recently orphaned Williams, a plebeian autodidact, is employed by 
Falkland to act as amanuensis and librarian. This brings him into contact with books of 
romance that celebrated aristocrats and their values. McCann notes that Williams “is 
ironically unaware of his proximity to the banal, innocuous and decentralized 




McCann’s adds that “these texts are instruments of . . . the state policing apparatus and of 
the public opinion that it co-opts as its greatest resource” (73). For this reason, Tilottama 
Rajan declares the novel “a work of political metafiction. Of all his novels it is the one 
that most clearly raises the question of the relationship between writing, reading, and 
political action” (“Secrets” 239). Williams is not only an unreliable reader, but an 
unreliable narrator. According to Rajan, the novel presents “the story of how Caleb 
becomes a spy in order to ‘divine’ the truth, and it thus creates an infinite regress in 
which his ‘truth’ is necessarily suspect” (“Secrets” 223).  
 What makes Williams susceptible to patrician indoctrination is his curiosity, 
which draws him to sentimental and sensational reading material. We learn of this when 
he introduces himself on the first page of the novel: “The spring of action which, perhaps 
more than any other, characterized the whole train of my life, was curiosity. It was this 
that gave me my mechanical turn. . . . It was this that made me a sort of natural 
philosopher” (4). So far, he sounds like a Godwin acolyte, devoted to reason and 
sincerity. But then Williams immediately follows this by relating: “In fine, this produced 
in me an invincible attachment to books of narrative and romance. I panted for the 
unravelling of an adventure, with an anxiety, perhaps almost equal to that of the man 
whose future happiness or misery depended on its issue. I read, I devoured compositions 
of this sort” (4). The budding philosopher had become the romance addict, showing that, 
in Caleb Williams, rationality and curiosity are counter-intuitively opposed.5
                                                          
5 Thus I disagree with Stuart Sim, who in his reading of Caleb Williams argues that “it will prove to be this 
trait of curiosity that the old order feels compelled to suppress at all costs: public inspection of its 
operations is the thing it wishes to happen” (125). The old order, as the novel makes clear, controls 





Later in the novel, Williams writes: “By a fatality for which I did not exactly 
know how to account, my thoughts frequently led me to the histories of celebrated 
robbers” (259). Such accounts are representative of a genre popular amongst plebeians, 
and were usually issued in chapbooks and handbills, which were the only media the 
poorer sort could afford. As Godwin depicts them, these works are as degraded and 
deceitful as those that celebrate chivalry and aristocracy. Kristen Leaver notes that 
Godwin shows his discomfort with romances and “penny-dreadfuls” (such as Williams’s 
robber narratives) by denigrating them in his novel. He offers as an alternative a 
“conversational” narrative which privileged Godwin’s ideal form of communication—the 
dyad (591). What made these works particularly dangerous was that they could be 
expropriated by the powers-that-be and used to contain dissent and impel compliance 
with the hegemonic order. 
 This becomes an important theme in the novel. While he is on the run from 
Falkland, Williams encounters hawkers selling handbills and chapbooks that depict him 
as “the notorious house-breaker, Kit Williams” (330). We eventually learn that the 
plebeian turncoat Gines, after being hired by Falkland, published the chapbook in order 
to help flush Williams from hiding (which it eventually did). In this manner, Leaver 
argues, Falkland “effectively puts [Williams] in his social place, countering what he feels 
to be Caleb’s outrages against class” (595). Similarly, McCann claims that the 
distribution of such “halfpenny legends” was part of the policing apparatus used by 
Falkland. They become “an extension of Falkland’s authority and panoptic omniscience,” 
and enlist “public outrage and invigilation as a crucial component of this apparatus” (73). 




use street literature to monitor and harass plebeian dissidents like Williams. Garrett 
Sullivan makes a similar claim, arguing that Caleb Williams depicts popular print culture 
as a tool of aristocratic indoctrination: “Godwin sees post-Revolutionary print culture not 
as an expanding set of practices to which writers of all classes have equal or near-equal 
access, but as another vehicle for upper-class power” (336). For this reason Godwin 
indicates that plebeians, because of their customary association with the aristocracy, 
could not be trusted, and should not be allowed to use the public sphere as a forum: one 
never knew to what extent they were motivated by reason, or by false consciousness.6
  Things, in other words, remain as they are—particularly if we consider Caleb 
Williams in terms of publicity that had been corrupted by incursions from above 
(patricians) and below (plebs), as part of a reactionary loyalist program devoted to 
preserving aristocratic hegemony. Godwin’s novel was an attempt to expose this co-opted 
publicity at a time when this was still possible, to spur his audience to think about how 
things could be. What he did not consider was that, for some, things as they are might be 
preferable to things that could be. At the end of the 1790s, what could be was an even 




                                                          
6 My position slightly differs from Sullivan’s in that I argue that Godwin does not condemn print culture en 
toto, but rather condemns only aristocratic and plebeian infiltration of print culture. Scarlet Bowen has a 
reading that is almost diametrically opposed to Sullivan’s reading, and mine. She claims that the Kit 
Williams chapbook is an empowering text, and evidence that Godwin was favorably inclined towards 
plebeian publicity. She writes: “Scholars who have considered Caleb Williams in the context of radical 
debates about whether to include plebeians in the political public sphere have ironically painted a picture of 
Godwin’s views that is remarkably similar to that of anti-Jacobin satire” (136). However, to claim that 
because Godwin condemns plebeian literature he is necessarily anti-Jacobin is fallacious. It is even more 
fallacious to say Godwin is pro-plebeian because popular publications such as the Kit Williams chapbook 
potentially “lend themselves both to hegemonic and subversive readings” (149). Perhaps, but in the novel 
they have a greater potential for use by patricians as loyalist propaganda, a reading that is consistent with 
Godwin’s discussion of the negative effects of plebeian publications and publicity in Political Justice, his 




Publicity, History, and the Gothic, as they relate to Godwin 
 
Godwin’s next novel after Caleb Williams was St Leon, published in 1799. This 
novel has many of the trappings of the Gothic, which I discuss in my reading below. But 
it is also a historical novel, set during the wars of religion in sixteenth-century Europe. 
This introduces a complication that is not a factor with Caleb Williams: history, 
particularly in relation to the Gothic and to Enlightenment philosophy. Enlightenment 
historiography is a hallmark of enlightened modernity, which, Stuart Townshend argues, 
“distinguishes itself through the dawning of a profound historical awareness” (1). In fact, 
he claims that “it is at the end of the eighteenth century that notions of history, historicity, 
and historiography, at least in their most recognizably modern forms, are invented” (2).  
In many of his earlier works Godwin exhibited an enlightened historicism—that 
is, historical inquiry based on scientific or empirical principles—but in the late 1790s he 
began to see the benefits of using fiction to explore historical subjects. In fact, in his 1797 
essay “Of History and Romance,” Godwin transposes history and fiction, showing how 
the novelist was better at writing history than the historian: 
The writer of romance then is to be considered as the writer of real history; while 
he who was formerly called the historian, must be contented to step down into the 
place of his rival, with this disadvantage, that he is a romance writer. . . . True 
history consists in a delineation of consistent human character, in a display of the 
manner in which such a character acts under successive circumstances. (Qtd. in 




Rajan shows that in the eighteenth-century, the novel defined itself in opposition to 
“romance,” which was considered an antiquated, patrician mode at the end of the century 
(Romantic Narrative 166-67). In Caleb Williams, Godwin clearly deplored the romance 
for this reason, so here he would seem to be appealing to a retrograde understanding of 
literature, but I would argue instead that he is critiquing the highly ideological “realism” 
on display in the politically conservative novels of the early nineteenth century, as well as 
skewed conceptions of history.  
Jon Klancher speaks to this in his reading of the essay. He writes: “Godwin 
forged a critique of Enlightenment universal history . . . and promoted in its place the 
reflexive historical romance as a superior mode of historiography capable of changing 
ideologies of modern history” (“Republican Romance” 147). This was part of Godwin’s 
struggle “to convert the conservative uses of romance against Enlightenment historicity 
into a new, reflexive, and progressive—if ultimately and paradoxically impossible—
mode of historical knowledge” (“Republican Romance”155). Godwin also proposed 
using the romance to “investigate, if ultimately to reinforce, the very distinction between 
‘public’ and ‘private’ upon which the British public sphere was built” (“Republican 
Romance”157).  
In her discussion of the essay, Clemit relates something similar: “Godwin’s 
primary concern with the pressures of politics and society on individual lives is reflected 
in a blend of psychological observation and political analysis which blurs the distinction 
between public and private concerns. This move beyond the study of inner states to 
explore historical causes opens up the possibility of reform” (49). That is, by “rejecting 




Godwin emphasizes the different kind of truth offered by an imaginative rendering of the 
past” (“Godwinian” 80). The fact that Godwin conducted a historical inquiry according to 
these principles in Gothic novels like St Leon should not be considered anomalous 
because, as most historians of the British Gothic point out, the mode evolved from the 
romance and the two terms (“romance” and “Gothic”) were used interchangeably in the 
eighteenth century.7
For both Clemit and Klancher, Godwin’s intermixture of romance and history, 
privacy and publicity, along with his historical and textual reflexivity, makes him 
Romantic. I will elaborate on this below. But here suffice it to say that St Leon evinces a 
very different agenda than Political Justice and Caleb Williams, and a very different 
attitude towards Enlightenment vis-à-vis history. Post-1798, in his Gothic fictions, 
Godwin called into question many of his bedrock, “enlightened” philosophical ideas. 
None of his contemporary critics went so far as to call him out as an apostate, but this 
was suggested by some reviewers. But for Godwin, changing one’s ideas—even (or 






In 1798, not long after the death of his wife Mary Wollstonecraft in childbirth, 
Godwin published his Memoirs of the Author of the Vindication of the Rights of Woman. 
This incited a firestorm of controversy in the public sphere, due to Godwin’s supposed 
                                                          





“indiscretions” about his recently-deceased wife, which provided an opening for 
reactionaries to smear both Godwin and Wollstonecraft as writers with French morals and 
sympathies. William St. Clair remarks that, following the publication of the memoirs: “At 
the moment of his deepest grief Godwin found himself one of the most hated men in the 
country, deserted by friends, and spat at in the streets” (192). This was not Godwin’s fate 
alone: at the end of the 1790s, “Jacobin” reformers were regularly attacked by “Anti-
Jacobin” activists, in person and on the page. St. Clair notes that “ever since Burke’s 
warnings the British conservatives had been gathering their strength. In 1798, with panic 
in the air, they were able to press their counterattack to a victory so complete and so 
decisive that it became dangerous to raise even the faintest protest” (192). Mark Philp 
adds that political reactionaries “had a near monopoly of propaganda, enforced by the 
sedition laws, and there was no need for other methods. But just as the French Jacobins 
had resorted to the guillotine when propaganda failed, everyone knew that the British 
Government had plentiful legal instruments for breaking necks if this should prove 
necessary” (196-7).  
Godwin’s initial response to this—what St. Clair calls his “counterattack”—was 
the novel St Leon, published in 1799 (210). This four-volume work features the tale of a 
sixteenth-century French noble named Reginald de St Leon who acquires from a 
mysterious stranger the alchemist’s “philosopher’s stone” and elixir vitae which, 
respectively, gives him the ability to produce gold at will and grants him immortality. 
These boons have disastrous consequences for St Leon and his family. St Leon himself is 
reduced to wandering Europe under various guises and pseudonyms, trying to use his 




ignorance, greed, and fear. In that Godwin makes use of the supernatural paraphernalia 
common to Gothic novels (philosopher’s stone, elixir vitae, but also uncanny or 
monstrous strangers, haunted castles and prisons, conspiracies, and Catholic superstition), 
critics consider St Leon Godwin’s most conventional exercise in the Gothic.8
In St Leon, Godwin interrogated—quite as fiercely as the title character’s 
tormentors—the possibility of enlightened publicity. Since St. Leon is set during the 
sixteenth-century, there is nothing resembling the rational public sphere that Habermas 
(or Godwin) describes. There is, however, something that predates Enlightenment 
publicity: the representative publicity of the aristocrat, combined with the forms of 
dissemination used by plebeians. The novel begins with an account of a pseudo-medieval 
pageant featuring the young and resplendent Henry VIII of England and Francis I of 
France at the “Field of the Cloth of Gold” in 1520—“a scene of the most lavish splendor 
that the world perhaps ever contemplated” (5). The young Reginald de St Leon is a 
spectator, along with the flower of English and French aristocracy. St Leon remarks: 
“The splendor of the dress that was worn upon this occasion exceeds almost all 
credibility. Every person of distinction might be said in a manner to carry an estate upon 
his shoulders” (5).  
  
Publicity here is nothing more or less than panoply and pomp, the aura of 
aristocracy, in which power was communicated and maintained by external indicators: by 
                                                          
8 Some critics, such as Gary Kelly and Pamela Clemit, argue that Godwin retreated from political 
engagement and was preoccupied instead with Romantic social alienation in St Leon (Kelly, “English 
Fiction,” 36-37; Clemit, introduction to St Leon, xx). However, critics such as James P. Carson argue to the 
contrary that Godwin’s novel is quite political: “Godwin’s St Leon . . . establishes a clear analogy between 
the Spanish Inquisition’s suppression of heresy and the Pittite repression of political radicalism in the 
England of the 1790s” (262). The novel is also quite critical of riches and war, as well as European 
aristocracy and a fanatical Catholic Church; as in Caleb Williams, Godwin uses Gothic conventions to 
expose the corruption at the heart of the ancien regime. But as this section should make clear, Godwin’s 





dress, bearing, refined manners, and armorial insignia. All this St Leon loses to a 
gambling addiction and spends the rest of the novel trying to buy back for himself and his 
family. He is thwarted in this by those who believe he had besmirched his public persona 
as aristocrat, and the aristocracy itself. These antagonists use the communication 
channels available to them to keep St Leon permanently outside the golden circle of 
aristocratic command. Whenever St Leon believes himself free from such imputation, by 
way of indiscretion or rumor he is found out and is forced to flee. These rumors shadow 
St Leon in ways similar to the ways in which innuendo shadowed Caleb Williams, and 
Godwin himself at the end of the 1790s.  
St Leon also has to contend with the indiscretion and rumors, the illegitimate 
pseudo-publicity, of the common folk. Wherever he goes, people of the lower orders are 
suspicious and think St Leon is in league with the devil. This is usually because they have 
been fed false information by powerful patricians. The most dramatic example of this in 
the novel occurs when St Leon moves with his family to Pisa. At the impetus of a local 
aristocrat named Agostino, a mob assails them. St Leon tries to reason with the mob but 
is pelted with mud and shouted down. St Leon recounts: “It was a critical moment, a last 
experiment upon the power of firmness and innocence to control the madness of 
infuriated superstition. It was in vain. I was deafened with the noise that assailed me. It 
was no longer shouts and clamours of disapprobation. It was the roaring of tigers, and the 
shriek of cannibals” (285). The plebeian mob burns down his house and then proceeds to 
torture and kill St Leon’s Negro servant, Hector. This Gothic scene evokes the memory 
of the Birmingham riots in 1791, but it is also reminiscent of some of the more 




(even more) demonized versions of the plebeians that Godwin describes in Political 
Justice and Caleb Williams. In this scene in St Leon, Godwin shows once again the 
dangers inherent in a customary plebeian-patrician alliance; however, he offers no 
enlightened publicity to counter it.  
This may be Godwin’s commentary on pre-Enlightenment publicity in Europe, 
but it could just as easily be a statement about post-Enlightenment publicity in Britain 
following the de facto shutdown of the reformist public sphere in the late 1790s. In any 
case, with representative and plebeian publicity running rampant without check from a 
bourgeois intelligentsia, St Leon can be read as a withdrawal from the kind of enlightened 
public sphere that Godwin championed in earlier works. Enlightenment publicity seems 
to be replaced in the novel with the domestic intimacy of the home, represented by the 
discussions between St Leon and his long-suffering wife, Marguerite de Damville. 
Readers of St Leon, both sympathetic and unsympathetic, see in Marguerite a 
portrait of Mary Wollstonecraft.9
                                                          
9 St. Clair argues that Marguerite is an ideologically-inflected caricature of Wollstonecraft: “As if in 
expiation of the impiety of the Memoirs, St Leon is a celebration of the traditional feminine virtues. 
Marguerite is loyal, supportive, forgiving, long-suffering, domestic, motherly, religious, and lacking in any 
kind of overt sexuality. If she shares any authentic features of the real Mary Wollstonecraft they cannot 
now be detected. If Marguerite is the culmination of the perfecting policies recommended in Political 
Justice, few people of either sex would wish to accelerate the process” (211). 
 Compared to the version offered by Godwin in the 
Memoirs, the Wollstonecraftian Marguerite is a paragon of domesticity, which Godwin 
associates with apolitical privacy. St. Clair contends that “the portrait of Marguerite was 
intended to signal an important recantation. In the Preface to St Leon, Godwin publicly 
withdrew his previous view that personal considerations should carry no weight in the 
impartial calculation of justice” (211). That is, he distances himself from his own 




how to act in order to benefit the most people possible. This is also known as “universal 
benevolence,” something that was regularly attacked by those who saw the more intimate 
domestic affections as the basis of social good.10 In the 1790s, these latter critics 
attributed the idea of universal benevolence to conspiratorial groups like the Illuminati, 
who were supposedly devoted to the destruction of family ties in the name of universal 
harmony. 11
In the preface to St Leon, Godwin writes: “Some readers of my graver productions 
will perhaps, in perusing these little volumes, accuse me of inconsistency; the affections 
and charities of private life being every where in this publication a topic of the warmest 
eulogium, while in the Enquiry concerning Political Justice they seemed to be treated 
with no great degree or indulgence and favour” (xxxiii). Godwin claims his central 
premises in that work have not changed; however, he now apprehends that “domestic and 
private affections [are] inseparable from the nature of man . . . and [he is] fully persuaded 
that they are not incompatible with a profound and active sense of justice” (xxxiv). 
Though Godwin did not characterize this new position as a recantation, some of his 
contemporary reviewers did.
 This Gothic theme finds its way into quite a few feudal Gothic and Anti-
Jacobin novels.  
12
This is not the only way that Godwin backs away from the principles of Political 
Justice in St. Leon. Godwin also reconsiders the core Enlightenment tenets of 
benevolence, sincerity, and necessity, which together comprise his version of enlightened 
  
                                                          
10 This is discussed by Chris Jones in Radical Sensibility, Chapter 1 (“Varieties of Sensibility”).  
11 The two works that initiate and attempt to document this claim are John Robison’s Proof of a Conspiracy 
against all the Governments of Europe (1797) and Abbé Barruel’s Memoirs, Illustrating the History of 
Jacobinism (1797-98).  
12 For instance, in the Broadview edition of St Leon William Brewer notes that “in an 1800 review of St 
Leon [in The Monthly Review] Christopher Lake Moody argues that the novel recants ‘some of the leading 




publicity. One of the main themes of St. Leon is the futility of benevolence. I have 
already described above how Godwin, in emphasizing domestic affections, retreated from 
the ideal of universal benevolence. This is thematized in other ways in the novel. For 
instance, after using his alchemical gifts to save his family from starvation and poverty, 
St Leon devotes himself to works of benevolence. He goes to Hungary, devastated by 
wars between Christians and Muslim Turks, builds houses for peasants, and attempts to 
revive moribund industry. As a result of his pains, St Leon (using the name de Chatillon) 
is considered by the peasants an interloper with a hidden, selfish agenda; a subversive by 
the Turkish authorities; and a traitor by the Hungarian Christians—including his son 
Charles, a soldier of fortune on the side of the Christians. St Leon reflects: “I had looked 
for happiness as a result of the benevolence and philanthropy I was exerting; I found only 
anxiety and a well grounded fear even for my personal safety. Let no man build on the 
expected gratitude of those he spends his strength to serve!” (382).  
St Leon’s benevolent efforts, once again, land him in jail. He is imprisoned in the 
labyrinthine dungeon underneath the castle of Turkish partisan Bethlem Gabor. Gabor, 
depicted as a tormented Gothic villain residing in the obligatory spooky castle, was once 
a good man but turned evil after his family was murdered and his previous castle 
destroyed. Gabor is at first the subject of St Leon’s philanthropy; this Gabor secretly 
resents. St Leon’s crime, in the eyes of Gabor, is precisely his benevolence. St Leon gives 
and gives even after he is insulted and scorned, which Gabor considers unmanly. Gabor 
tells St Leon “You took upon yourself to be the benefactor and parent of mankind. . . . I 
was compelled to witness or to hear of your senseless liberalities every day I lived. Could 




kindness produces no responsive affection, and injustice no swell, no glow or 
resentment” (416). Gabor is, like Falkland in Caleb Williams, a misanthrope, the 
malevolent anti-type of enlightenment publicity, according to Godwin. Godwin also 
suggests that, as a result of his own misadventures, St Leon himself becomes a 
misanthrope. According to Rajan, St Leon “is very much a figure of the Enlightenment, 
both in its more benevolent aspects and in those critiqued by Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer in their Dialectic of Enlightenment” (146).13
Godwin seems equally skeptical of the principle of sincerity, another core 
principle of his Enlightenment philosophy. As already mentioned, a condition of St 
Leon’s acquisition of the philosopher’s stone and elixir vitae was a vow of silence, which 
alienated him from his family and friends. This small seed of silence grows into a forest 
of lies. To do any good at all, St Leon has to continually change his name, his back-story, 
even his costume. St Leon will not even elaborate upon his experience in the jails of the 
Inquisition because he was forced to take a vow of silence, which he inexplicably honors 
long after he has escaped the horrors he encountered there. Clemit points out that 
“although at the start of the narrative St Leon protests his sincerity, he later dismisses the 
possibility of openness with his audience” (St Leon xxii). She goes on to note that “the 
 Misanthropy is the dark side of 
the Enlightenment, its Gothicization.  I will have more to say about the figure of the 
misanthrope when I discuss Mandeville below, but suffice it to say that in St Leon 
Godwin exhibits a very skeptical attitude towards the ideal of benevolence, and a public 
sphere activated by this ideal.  
                                                          
13 I refuted above the contention that in Caleb Williams Godwin offers a critique of Enlightenment 
instrumentality, the bête noire of the Frankfurt School. But here I admit that there is something of this 
critique in St Leon. I will also note that Godwin’s suspicion of popular media anticipates a similar suspicion 




gaps and equivocations in St Leon’s narrative undercut expectations of frankness and 
sincerity in human dealings,” and in fact make him an unreliable narrator (xxii). Rajan 
adds: “St Leon crystallizes [the] problem of conveying private judgment into the public 
sphere, as the aporia produced when Godwin, who espouses Enlightenment values of 
frankness and public discussion, uses a character like St. Leon to convey his ideas” 
(163).14
Also key to Godwin’s Enlightenment thought is the principle of necessity. In St 
Leon, Godwin does very little to expose how people are blighted by prejudice, and he 
holds out little hope for perfection. Basically, in the novel Godwin suggests that people 
are the way they are and will never change. This is expressed by Bethlem Gabor. Gabor 
hates mankind rather than just the murderers of his family, because, he suggests, people 
are the same everywhere: “All men, in the place of these murderers, would have done as 
they did. They are in league together. Human pity and forbearance never had a harbour 
but in my breast; and I have not abjured them. With something more of inwrought vigour 
and energy, I will become like to my brethren” (415). Earlier in the novel, following the 
destruction of St Leon’s home in Pisa, the aristocratic marchese Filosanto expresses 
similar sentiments. He laments “that there was a principle in the human mind destined to 
be eternally at war with improvement and science. No sooner did a man devote himself to 
the pursuit of discoveries which, if ascertained, would prove the highest benefit to his 
 
                                                          
14 There is one character in St Leon that is scrupulously sincere in the ways Godwin advocates in Political 
Justice. This is Hector (mentioned above), who was one of St Leon’s jailers in Constance. When St Leon 
attempts to bribe Hector, Hector is compelled to turn him in. For his honesty, Hector is imprisoned himself. 
When he is released he becomes St Leon’s servant and later is responsible for an unwitting indiscretion that 
endangers St Leon’s family. As a result, when they are beset by a mob in Pisa, Hector feels it is his duty to 
protect St Leon’s property; he ends up being slaughtered by the mob. Sincerity, in the case of Hector, 
indirectly results in an unspeakably horrible death. St Leon, rather than an explication of sincerity, is a 




species, than his whole species became armed against him” (290). This “dark” necessity 
leads ineluctably to the repression of revolutionary aspirations.  
The idea that nothing really changes is always to the benefit of those in power, 
and is often based on a static view of history. As mentioned above, St Leon is not just a 
Gothic novel but a historical novel. But its historicism is not teleological or progressive, 
as it is in Enlightenment thought, but rather cyclical and unchanging, as it is in medieval 
or feudal thought. The individuals mentioned in the paragraph above (Bethlem Gabor and 
marchese Filosanto) express this feudal conception of history in their despairing 
assessments of humanity. In this novel set in the period of the Reformation, Godwin 
implies that true reformation is not possible because historical progress is not possible. 
History is cyclical, “a state of ebb and flow”; in the future, “men shall learn over again to 
persecute each other for conscience sake; other anabaptists or levelers shall furnish 
pretexts for new persecutions; other inquisitors shall arise in the most enlightened tracts 
of Europe” (338). This suggests that Godwin considered his experience of irrational 
persecution in the public sphere as something to be expected in the order of things, as a 
recurring pattern. Reaction leads to reaction leads to reaction, as the pendulum of public 
opinion precipitously swings back and forth forever. Thus, in St Leon Godwin uses the 
Gothic mode to recant some aspects of his conception of both Enlightenment publicity 
and Enlightenment historiography. However, this is not the same thing as political 







Publicity, the Gothic, and Romanticism, as they relate to Godwin 
 
Romanticism and the Gothic have been linked since the nineteenth century, when 
critics generally viewed them as two aspects of the same phenomenon. However, with the 
rise of interest in Romanticism in the twentieth century, critical appreciation of the 
Gothic declined. For those particularly indisposed to the Gothic, it was seen as a 
corruption of Romanticism: the Gothic went from legitimate to illegitimate relation of 
Romanticism. For others, the Gothic was a “juvenile” phase of Romanticism, but without 
value otherwise. Maggie Kilgour asserts that for these critics the Gothic was “a 
transitional and rather puerile form which is superseded by the more mature ‘high’ art of 
superior Romantics” such as Coleridge, Keats, and Byron (3). This was the attitude of 
Robert D. Hume in 1969 when he argued that Romanticism needed to be sealed off from 
the Gothic to protect it from contamination. More recently, Geoffrey Hartman has made a 
similar argument.15
                                                          
15 See Geoffrey Hartman, “The Psycho-Aesthetics of Romantic Moonshine: Wordsworth’s Profane 
Illumination” (cited in Wang, Romantic Sobriety, 142). 
 However, amongst Romanticists working on the Gothic this 
perspective has become anomalous. Michael Gamer, for one, has attempted to break 
down the strict separation between the Gothic and Romanticism; he sees the relationship 
between the Gothic and Romanticism as dialectical, in which Romantic aesthetics 
develop in reaction to the Gothic. Orrin Wang argues that “Romanticism and the gothic 
are intimately connected,” and maintains that the abraded border between Romanticism 
and the Gothic provides a good deal of the energy driving the British Romantic 




Romanticism and the Gothic, while differentiating between male and female conceptions 
of the Gothic.   
More politically engaged critics have come to see the Gothic, in Davison’s words, 
as the “early or radical left-wing branch of Romanticism,” otherwise known as “Dark 
Romanticism” (7-8). Beginning with David Punter in 1980, followed by critics such as 
Botting and Townshend, new historicist scholars have contributed to the consideration of 
the relationship between Gothic and Romanticism. However, in regards to Godwin, I 
object to some of the findings of new historicist scholarship. In general terms, Romantic 
new historicists tend to view a “turn to history” or to the past as an evasion of politics. 
They also tend to associate Romanticism with the same evasion. I have already responded 
above to the criticism that Godwin evaded politics in his historical/Gothic fictions. Here I 
make the same answer to those who claim Godwin’s turn to Romanticism—in novels like 
Mandeville—indicates political evasion or retreat. Even though Godwin critiques the 
Enlightenment in St Leon, he does so in an attempt to find a discourse that would link or 
fuse private feeling and public engagement. I argue that this discourse is a politically 
progressive Romanticism that recuperates many Enlightenment principles, and that 
Godwin is one of the first to articulate it. His essay “Of History and Romance”—where 
he argues that fiction is better than facts in elucidating history because it reveals the 
individual, psychological development of historical actors—was one of his first attempts. 









In 1817, Godwin published Mandeville, a historical novel set in seventeenth-
century Britain, at the time of the English Civil War and the ensuing Commonwealth. 
The central figure, and narrator, is Charles Mandeville, the misanthropic heir to a large 
estate. In the novel Mandeville relates his personal development and eventual 
disintegration—due to horrific violence, vicious fanaticism, and political opportunism—
from his early youth until the age of eighteen. For that reason, and for the reasons 
elucidated below, Mandeville is a novel that utilizes the Gothic in significant ways. What 
keeps other critics from labeling the novel as Gothic—besides the fact that the novel has 
attracted very little critical attention—is that Godwin once again enlists the Gothic in 
defense of the principles of enlightened publicity which he elucidated in Political Justice. 
Given that 23 years separate these two works, and that Mandeville is more properly a 
historical novel, we can expect this defense to be different, and it is. The main difference 
between the two works is that in Mandeville Godwin not only attacks the feudal order in 
Britain but also affirms a Romanticism that reforms and reconstitutes his Enlightenment 
philosophy for a new century.  
As with St. Leon, Mandeville is set before there is a bourgeois or “classical” 
public sphere. There are, nonetheless, varieties of publicity on display: representative and 
plebeian, legitimate and illegitimate, concrete and spectral. We can read the novel as both 
a historicization of British publicity, and as commentary by analogy upon the embattled 
public sphere of the first quarter of the nineteenth century. The character Mandeville 




to a future in which he will take up his public role as patrician. He expects to be judged 
by his beautifully caparisoned person, by his illustrious name, and values his family 
honor above all things. Instead, he is brought low by innuendo and rumor, which are 
components of the shadow-side of representative publicity, and indicative of a fledgling, 
pre-enlightened public sphere in seventeenth-century Britain.  
Mandeville comes to believe that all publicity is spectral, though it is he for the 
most part that Gothicizes publicity in his first-person account. Everything he hears and 
reads (he believes) is part of a vast conspiracy designed to drive him mad. In this he is 
not completely paranoid. Early on in the story Mandeville describes his perfervid perusal 
of Fox’s Acts and Monuments of the Church, whose famously gory illustrations depict 
“all imaginable cruelties, racks, pincers and red-hot irons, cruel mockings and 
scourgings, flaying alive,” which are employed against Protestants by Catholics (I:136). 
Mandeville admits that the book “kept me awake whole nights, that drove the colour 
from my cheeks, and made me wander like a meagre, unlaid ghost” (I:136). At the end of 
volume I (chapter 12) he has trouble with another book, a collection of satirical prints 
mocking King Charles I, then a prisoner awaiting execution. This book is planted in 
Mandeville’s rooms in Winchester School by his only friend there, Waller. Waller knows 
that Winchester School is rabidly royalist, and not wanting to be discovered with the 
book, hides it in Mandeville’s rooms, where it is found. It leads to a trial for Mandeville 
before a student jury. This is a turning point in the novel, as Mandeville is found guilty, 
his name blackened, his person forever suspect. His unearned infamy shadows him 




At the beginning of the third volume, Mandeville comes across a copy of an early 
newspaper, the Mercurius Politicus, which increases his mental darkness. He learns from 
this newspaper that his bête-noire, Clifford, has renounced Protestantism and become 
Catholic. At first this thrills Mandeville because Clifford’s apostasy gives Mandeville 
justification for his hatred of Clifford; but later when Clifford’s apostasy is discounted 
and more or less forgotten, it crucially exacerbates the madness of the fanatical 
Mandeville. Godwin suggests that this is illegitimate dissemination as opposed to 
legitimate circulation, and in so doing exposes the corruption at the heart of aristocratic 
representative publicity.  
Unlike in Caleb Williams and St Leon, Godwin depicts this spectral publicity 
reflexively and critically: it represents Mandeville’s anxiety concerning publicity, rather 
than Godwin’s. Mandeville is also distinct from the two previous Gothic novels in that 
Godwin offers an alternative to spectral publicity. This enlightened publicity is 
represented by Mandeville’s devoted sister, Henrietta. Like Marguerite in St Leon, 
Henrietta is arguably a portrait of Mary Wollstonecraft. But whereas the portrait in St 
Leon turns Wollstonecraft into a victim immured in the domestic, her portrait in 
Mandeville makes her out to be an Enlightenment philosopher urging public engagement 
from the redoubt of the domestic. In most of a long chapter in volume II, while visiting 
Charles in a madhouse, Henrietta revisits many of Godwin’s burning concerns in the 
1790s.  
Before I tend to these concerns, however, I need to discuss the passage that 
provides the text for Henrietta’s sermon: Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, 




Enlightenment, enormously popular in the eighteenth-century, examines the relations 
between virtue, sensibility, and political liberty. The eighteenth-century Scottish 
philosopher Francis Hutcheson built his philosophy of universal benevolence upon the 
ideas of Shaftesbury, and Godwin’s system of political justice is based on the ideas of 
both men. Noting that it is one of the favorite passages of Henrietta and Charles, Godwin 
excerpts a segment in which two unnamed figures debate universal benevolence. The first 
figure declares his preference for friendship over citizenship, and makes clear his 
indifference to public opinion. The second figure argues that friendship is not enough and 
that true happiness is not possible without a benevolence that extends to as many people 
as possible. He says “consider then, what it was you said, when you objected against the 
love of mankind . . . and seemed to scorn the public, because of its misfortunes! For, 
where can generosity not exist, if not here?” (II:139).16
The dialogue taken from Shaftesbury could be read as a fanciful recreation of a 
debate between Shaftesbury and Thomas Hobbes, who disdained public benevolence, 
seeing it as delusional in the “war of all against all.”
 As Chris Jones notes, Shaftesbury 
“stressed the necessity of keeping the partial affections like those to kindred under the 
direction of universal benevolence which sought the good of the widest system of which 
man was a part” (Radical Sensibility 61).  
17
                                                          
16 In Radical Sensibility, chapter 2, Chris Jones describes the ideas of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson on 
universal benevolence, and the controversy these ideas engendered in the 1790s when sensibility came to 
be associated by loyalists with subversion. 
 It could also be read as a late-
eighteenth-century debate between those who championed domestic affections and 
attacked universal benevolence, and those like Godwin who saw universal benevolence—
17 The shady lawyer Holloway, who does his utmost to deprive Mandeville of his inheritance, is arguably a 
personification of Hobbes. He gives a long speech in praise of greed in volume II, chapter 5, which begins: 




including domestic affections—as the praxis of perfectibility. Through Shaftesbury, 
Godwin re-engages the critics who attacked him in the 1790s; he had not given up this 
fight, and still declares for universal benevolence. But this time Godwin historicizes 
benevolence, showing how it derives from an indigenous, British Enlightenment 
represented by the well-respected figure of Shaftesbury.18
Henrietta decides that Charles’s disease is misanthropy and the cure is universal 
benevolence. Or as she puts it: “We are all exactly fitted to contribute to the good of all” 
(II:139). Henrietta, like Godwin, sees benevolence in relation to necessity. She exclaims: 
“Man is but a machine! He is just what his nature and his circumstances have made him; 
he obeys the necessities which he cannot resist. . . . Give him a different education, place 
him under other circumstances . . . and he would be altogether a different creature” 
(II:143). If we practice justice, we will become perfect, and when enough people do this, 
society will become perfect. But if we continue to believe the lies of the aristocracy, and 
submit to them, society will be but one large prison. That is, without enlightened 
discourse, without enlightened publicity, perfect people and a perfect society are 
impossible. And sincerity is a necessary ingredient in any scheme of perfectibility. 
Henrietta is scrupulously sincere, and tries in vain to get Charles to be more so. In her 
mind, open, enlightened discussion is based on the presupposition that “the words that 
 And by putting these 
sentiments in the mouth of Henrietta, who argues (as did Mary Wollstonecraft) that there 
was no real separation between the public and the private spheres, Godwin romanticizes 
benevolence as well.  
                                                          
18 In a note at the end of volume II, Godwin admits that the passage from Shaftesbury comes from a work 
published after the events in the novel (in 1711). That Godwin would make use of such an anachronism, 
and admit to it, strongly suggests that he was addressing issues under debate in the public sphere, or 




[someone] utters may be supplied by that reason, to which the high and the low, the rich 
and the poor, have equally access” (II:149).  
In the dyad she forms with Charles, Henrietta performs the publicity that she 
extols. We see this when Charles makes an extended visit to his sister at Beaulieu, in the 
New Forest. Henrietta lives with Mrs. Willis, and her retired-sailor husband, and is 
friends with the Montagu family, who are local gentry. The discussion of this unassuming 
group—which includes reports of books read, and letters exchanged—is largely 
responsible for Henrietta’s enlightened views. Charles himself describes Beaulieu in 
these words: “Everything I saw was frank, and easy, and communicative, and sensitive, 
and sympathetic. It was like the society of ‘just men made perfect,’ where all sought the 
good of all, and no one lived for himself, or studied for himself” (I:210-211).  
But in the end Charles the patrician cannot or will not exchange the splendid but 
corrupt representative publicity of the aristocrat—though he is victimized by it in terms 
of the rumor and innuendo that shadow him—for the more modest benefits of 
transparent, enlightened discourse. He becomes instead a misanthrope, the antipode of 
Enlightenment publicity. After his hatred of Clifford makes his life impossible, 
Mandeville embraces malevolence as his mission in life. He is unable to be sincere with 
any human being, though he comes closest with Henrietta. His adherence to necessity 
shows itself in his Presbyterian belief in pre-destination, which does not allow for 
perfection but rather election: only God is perfect, a small remnant will be saved but only 
due to God’s grace, and the mass of men are condemned to eternal hellfire. In his mind, 




delusion and damnation, rather than enlightenment or salvation. In short, Mandeville is a 
case study of the aristocrat who, by ignoring enlightened publicity, becomes a monster.   
In Mandeville Godwin focuses on the religious roots of the Gothic. They are the 
same, in fact, as Godwin’s religious roots in Presbyterianism, the sect in which he was 
raised and was a minister for some years, before abandoning his beliefs (after reading the 
French philosophes). Mandeville is clearly obsessed and deluded by his extremely 
morbid religion. He refers to the “satanic rebellions” and the “carnival of diabolical 
suggestions” by which he is beset (III:17, 25). He constantly evokes apocalyptic 
scenarios taken from the Bible, particularly the Book of Revelation. These ravings are not 
inspiring, but rather dispiriting, for the reader. But what are we to make of all this, 
coming from the mouth of a self-confessed madman, the ultimate unreliable narrator? 
Godwin’s Gothic exhibits a self-consciousness here, showing the contingency and falsity 
that underlie the mode, cueing the reader to interrogate the account that is being read. In 
this way Godwin uses the Gothic mode to show how religion can be Gothicized, made to 
serve political and ideological ends.   
Mandeville is not the only one to use the Gothic in this way. His fanatical tutor, 
the “evil genius” Hilkiah Bradford, Gothicizes Catholicism. Mandeville relates that 
Bradford “was particularly shocked with the unbounded usurpations and arbitrary power 
of the church of Rome” which he compares to the Beast and the Whore of the Biblical 
Book of Revelation (I:125). Mandeville continues: “My preceptor was further revolted at 
the sanguinary character of the church of Rome. She put the dagger into the hands of her 
votaries, and caused them to commit innumerable massacres” (I: 125). The royalist 




demonize opponents. Her particular animadversion is Oliver Cromwell, who is Lord 
Protector during the time the novel is set. She calls him “the special pupil and ward of 
devils” and goes on to compare him to sea-monsters and lamiae (II:64-65). Here Godwin 
reveals himself as an historian of the Gothic, showing the various ways people 
historically use this mode to support their ideological positions, or to attack the ideology 
of their opponents. Godwin makes clear that Gothicization is sometimes politicization, or 
propaganda.  
Mandeville also presents an “enlightened” attitude towards apostasy. Being a 
novel related by a Presbyterian fanatic, set during a time and place (the Commonwealth 
in Britain) which was characterized by intense religious debate, it is not surprising that 
religious apostasy would be a theme in the novel. Godwin himself was just such a 
religious apostate, forswearing Presbyterianism and thereafter attacking Christianity in 
numerous publications. The presentation of apostasy in Mandeville quite likely reflects 
Godwin’s autobiographical concerns. But it also seems likely that in the novel Godwin is 
commenting on the debate concerning political apostasy that was raging when 
Mandeville was published in 1817. In early 1817 Wat Tyler, a radical play written in the 
early 1790s by Robert Southey, had been published in a pirated edition. Given that this 
exposed the radical views of Southey’s youth, and could be easily compared to Southey’s 
reactionary writing for the Quarterly Review circa 1817 (something that William Smith 
did in Parliamentary debate), Southey was understandably non-plussed and fought back 
in a pamphlet. Defenders (such as Coleridge) and detractors (Hazlitt and William Hone) 
joined in the controversy.19
                                                          
19 For more on the Wat Tyler controversy, see Charles Mahoney’s Romantics and Renegades, chapter 4. 
See also the electronic edition of 
  




Mandeville was Godwin’s contribution to the apostasy debate that preoccupied 
the British public sphere in 1817. Godwin’s position in this debate was somewhat 
surprising, given his reputation as a political radical. In Mandeville he uses religious 
apostasy to analogize political apostasy, in order to suggest that apostasy was not always 
and in every case politically regressive. That is, Godwin insinuates that apostasy might be 
considered as a stage on the road to personal and societal perfection. In this sense 
apostasy is necessary—part of a general scheme of social progress. Apostasy would have 
benevolent effects if it led to the abandonment of outmoded, feudal conceptions of 
religion, as well as irrational, atavistic, anti-Catholic views. And sincerity demands the 
kind of public truth-telling that apostasy occasions. In other words, apostasy could be 
enlightened, part of a scheme of perfectability.  
Granted, none of this is dealt with explicitly in the novel, but it informs a key 
plot-point. In the third volume, Mandeville develops a twisted friendship with Mallison 
(son of Malice?), who as a boy tormented Mandeville at Winchester School. The 
manipulative Mallison goads Mandeville by convincing him that Clifford’s apostasy was 
not the career-killer (or soul-killer) that Mandeville thought it was. Mallison opines that 
“the Protestant episcopal religion is the faith that becomes an English politician, while the 
Catholic is the religion of a gentleman. There is no other creed to be found at the courts 
of Versailles, Madrid, and Vienna, the great receptacles of all that is magnificent and 
brilliant in civilised Europe” (III:131). This comment destroys what remains of 
Mandeville’s sanity by removing the last remaining logical justification for his hatred of 




Machiavellian (since he converts to Catholicism to inherit a large estate, along with the 
power this entails), but this does not seem to be Godwin’s attitude towards Clifford.  
Nor is it necessarily the attitude of Mandeville. There is a fascinating passage in 
volume III, chapter 3, when after excoriating Clifford once again, Mandeville plays 
devil’s advocate and constructs a much more sympathetic account of Clifford’s apostasy, 
one in which the uncle who has named Clifford his heir begs Clifford to convert to 
Catholicism. Clifford resists at first but then out of a sense of benevolence gives in to his 
uncle’s demand. Not long after this sympathetic account Mandeville reverts to form, 
calling Clifford a monstrous deformity and fantasizing about bathing in his blood. 
Clifford is technically an apostate, but he is otherwise admirable in every way, and 
maintains his integrity throughout. Clifford’s apostasy might be read as prudent, as 
befitting an enlightened statesman, rather than the opportunistic villainy that Mandeville 
sees. Evincing the kind of inversion that characterized Godwin’s late Gothic, the winners 
at the end of the novel are Catholics—particularly benevolent, sincere, non-sectarian, 
public-minded Catholics like Clifford.  
Godwin does not appear to subscribe to the radical-reactionary binary that 
characterized political apostasy during the Romantic period. Instead, he takes a middle 
way between the two extremes, showing some of the progressive possibilities of apostasy 
and characterizing as unenlightened public attacks on people for changing their minds. 
For Godwin, misanthropy was a much more serious public problem than apostasy. In this 
he anticipates, and to some extent critiques, the Romantic figure of the alienated outcast, 
which had been made popular by Lord Byron in Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage and the 




recognized by Percy Shelley who, after reading Mandeville, sent a copy to Byron, calling 
Godwin’s character “a Satanic likeness of Childe Harold the first” (Qtd. in Clemit, 
Godwinian Novel 96). Later Shelley reviewed the novel positively for the Examiner. 
Other reviewers, such as John Gibson Lockhart at Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 
saw the Satanic resemblance (Godwin Reviewed 339). Just as Byron’s alienated heroes 
are mouthpieces for Byron’s cultural critique, Mandeville in the novel by that name can 
be regarded as Godwin’s critical response to lingering disaffection with the government 
and his refusal to affirm the re-established feudal legitimacy in post-Napoleonic Europe.    
Some of the reviewers of Mandeville also made comparisons between Godwin 
and the author of the Waverly novels, later to be revealed as Walter Scott. Mandeville is, 
at least in part, a rebuke to Scott’s conservative historiography. Anthony Jarrells notes 
that Scott’s fiction “helps not so much in understanding history as in accepting it. Scott’s 
romances serve what we might call the Burkean end of making the nation lovely: they do 
not challenge the national institutions bur rather accouter them in the generic clothing of 
romance” (33). At the same time, as Davison notes, Scott “strategically employs” the 
Gothic to demonize the opponents of “things as they are” by associating them with the 
backwardness of Celtic culture and Catholicism (189). “This Gothicization of a savage 
and superstitious Celtic periphery” in Scott’s novels “served to promote a fantasy of 
shared national feeling” which was decidedly loyalist and reactionary (189). In 
championing aristocratic, feudal hegemony, and in using the Gothic to smear his 
opponents, Scott’s novels are indicative of the Gothic feudalism that Burke utilized in his 




done to individuals by social institutions, by “highlighting the failure of the individual to 
rise above the violence of history” (Jarrells 28).  
On the basis of these evaluations, and its affinity with the alienation espoused and 
troubled by Byron and Scott, I read Mandeville as a Romantic novel—or, more 
specifically, a Romantic Gothic novel—with the proviso that in its treatment of social 
alienation and in its conception of history, Godwin comes much closer to Byron than 
Scott. But here, at the conclusion of my discussion of the novel, I would like to show how 
Mandeville is uniquely Romantic in its own right, and what this means. Clemit says of 
Mandeville: “Godwin’s study of fanaticism from the point of view of the fanatic explores 
the doubts about man’s rational capacities” (“Godwinian Novel” 99). Kelly remarks that 
Mandeville shows that “as a man, as a philosopher, as a writer, Godwin had changed 
from a philosophe to a Romantic” (“Jacobin Novel” 249). If by “Romantic” we mean 
anti-Enlightenment and politically conservative, Mandeville is not Romantic. But if we 
understand the term as a recuperation of Enlightenment principles within a larger 
framework that affirms feeling, in both the public and private spheres, and acknowledges 
cultural dissidence in the form of alienation/misanthropy—the novel is Romantic.  
More specifically, Mandeville is Romantic in that it has as its hero an alienated, 
self-deluded, unreliable first-person narrator, with the narrative serving as his confession. 
But it is a confession that admits nothing, and reveals little of the inner life of the 
narrator. Rajan remarks that Mandeville’s “refusal to be cured breaks open the institution 
of confession so as to expose the pathology of normalization” or political legitimacy 
(Romantic Narrative136). The narrator’s psychological disintegration is telling. Rajan 




hand in hand with a radical destructuration of the ideological field itself” (Romantic 
Narrative 142). Mandeville’s madness is emblematic of a crumbling ancien regime in 
Britain. Due to the narrator’s opacity and his antiquated values, the reader is discouraged 
from sympathizing with the patrician Mandeville, to distrust everything he says, and to 
read between the lines. This “distancing” is a key part of what makes the text reflexive. 
With Rajan, I interpret textual reflexity as one of the emergent aspects of Romanticism.20
Marilyn Butler describes Mandeville as a bildungsroman; but, if so, it is a 
coming-of-age tale that is Gothicized, in that it is the portrait of a fledgling lunatic who 
nurtures an insane antipathy to a school-mate, the charmed Clifford (“War of Ideas” 63). 
I think it better to describe Mandeville as an anti-bildungsroman, in which the 
conventions of the form are inverted, showing not the progressive development but rather 
the disintegration of the protagonist. This is another way in which the novel is reflexive. 
The shortness of the text also signals reflexivity: Mandeville is a three-volume novel 
(compared to the four-volume St Leon) that seems to be missing a final volume. This 
might be why the novel ends so suddenly, with Mandeville, finally and irrefutably insane, 
at the tender age of eighteen years. Godwin refuses to supply a satisfying ending to his 
novel. In this sense, Mandeville resembles Godwin’s edition of Wollstonecraft’s 
posthumous works, particularly Maria; or, The Wrongs of Women, in which he provides 
suggestive scraps rather than a fully worked-out text, making a virtue of contingency.
 
21
                                                          
20 This, anyway, is my reading of her readings of Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Blake in The Supplement of 
Reading and Romantic Narrative. In the former work, Rajan contends that “the novels of Wollstonecraft 
and Godwin . . . cross a particularly ‘romantic’ threshold in the history of the genre, in that they raise the 
problem of the textuality of political writing” (167). They “use fiction self-consciously to make us aware of 
reality as a ‘text’ or system of misrepresentation, but also of ideology as a form of textual desire” (167).  
 
21 Rajan describes Godwin’s editing of Wollstonecraft’s Maria: “On the one hand, Godwin’s philological 
scrupulousness evinces an honesty about the state of this text, the roughness of which makes visible 
something more fundamental about textuality and narrativity. On the other hand, one cannot quite say that 




Mandeville concludes when the narrator is no longer capable of telling his tale 
coherently, which is long before the reader expects or desires it. Instead, we are left with 
a monstrous joke. In his final confrontation with Clifford, Mandeville is accidently cut by 
Clifford’s sword. “The sword of my enemy had given a perpetual grimace, a sort of 
preternatural and unvarying distorted smile, or deadly grin, to my countenance,” 
Mandeville relates afterwards (III:366). Before his hatred for Clifford was an act of 
imagination, but now he carries it around on his person, like a brand upon his flesh.  
Mandeville is also Romantic in a specifically historical way. Enacting the ideas 
set forth in his essay “Of History and Romance,” Godwin makes Mandeville the source 
of a highly subjective and unreliable account of history, in a way that discourages a 
suspension of disbelief and encourages critical demurral and rebuttal. The novel evinces 
history aggrandized by a narcissistic aristocrat who then refuses to countenance it. As 
some commentators note, in Mandeville we learn precious little about the turbulent 
history of the Commonwealth, mostly because it does not concern the insulated and self-
involved misanthrope who is reciting the tale. As Rajan  notes, “the historical backdrop 
of the novel is the scene of a lost Republican moment that never materializes because, 
disappointingly, there are no Republican heroes in the text” (142). This makes the novel 
historically “decentered, in ways that make politics, like character, a scarred and defaced 
project. . . . [Mandeville] is a historical novel in which, paradoxically, Mandeville’s 
psychic history usurps the foreground, while the clash of religious and political factions 
provides the background” (141). We must be careful not to attribute Mandeville’s 
aggrandizement and avoidance of history to Godwin. Rather, because it posits that people 
                                                                                                                                                                             
nothing of himself into the work’” (quotes within quote from Godwin’s editorial notes) (174). That is, 





in power attempt to abscond from history, the novel is perspicacious and progressive in 
its historicity. But it is a Romantic historicity. 
Finally, the novel is Romantic in that it suggests a conflicted but productive 
relationship between private feeling and public polity. In Mandeville, Godwin shows how 
public animosity feeds a festering hatred in private, in the case of Charles Mandeville; 
and conversely how the private domestic sphere—following Shaftesbury—nurtures 
feelings of public benevolence, in the case of Henrietta Mandeville. These things might 
seem contradictory, and Mandeville a fatally flawed, “mixed” text. But I argue that this 
lack of cohesion and closure in the novel is what makes it Romantic. Rather than 
denouncing his Enlightenment principles, in the novel Godwin re-affirms publicity, as 
well as the efficacy of the principles of benevolence, sincerity, and necessity, in 
campaigns for social amelioration and reform. But Godwin qualifies and complicates 
Enlightenment discourse by yoking it to the Gothic, utilizing irrationality in the form of 
inversion and irony, affirming the positive by addressing the negative, paradoxically 
shining shadows upon the world to reveal it in its true light. By combining these two 
disparate discourses in Mandeville, Godwin suggests that it is in the “collisions” between 
public-oriented Enlightenment and private-oriented Gothic that truth is to be found. This 
mapping of the inchoate space between public and private, more than anything else, 




Chapter 4: “Unsex’d” Sensibility and Publicity in the Polemical Works 
of Mary Wollstonecraft 
 
 
In 1798, William Godwin published his Memoirs of the Author of the Vindication 
of the Rights of Woman in commemoration of his recently deceased wife, Mary 
Wollstonecraft. In response, Richard Polwhele published The Unsex’d Females—his 
own, very different, commemoration of Wollstonecraft. In his memoirs, Godwin 
characterized Wollstonecraft as a heroine of sensibility, “a female Werther.” In his poem, 
Polwhele pictured Wollstonecraft as a monster of sensibility—a hermaphrodite who is 
both masculine rake and feminine ingénue. As rake, Wollstonecraft manages to seduce a 
whole band of women writers; as ingénue, she is seduced by the painter Henri Fuseli. In 
his notes to the poem, Polwhele makes explicit his criticism of Wollstonecraft the 
“unsex’d” female: “Nature is the grand basis of all laws human and divine: and the 
woman, who has no regard to nature, either in the decoration of her person, or the culture 
of her mind, will soon ‘walk after the flesh, in the lust of uncleanness, and despise 
government.’” In his poem, Polwhele clearly deplores Wollstonecraft’s sensibility, which 
he characterizes as too masculine in its rationality, and too feminine in its emotionality. 
This is what makes her, in Polwhele’s estimation, “unsex’d” and monstrous: she subverts 
the traditional, customary gendering of both men and women under the regime of 
sensibility by taking on aspects of both. More egregiously, she performs this “gender 
bending” in public, using her “unsex’d” sensibility to confuse and conflate the domestic 




This is what motivates Polwhele to raise, and remonstrate with, Wollstonecraft’s ghost in 
an attempt to exorcise her from the body politic. 
 In this chapter I examine Wollstonecraft’s subversive “unsex’d” sensibility within 
the context of publicity. Specifically I look at how Wollstonecraft in the 1790s intervened 
in public controversies in which gender, sensibility, and domestic politics were being re-
negotiated, as part of the larger French Revolution debate. I make the case that 
Wollstonecraft distinguished between two different kinds of sensibility in these 
controversies. “Chivalric” sensibility, which was politically conservative and invested in 
the preservation of a patriarchal status quo, viewed women as pretty playthings that had 
no agency, thoughts, property, or rights of their own. Wollstonecraft countered this with 
“civic” sensibility, which used reason to order the passions and cultivate the social 
feelings necessary for public engagement. She pointedly included women in this 
formulation, re-situating the domestic within an “unsex’d” public sphere. 
In her Vindication of the Rights of Men, Wollstonecraft indicted the conservative, 
“feminized” Edmund Burke for his reactionary chivalric sensibility and its attendant 
misogyny. In Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft exposed the French 
republican Jean-Jacques Rousseau as another vector of chivalric sensibility, suggesting 
that his version was even more insidious because it made misogyny palatable to political 
reformers. However, in Letters Written During a Short Residence in Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark, Wollstonecraft seemed to change course. In this epistolary work she 
entertained chivalric sensibility, seemingly rehabilitating both Burke and Rousseau, and 
looked askance upon the civic sensibility she had championed in her vindications. But in 




misogyny. Rather, in the work Wollstonecraft put into dialogue—into mutual 
interrogation—chivalric and civic sensibility. The result of this dialogue was a new, 
hybrid “romantic” sensibility that attempted to transcend the divisions between male and 
female, rational and emotional, political and domestic, public and private—in effect 
creating a buffer zone where neither the contentious publicity nor the reactionary 
domesticity of late-1790s Britain had a place.  Thus I maintain that, rather than retreating 
to the private sphere or staking out territory for women in the public sphere, the 
“unsex’d” Wollstonecraft of A Short Residence found the inchoate discursive space 
between public and private, and the slippage between the two, more congenial to cultural 
advancement.  
In each of these readings, I am particularly interested in exploring how sensibility 
was both a subject and vehicle of publicity in Britain in the 1790s. I therefore map out the 
public debates involving sensibility, to investigate how the ethic of sensibility affected 
those public debates, and to adumbrate Wollstonecraft’s role in both efforts. I also 
consider how issues of class and media inflect these debates, and to what extent 
Wollstonecraft’s evolving attitude towards sensibility affected her relationship to 
incipient Romanticism. I focus on the three polemical texts mentioned above—in 
addition to Wollstonecraft’s early reviews for the Analytical Review—because they were 
all intended as public interventions in controversies concerning sensibility. I exclude 
other sentimental texts from this chapter—such as Wollstonecraft’s novellas Mary, A 




private, reflective mode, and were immature, inconsistent, and/or fragmentary forays into 
sensibility.1
 In explicating Wollstonecraft’s texts and making my argument, I draw from the 
ongoing and energetic debate concerning Wollstonecraft and her critical legacy—
particularly the relationship between sensibility and gender in her writing. Some critics 
upbraid Wollstonecraft for fiercely criticizing paternalistic sensibility in her early works, 
while others see her submitting to paternalism in these same works. That is, for some she 
is too feminine, for others too masculine; for some she is too beholden to reason, for 
others too beholden to feeling; for some her rejection of sensibility indicates political 
betrayal, for others her championing of sensibility supposedly makes her a traitor to 
progressive politics. Thus in the critical history, as in Polwhele’s poem, Wollstonecraft is 
“unsex’d.” The bulk of this chapter is devoted to an exploration of this perceived gender 
“confusion” in Wollstonecraft, vis-à-vis sensibility, during an epoch in which the British 
tradition of sensibility was undergoing fierce debate in the public sphere.  
   
 
Sensibility and Publicity 
 
  In eighteenth-century Britain, the meaning of the term “sensibility” was in flux. 
Syndy Conger notes that during this time sensibility could mean “emotional 
consciousness”; “quickness and acuteness of apprehension of feeling”; “capacity for 
refined emotion”; “delicate sensitiveness of taste”; or “compassion for suffering, and [the 
                                                          
1 These two novellas are nonetheless quite illuminating in what they reveal of Wollstonecraft’s evolving 
attitudes towards sensibility, as recently published editions of these two works make clear. I recommend in 
particular two editions that combine both texts in one book: Michele Faubert’s Broadview edition (2012), 




capacity] to be moved by the pathetic in art” (xxxi). Susan Todd defines sensibility more 
generally as “the capacity for extremely refined emotion and a quickness to display 
compassion for suffering’ (Sensibility 7). The term was often associated with a number of 
different concepts, four of which I will mention here. The physical basis of sensibility 
was sensation, in the way John Locke uses that term, referring to the sense impressions 
and experiences that together comprise the individual. The engagement with, and 
refinement of, sentiments (or feelings) was an important component of sensibility. There 
was an interpersonal aspect of sensibility, in that it encouraged an emotional connection, 
or sympathy, with others. On a societal level, sensibility led to sociability, discussion in 
public and print, which was a key aspect of eighteenth-century British life.2
 Chris Jones isolates three main strains of sensibility in eighteenth-century Britain: 
1. Self-indulgent sensibility, in which one became a slave to super-refined feelings; 2. 
Conservative sensibility, which fostered emotional attachments to tradition, hierarchy, 
and social custom; and 3. Radical sensibility, which emphasized social sympathy, 
benevolence, and reason (“Radical Sensibility” 69). The first kind of sensibility (“self-
indulgent”) was condemned by the other two, though I argue that later in the 1790s, self-
indulgent sensibility was often coded as conservative by radicals and radical by 
conservatives. These “three trends in sensibility, the potentially radical, the conservative, 
and the self-indulgent, seem to coexist throughout the century, often uneasily cohabiting 
within the same text or providing parameters for the development of an author’s attitude” 
(Radical Sensibility 15). 
  
                                                          
2 John Mullan focuses on sociability in the context of sensibility, in Sentiment and Sociability: The 




The conflict between “conservative” and “radical” sensibility was based on the 
philosophical differences between two wings of the British Enlightenment. Representing 
conservative sensibility, David Hume and Adam Smith propounded the view that 
sensibility served the cause of social harmony by cultivating in the individual feelings of 
reverence for tradition, hierarchy, and aristocratic rule. Hume and Smith argued that these 
deferential feelings were largely generated in the home, in the form of “domestic” or 
“partial” affections. As Jones puts it: “Hume . . . appealed to the contagion of the 
passions, and Smith feelingly evoked the human desire for unbounded sympathy, yet both 
explored the mechanisms by which Providence directed this capacity to the limited ends 
insuring the stability of society” (“Radical Sensibility” 71). The writers of conservative 
sensibility tended to denigrate the role of reason in the construction of a harmonious 
society, championing instead passions ordered by social deference. If sensibility fostered 
social conformity, it was acceptable; if it fostered personal expression and individuality—
or even worse, reformist sentiments—it was anathema. 
This conservative sensibility was countered by the proto-utilitarian view of 
Francis Hutcheson, who popularized the ideas of Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 3rd Earl of 
Shaftesbury. The proponents of (what became) radical sensibility emphasized “universal” 
benevolence over customary deference, and “stressed the necessity of keeping the partial 
affections like those to kindred under the direction of universal benevolence which 
sought the good of the widest system of which man was a part” (Radical Sensibility 61). 
For writers of radical sensibility, the ideal forum for the practice of universal benevolence 
was an unfettered public sphere, where disinterested debate and shared intellectual work 




sensibility also had a high regard for the role of reason in the moral and political progress 
of society, and in countering the prejudices of aristocracy. Individual expression and 
reforming zeal was not only acceptable but a necessary component of radical sensibility. 
The eighteenth-century debate in the British public sphere between conservative 
and radical conceptions of sensibility was complicated by issues of class and gender. 
Chris Evans notes that “sensibility was believed to be most commonly found among the 
middle classes. The poor were too brutalized by their labours and their wretched living 
conditions to be capable of the heightened emotional receptivity that was true sensibility. 
As for the aristocracy, their palates were too jaded by dissipation and excess. Indeed, the 
idea of sensibility soon became a vehicle for criticism of the fashionable aristocracy” 
(114). Sensibility, then, became a signifier of class. Avoiding the degradation of the 
plebs, and the dissipation of patricians, sensibility became a special quality of the 
bourgeoisie. According to this scenario, middle-class Britons represented the glue that 
held society together and vouchsafed the social advancement of Britain as a whole. This 
advancement had a commercial aspect, implicating sensibility in the development of 
capitalism in eighteenth-century Britain, something that is implied but not explicitly 
discussed in the eighteenth-century literature of sensibility.  
More specifically, sensibility was a movement associated with middle-class 
women. This is not surprising given that it was women, for the most part, who both wrote 
and read novels of sensibility in eighteenth-century Britain. But the association was also 
based on a general conception that empathy, sympathy, and sociability were things that 
were more “natural” to women than to men. As we will see, this gendering of sensibility 




sensibility was used “to justify the new exalted subordination of women” (Sensibility 20). 
That is, women were seemingly exalted as superior beings when it came to feeling, but in 
fact this refinement was used to put them in their (domestic) place, making them second-
class citizens. As Conger puts it, “man uses the notion or the language of sensibility to 
flatter woman into a posture of weakness, then declares her weak by nature (according to 
God’s will) and accordingly denies her access to ‘manly’ pursuits” in the public sphere” 
(113-14). However, as I argue below in my reading of Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the 
Rights of Man, this “false,” feminized sensibility was not the only strain. What the critics 
above refer to above as sensibility was really conservative sensibility, as Jones defines it. 
It is what I call chivalric sensibility, in contradistinction to the civic sensibility that 
Wollstonecraft develops in her vindications.3
In the 1790s, the philosophical debate concerning sensibility became bitterly 
politicized; the catalyst was the French Revolution. Claudia Johnson remarks that “the 
welfare of the nation and the tearfulness of private citizens—actual as well as fictional—
were understood in the 1790s to be urgently interconnected” (2). Nicola Watson notes 
that in the 1790s  
  
Both conservatives and radicals (and all shades of partisan in between) accused 
those of other political persuasions of excessive sensibility and of exploiting an 
essentially sentimental rhetoric, and all equally indignantly denied the charge. If 
Wollstonecraft, in A Vindication of the Rights of Men, could base her critique of 
                                                          
3 Similar to Wollstonecraft’s distinction between “feudal” and “civic” sensibility is her husband William 
Godwin’s distinction between “feudal” and “enlightened” Gothic, which I discuss in my chapter on 
Godwin. There was a close association between sensibility and the Gothic in the eighteenth century, and 
Wollstonecraft and Godwin were similarly engaged in efforts to champion the Enlightenment at the 
expense of the old feudal order. So it should come as no surprise that these two writers should work in 




Burke’s politics upon accusations of muddy sentimental thinking, constructing 
him as all crocodile tears and about as much sympathy, Gillray, the noted 
conservative caricaturist, was, for his part, just as comfortable producing a 
cartoon of Sensibility as a woman crying over a dead bird, with the volumes of 
Rousseau in one hand and a foot carelessly resting on the French king’s severed 
head. (27)  
At issue were the main topics discussed by Hume, Smith, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson 
earlier in the century. Jones argues that  
in espousing the principles of the French Revolution, radical sensibility 
politicized ideas which had previously been points of debate within the same 
tradition and took to extremes ideas which had been firmly restricted by 
prevailing practice. So it is that during the 1790s the idea of the domestic 
affections is so charged with conservative force, and universal philanthropy 
considered a dangerously radical propensity, that the ability to regulate passion 
assumes a high profile in radical writers, often uneasily coupled with pleas for a 
more accommodating public morality (Radical Sensibility 101-02). 
As we will see, in terms of the controversy associated with sensibility in the 1790s, 
Wollstonecraft ardently rushed into the fray. Her exploration of the opposing strands of 
chivalric and civic sensibility, which roughly correspond with conservative and radical 
sensibility, was the result. 
It should be clear from the preceding that the literature and discourse of 
sensibility was an eminent subject of debate in the eighteenth-century British public 




plays a vital role in various models of the public sphere, particularly that of Jürgen 
Habermas. Habermas argues that the eighteenth-century public sphere originated in “a 
rational-critical debate in the world of letters within which the subjectivity originating in 
the interiority of the conjugal family, by communicating with itself, attained clarity about 
itself” (51). Literature made public the concerns and preoccupations of the bourgeois 
home—what Habermas calls the private sphere—thus making literature a factor in the 
negotiation between the private sphere and the state. The literature of sensibility, 
according to Habermas, was one of the vehicles used in this process of bourgeois class 
consolidation in that it provided ideological legitimation, by naturalizing and 
universalizing the intimate experience of the bourgeois. In the words of Habermas: “The 
subjectivity that had become fit to print, had in fact become the literature appealing to a 
wide public of readers. The privatized individuals coming together to form a public also 
reflected critically and in public on what they had read, thus contributing to the process of 
enlightenment which they together promoted” (51). Habermas cites novels of sensibility 
such as Richardson’s Pamela and Sterne’s Tristram Shandy as exemplary works of 
literature in this regard. He does not cite, however, the many women writers of sensibility 
in eighteenth-century Britain, or note the general consensus that sensibility was a 
woman’s genre. Regardless, in Habermas’s model, the psychological ethic and 
interpersonal praxis of sensibility made the development of eighteenth-century publicity 
possible.  
 However, while Habermas cites the importance of sensibility in the literary public 
sphere, he is quite vague about its role vis-à-vis the political public sphere, which 




political public sphere and literary public sphere “blended with each other in a peculiar 
fashion” (55). For instance, Habermas notes, “women and dependents were factually and 
legally excluded from the political public sphere, whereas female readers as well as 
apprentices and servants often took a more active part in the literary public sphere than 
the owners of private property and family heads themselves” (56). The implication here is 
that female readers had some power, and indirectly exerted influence upon the politics of 
the nation. Women were active in the bourgeois public sphere, according to Habermas, 
though they did not actively engage in politics. Along these lines, Michael McKeon 
observes that “Habermas has been chided both for ignoring women’s exclusion from the 
public sphere and for ignoring their access to it—or to alternative publics, counterpublics, 
or ‘subaltern counterpublics’. In fact his position lies somewhere between these two 
claims” (73).4
 
 Habermas might have avoided feminist criticism had he perused more 
closely Wollstonecraft’s writings, in which she is a perceptive and proleptic critic of his 
model. He might also have seen more clearly the relationship between the literature of 
sensibility and the political public sphere, and gained insight into how sensibility 
functioned as publicity in the late eighteenth century. 
 
 
                                                          
4 For many feminist scholars, a controlling interest in literature does not make up for the lack of political 
agency, particularly at a time in which much of the literature written by women, and genres associated with 
women, was treated with condescension by male writers and readers, thus sapping its political impact. For 
this reason feminist critic Joan Landes, in Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French 
Revolution, concludes that Habermas’s model is hopelessly masculinist. Nancy Fraser, in Rethinking the 
Public Sphere, goes so far as to propose a feminine “subaltern counterpublic”: a “room of her own” in the 
public sphere for the eighteenth-century British woman. But more recently feminist critics eschew this kind 
of separatism and increasingly re-structure the public sphere by revising the terms of the debate (which I 





Wollstonecraft’s Apprenticeship in Sensibility and Publicity: Reviews for the 
Analytical 
 
In 1788 Wollstonecraft left her governess position with the Kingsborough family 
and took a job in London as editorial assistant at a new literary review magazine called 
the Analytical Review, published by the man who would publish all her books: Joseph 
Johnson. Review magazines had by this time achieved huge popularity and influence. 
Marilyn Butler rightly calls the eighteenth-century Review “culture’s medium,” 
particularly in its role as arbiter of literary production at a time in which both print and 
literacy were expanding at a prodigious rate.5 Reviews were key institutions not only in 
print culture but in the public sphere. They dwelt at the intersection of the literary and 
political spheres, and were central to the bourgeois reformist agenda. Butler notes that in 
1790, all four major Reviews were published by bourgeois dissenters and supported 
reform and the fledgling French Revolution (130). Johnson’s Analytical Review was one 
of these, and arguably the most liberal of the four. Wollstonecraft was not only a 
reviewer at the Analytical; she was also a de facto section editor. This made her “the first 
of a new genus” and gave her a good deal of power in a public sphere that was 
supposedly out-of-bounds for women.6
                                                          
5 Marilyn Butler, following Derek Roper in Reviewing Before the Edinburgh, contends that the Reviews in 
the latter half of the eighteenth century achieved the high-point of their cultural hegemony. This counters 
the previous understanding that the Reviews were basically unsophisticated advertizing vehicles until the 
Edinburgh Review came along in 1803. Most critics now attest to the general excellence of Reviews before 
the Edinburgh—thanks to the work of Butler, Roper, and others—and given the size of the reading public 
in the second half of the eighteenth century, the sales figures are arguably similar (5,000 monthly for the 
Monthly Review in 1797, compared to 2,000 for the initial run of the Edinburgh in 1803, and 4,000 on 
average in 1805—though, admittedly, a far cry from the 13,000 sold in one month in 1815) (Roper 24, 
Butler “Culture’s Medium” 126). 
  
6 “The first of a new genus” was a phrase from a letter of Wollstonecraft to her sister Everina (7 November 
1787) that many critics cite in their discussions of Wollstonecraft’s importance in the print culture and the 
public sphere at this time. See in this regard Mary A. Waters’s article “‘The First of a New Genus’: Mary 




Wollstonecraft’s public influence at this early stage was largely due to the 
anonymity—and perceived maleness—of reviewers. Mary Waters writes: “The 
anonymity of reviews meant that a woman writer could trespass on territory usually 
reserved for men, and no one other than her employer need by the wiser” (422). It also 
meant that Wollstonecraft was compelled to write in the “house style” (of both review 
magazines and the public sphere), which was in the masculine voice. However, Waters 
argues that “Wollstonecraft at least occasionally exploited her anonymous position subtly 
to revise accepted notions of gender”; in addition, anonymous reviewing for 
Wollstonecraft helped her develop “a strong sense of the conventions of masculine versus 
feminine discourse, and a consciousness that these differences arose not from nature but 
from strategies of language” (422). That is, even at this early stage, Wollstonecraft was 
being educated in the contingencies of gender in the eighteenth century, and developing 
tactics to denaturalize paternalistic gender roles.  
Wollstonecraft is decidedly unsentimental and satirical in her evaluation of 
fashionable novels of sensibility, which she calls—in one of her first reviews in one of 
the first numbers of the Analytical—“those misshapen monsters, daily brought forth to 
poison the minds of our young females” (Analytical Review 1 [June 1788]). Conger 
claims that only when Wollstonecraft “becomes a regular contributor to Joseph Johnson’s 
newly formed Analytical Review in the late 1780s does she begin to see sensibility as part 
of the problem rather than the solution” (86). Conger continues: “Wollstonecraft’s many 
acerbic reviews of sentimental novels make it easy to misconstrue her articles as 




with it” (86). But in her reviews, Conger concludes, Wollstonecraft “objects not to 
sensibility per se but to its abduction by mediocre writers” (87).  
Mitzi Myers concurs: “While Wollstonecraft demystifies the contemporary 
feminine specialty, the novel of sensibility so often ‘told in letters’ and written by ‘A 
Lady’. . . she was certainly not ready to jettison the positive attributes associated with 
feminine sensibility” (“Literary Reviews” 83-84). Indeed, “throughout her career she 
defined sensibility in glowing terms, repeatedly equating it with genius and forever 
waxing ardent over Rousseau’s ardors” (“Literary Reviews” 93). According to Myers, 
Wollstonecraft had an “ideological commitment” to expose woman writers of sensibility 
“for serving as passive channels through which linguistic and cultural codes flow without 
resistance. She finds oppression and repression inscribed in the feminine texts she reads” 
(“Literary Reviews” 84). What Wollstonecraft targets in her reviews is “cultural 
conditioning masquerading as fiction” and “the self-sabotaging myths of [‘false’] 
sensibility” (Myers 88, Conger 88). The point I wish to emphasize here is that as a 
reviewer, in challenging gender constraints and the false consciousness of paternalistic 
sensibility, Wollstonecraft was flexing her critical muscles in the public sphere and 
making distinctions between “true” and “false” sensibility. She was also making 
pronouncements about sensibility and gender that critics now, particularly feminist 
critics, tend to ponder and parse in order to pinpoint the advent of her feminism, or the 







A Vindication of the Rights of Men 
 
After tinkering with it for a year, Edmund Burke finally published his highly-
anticipated Reflections on the Revolution in France in early November 1790. After not 
tinkering at all, writing at a feverish pace over a matter of weeks, Wollstonecraft 
published her anonymous reply in the same month. The title A Vindication of the Rights 
of Men most obviously refers to the “Rights of Man,” promulgated by the National 
Assembly in revolutionary France, and attacked by Burke in his Reflections. But the title 
also has a satirical edge, in that Wollstonecraft is not only vindicating the “Rights of 
Man,” but also criticizing a political and cultural system in which the rights of men are 
reserved only for men who abandon their manliness, while women are left without any 
rights and even their femininity is taken from them. This has come about, Wollstonecraft 
charges, because men have feminized culture for their own benefit, and used sensibility 
to do so.  
 Wollstonecraft’s first vindication was the initial shot in the propaganda war that 
erupted in Britain shortly after the fall of the Bastille in 1789. Like Burke’s Reflections, it 
must be noted, Wollstonecraft’s reply was a pamphlet. The pamphlet, one of the major 
media of the eighteenth-century public sphere, is distinguished from the book in that 
pamphlets tended to be quickly produced in order to capitalize on public controversy. 
Pamphlets also tended to be much cheaper than books, to ensure the widest possible 
distribution. Later in the 1790s, dissenting political sentiments published in the medium 




thus available to the masses.7
 Most commentators note that, in her first vindication, Wollstonecraft seemed 
more interested in attacking the style than the content of Burke’s Reflections on the 
Revolution in France. Burke’s sentimental style obscures and prettifies his reactionary 
screed attacking the French Revolution and with it British reform. This is indicated by his 
chivalric encomium to Marie Antoinette. Deborah Weiss notes that in this passage 
Burke’s expression of voyeuristic sympathy with the suffering female victim—what 
Burke would call “sensibility”—is used in support of a paternalistic ideology (216). 
Conger claims that “Burke commits the final outrage, in Wollstonecraft’s eyes, of 
pressing the language of sensibility into the defense of an antiquated, corrupt, and 
oppressive political structure” (102). She continues: “Burke’s attack on the French 
Revolution serves as an unwelcome catalyst in Wollstonecraft’s intellectual life: it takes 
her largely untested faith in sensibility by surprise and forces her to sift its contradictory 
values and truth-claims in order to decide which, if any, she can reaffirm and which she 
should reject or deny” (103).  
 One, imperfect, way prosecution could be avoided was to 
publish anonymously. This is a convention that Wollstonecraft capitalized upon in her 
first vindication, something which (after the second edition made it clear that A 
Vindication of the Rights of Men was written by a woman) left the reviewers nonplussed. 
As I discuss below, critics now also look askance at Wollstonecraft’s bold act of male 
ventriloquization in her pamphlet.    
                                                          
7 The best example of this phenomenon was when Thomas Paine re-published his Rights of Man as a 
pamphlet and was shortly thereafter tried in absentia for treasonous libel. E. P. Thompson, in The Making 
of the English Working Class, discusses Paine’s pamphlet and the attacks upon cheap periodicals in the 





Burke’s language and imagery, drawn from the tradition of literary sensibility, 
provides an “idle tapestry” or fanciful “drapery” that blocks from view the “empty 
pageant” of aristocratic hegemony (Vindication I 12, 43). Wollstonecraft writes:  
Throughout your letter you frequently advert to a sentimental jargon, which has 
long been current in conversation, and even in books of morals, though it never 
received the regal stamp of reason. A kind of mysterious instinct is supposed to 
reside in the soul, that instantaneously discerns truth, without the tedious labour of 
ratiocination. This instinct, for I know not what other name to give it, has been 
termed common sense, and more frequently sensibility; and, by a kind of 
indefeasible right, it has been supposed, for rights of this kind are not easily 
proved, to reign paramount over the other faculties of the mind, and to be an 
authority from which there is no appeal. (Vindication I 23) 
For Burke, sentiment or feeling trumps reason, and vitiates societal enlightenment. As 
Claudia Johnson puts it: “For Burke, the continuance of civil order resulted not from our 
conviction of the rational or metaphysical rightness of certain obligations or 
arrangements, but rather from our attachment to customary practices, practices which are 
unconflictually sustained because we feel emotions of veneration, awe, desire, solicitude, 
gratitude, loyalty, endearment towards them and towards the persons who represent 
them” (3). Or as Wollstonecraft herself presents it: “We are to reverence the rust of 
antiquity, and term the unnatural customs, which ignorance and mistaken self-interest 
have consolidated, the sage fruit of experience: nay, that, if we do discover some errors, 
our feelings should lead us to excuse, with blind love, or unprincipled filial affection, the 




Chris Jones remarks that “it is easy to see how this type of Sensibility leads to the 
affirmations of Burke that all our feelings are formed by the habitual associations of the 
status quo, and that any departure from these divinely implanted guides will bring 
anarchy” (“Radical Sensibility” 72). Indeed, according to Jones, Burke is the exemplar of 
the late, highly-politicized, conservative sensibility of the 1790s—what I term “chivalric” 
sensibility. Opposed to Burke’s chivalric sensibility was the supposedly radical civic 
sensibility of Richard Price, the dissenting divine that Burke attacks in his Reflections, 
and the mentor that Wollstonecraft defends in her first vindication. Eighteenth-century 
conservative sensibility privileged custom and feeling over reason and benevolence, and 
radical sensibility did the opposite. Jones contends that Price “held that natural 
Sensibility should be regulated, but maintained that it was the narrow, partial affections 
which had to be regulated by the expansive conception of the good of the whole and a 
rational assessment of ways and means. The main development of conservative 
Sensibility had been to restrict a potentially unlimited capacity for sympathy to the 
exclusive bounds of country and family,” which is the position of Hume, Smith, and 
Burke (“Radical Sensibility” 74).  
Burke defends what Wollstonecraft calls “natural feelings,” which for 
Wollstonecraft represents a dangerous, mystifying kind of sensibility. This includes the 
charity that disguised itself as benevolence, providing crumbs to the poor while ignoring 
the structural causes of poverty. Wollstonecraft writes:  “Sensibility is the manie of the 
day, and compassion the virtue which is to cover a multitude of vices, whilst justice is left 
to mourn in sullen silence, and balance truth in vain” (Vindication I 7). Wollstonecraft 




particularly in structuring social relationships and confronting authority in the public 
sphere. In her vindication, as in her reviews in the Analytical Review, Wollstonecraft 
attacked conservative, chivalric sensibility because it was used to create false 
consciousness, especially in women.  
Though Wollstonecraft spends much of her pamphlet attacking Burke’s position, 
she does suggest an alternative to chivalric sensibility. The somewhat rudimentary 
conception of civic sensibility that she develops in her first vindication is based on the 
cultivation of reason in the performance of the God-given rights of men. Wollstonecraft 
writes: “The birthright of man, to give you, Sir, a short definition of this disputed right, is 
such a degree of liberty, civil and religious, as is compatible with the liberty of every 
other individual with whom he is united in a social compact, and the continued existence 
of that compact” (Vindication I 7). A little later she writes: “It is necessary emphatically 
to repeat, that there are rights which men inherit at their birth, as rational creatures, who 
were raised above the brute creation by their improvable faculties; and that, in receiving 
these, not from their forefathers but, from God, prescription can never undermine natural 
rights” (Vindication I 11). For Wollstonecraft, the use of reason is tantamount to the 
worship of God, and a life of virtue is impossible without reason, for it orders and 
contains the passions. The use of reason makes social benevolence possible and effective, 
encouraging justice rather than just charity. What Wollstonecraft describes is reminiscent 
of the rational religion of dissenters and “Commonwealthmen” like Richard Price. 
Wollstonecraft’s innovation is in describing this rational religion in terms of public-




directed outwards for the widest possible benefit, that the individual—and eventually the 
nation—becomes virtuous.  
Wollstonecraft illustrates how chivalric sensibility is closely connected to the 
aristocratic, ceremonial “publicity of representation” which in Habermas’s model is 
replaced by bourgeois publicity.8
The court of King Louis XVI, particularly Queen Marie Antoinette, exemplified 
this pageantry-as-publicity. Some might argue (some no doubt did argue) that Burke’s 
chivalrous defense of the French queen indicated a high regard for women. 
Wollstonecraft, in her first vindication, had the effrontery to point out that this 
supposedly pro-woman chivalry was anything but. In effect, Wollstonecraft’s charge is 
that Burke had “feminized the discourse” in the service of aristocratic paternalism, using 
 As I contend in my introductory chapter, aristocratic 
publicity did not go as quietly as Habermas suggests; in the 1790s it was resurgent and, 
for a while, made counter-aristocratic bourgeois publicity impossible. Aristocratic 
publicity is uninterested in, and threatened by, reasoned discussion in the public sphere. 
In that sense, it is anti-public, exclusive, and private. At the same time, its express 
purpose is social conformity, which is to say obeisance to paternalism. Its messaging is 
based entirely on spectacle and pageantry. It often permeates society surreptitiously, as 
propaganda does, forming what I call “spectral” publicity. In attacking this secretive, 
sentimental pageantry—which she also calls “prejudice”—Wollstonecraft in effect 
vindicates what replaced it: the public use of reason to confront the seemingly sublime 
power of the state. 
                                                          
8 Burke is credited by Habermas, in his account, as a key architect of the eighteenth-century bourgeois 
public sphere in Britain. Burke’s abandonment of rational-critical public debate in favor of aristocratic 
prejudice (or representative publicity) in Reflections on the Revolution in France, I would argue, was a 
significant aspect of his supposed apostasy. This, anyway, seems to be Wollstonecraft’s view in A 




the language of sensibility to do so. In The Rape of Clarissa, Terry Eagleton explains that 
this feminization of discourse in eighteenth-century Britain was not in any way feminist, 
but rather part of the consolidation of patriarchy. He writes: “the ‘feminization of 
discourse’ witnessed by the eighteenth century was not a sexual revolution. It was 
imperative to mollify ruling-class barbarism with the milk of middle-class kindness, but 
not, naturally, to the point where virility itself came under threat. Male hegemony was to 
be sweetened but not undermined; women were to be exalted but not emancipated” (95). 
Johnson, in Equivocal Beings, also reflects upon the negative effects of the feminized 
discourse upon women. In the 1790s, Johnson writes, “the ‘masculinization’ of formerly 
feminine gender traits, and . . . the affective practices associated with it are valued not 
because they are understood as feminine, but precisely and only insofar as they have been 
re-coded as masculine” (14). As a result, Johnson argues, “sentimental man, having taken 
over once-feminine attributes, leaves to women only two choices: either the equivocal or 
the hyperfeminine” (11). This in effect leaves “women without a distinct gender site. 
Under sentimentality, all women risk becoming equivocal beings” (11, 12).9
Wollstonecraft’s strategy for combating the paternalistic feminization of discourse 
in Burke’s Reflections was to recast it as an effeminization of discourse. E. J. Clery 
explains that in eighteenth-century Britain effeminization was “employed as the sum of a 
complex of derogatory ideas also gendered ‘feminine’, including corruption, weakness, 
cowardice, luxury, immorality and the unbridled play of passions. The ‘effeminate’ 
 That is, the 
risk of being masculinized, or “unsex’d.” 
                                                          
9 Both Anne Mellor and Alan Richardson speak of the “feminization of discourse” in the eighteenth 
century, arguing that the male Romantic poets more or less colonized and stole feminine sensibility from 
women writers. See Richardson’s “Romanticism and the Colonization of the Feminine” and Mellor’s 




man…takes on the qualities of self-indulgence, wantonness, vanity and hysteria 
traditionally attributed to women by misogynist rhetoric. His manners towards women 
may be excessively gallant, while secretly he sneers at them, attempting to reduce them to 
his level” (10). Religious dissenters, especially those drawing upon the British republican 
Commonwealthman tradition, were prone to this line of attack. G. J. Barker-Benfield 
notes that eighteenth-century Commonwealthmen “urged that the individual be freed 
from the control of his own and government’s unnatural passions and prejudices. Like 
other Commonwealthmen, they were deeply critical of the luxury and dissipation of the 
‘ins,’ the ruling class. Conversely, they presented ‘the middling people’ as the repository 
of morality and civic virtue” (40). That is, aristocrats were effeminate and bourgeois were 
manly. Barker-Benfield notes that James Burgh, Joseph Priestley, and Richard Price—
authors published by Wollstonecraft’s employer and publisher Joseph Johnson, and all 
personally known to Wollstonecraft—effeminized their upper-class opponents in the 
public sphere. Barker-Benfield argues that “the Commonwealthman’s particular 
sexualization of virtue and corruption would provide a point d’appui for Wollstonecraft” 
(43).  
 The problem with this approach, critics point out, is that in order to attack Burke 
for being effeminate Wollstonecraft had to adopt the persona of a man. In her vindication 
Wollstonecraft not only repeatedly calls into question the “manliness” of Burke; she 
vows, unlike Burke, to give “a manly definition” to the “rights of men” in her vindication 
(6). In doing so, Mary Poovey claims, Wollstonecraft rejects the “feminine position” in 
favor of male rationality (63). That is, she engenders reason as masculine, as a 




“consistently presumes that manliness and liberty are virtually synonymous” (31). The 
consequence of this, Barbara Taylor contends, is that “the condemnatory weight of 
[Wollstonecraft’s] polemic falls heaviest on women themselves” (70). That is, “the overt 
message of the Rights of Men is that the male sexual imagination is to blame, but the 
insistently idealising tone in which true masculinity is evoked (as contrasted to Burke’s 
effeminacy), combined with the hostile tone in which women and Burke’s womanliness 
are described, suggests otherwise” (70-71). She goes on to claim that “the rhetorical 
weight of Wollstonecraft’s attack falls so heavily on her own sex as to make a reader 
begin to wonder whether the aim is less to free women than to abolish them—an 
aspiration strongly implied at various points in the text” (13). 
The immediate rebuttal to the characterization of Wollstonecraft as an equivocal, 
“unsex’d,” misogynist in her first vindication is that she was adapting herself to the 
conventions of (male) publicity, but I grant this is a weak reply. A better rebuttal is that 
Wollstonecraft inverted gender affiliation for a rhetorical purpose. Wendy Gunther-
Canada asks (rhetorically) how might a “woman write with authority on the rights of 
man? Wollstonecraft’s gender-bending answer to this discursive dilemma was to 
masquerade as a man, treating gender in her text not as a stable category but rather as a 
rhetorical position” (78).  An even stronger rejoinder to those who criticize 
Wollstonecraft for being masculinist in her first vindication is that Wollstonecraft does 
not blast all women with her criticism. Gunther-Canada contends that “Wollstonecraft 
repeatedly contrasted the diseased anatomy of the aristocracy to the healthy physique of 
the middle classes. At the center of her analysis was an attack on the twin evils of female 




court culture” (85). Wollstonecraft was not attacking women qua women, but rather 
aristocratic women (and bourgeois women who “ape” their lifestyle) who have traded 
their public role for the blandishments of chivalric sensibility. That is, the issue of class 
over-rides that of gender. In my reading of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman I argue 
that the charge of misogyny is more justified, but here my explanation for 
Wollstonecraft’s supposedly “Amazonian” discourse is not that it is unconscious 
misogyny, or just a rhetorical position. Rather, I argue that Wollstonecraft uses seemingly 
anti-feminine sentiments and language satirically.  
In this regard I would like to look a little more closely at a passage in the first 
vindication that often leaves critics flummoxed. It is a passage found at the climax of the 
work, and it is actually the punctuation, rather than the words, that are noteworthy. 
Wollstonecraft writes, addressing Burke, “You mourn for the empty pageant of a name, 
when slavery flaps her wing, and the sick heart retires to die in lonely wilds, far from the 
abodes of men” (Vindication I 57). “Such misery,” Wollstonecraft asserts accusingly, 
“demands more than tears” (Vindication I 58). Here Wollstonecraft’s text dramatically 
breaks off, followed by a line of dashes to insinuate that the author is overcome by 
emotion. The critics that notice this passage proffer different explanations for this break 
in the text. Gunther-Canada describes it as a moment in which Wollstonecraft reveals her 
sensibility and her gender, suggesting an identity crisis (89-90). Virginia Sapiro 
characterizes it as Wollstonecraft dramatically performing her own silencing by 
feminized discourse (205). Gary Kelly argues that it is meant to show Wollstonecraft’s 
authentic feelings, in contradistinction to Burke’s hysterical rhetoric (99).  My 




feminine by the patriarchal order by pretending to be a man who breaks down in tears 
while trying to make an argument. With her dramatic dashes, Wollstonecraft may have 
even been making a clever allusion to Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, one of the 
classics of the sentimental canon, which employs many such typographical illustrations 
for satirical effect. Granted, not many got Wollstonecraft’s joke, but contemporaneous 
readers and reviewers of the second edition (in which Wollstonecraft revealed she was 
the author) did see the irony of a woman impersonating a man to attack a man for being 
too much like a woman.10
Reading the entire vindication as a satire of the effeminized misogyny that is at 
the dark heart of chivalric sensibility, and Wollstonecraft’s inversion of gendered terms 
as ironic, goes some way towards explaining why a radical feminist writer would 
supposedly betray her own gender. It also might help explain why none of her 
contemporaries, male or female, took Wollstonecraft to task for misogyny in her first 
vindication—although reviewers did take umbrage for her presumption, as a woman, to 
lecture men on issues beyond her ken. Quite a few other critics of Burke in the 
Revolution controversy followed Wollstonecraft’s lead by highlighting how Burke used 
sensibility to cloak the patriarchal arrangements of society with “pleasing illusions.” 
Thomas Paine would be the best example of this line of attack, epitomized by his famous 
assertion that in his Reflections Burke “pities the plumage, but forgets the dying bird.” In 
Wollstonecraft’s account, Burke is an effeminized rake at large within the public sphere, 
attempting with honeyed sentiments to seduce the nation into accepting the false 
compliments of paternalism. Burke, not she, is equivocal; men who adopt a feminine 
  
                                                          
10 Janet Todd, in her recent biography of Wollstonecraft, seems to “get the joke” about this passage and 




sensibility in order to hoodwink women, not women who impersonate men in order to 
point this out, who are “unsex’d.” 
 
Gender, Publicity, and Separate Spheres  
 
 In eighteenth-century Britain, gender difference was thought to be publically 
manifested and structured in terms of “separate spheres.” According to the thesis of 
separate spheres, men represented the public and women the private; that is, men had all 
the responsibility and power in the public sphere, but women were granted control over 
the domestic sphere. In actuality, in eighteenth-century Britain men lorded over both 
society and the home; it was a “separate but unequal” arrangement. Such a division 
played into the idea that men were stronger and more intelligent than women, better fitted 
by nature for public exertion, and that women were best left uneducated and weak 
because they “only” needed to raise children, manage the household, and keep their hard-
working men sexually satisfied. Having no public duties (or rights), and no education, 
bourgeois women had little better to do than cultivate beauty and refinement, and 
narcissistically indulge their more extreme emotions, making them hyper-sensitive. 
Paternalistic men encouraged this emotional indulgence in women. So did novelists of 
sensibility. 
Beth Elshtain notes that the idea of separate public and private spheres can be 
found as early as Aristotle and is at the heart of Western (Greco-Roman) tradition, but it 
was not until the eighteenth century that the separate spheres became gendered and 




numerous critics have pointed out, Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere uncritically 
concedes this gendered division. Moyra Haslett argues that “the model of ‘separate 
spheres’ in which men are associated with and situated within a public sphere, and 
women with a private sphere . . . dominated thinking about gender until, arguably, the 
late 1980s” (140). Following the general trend of new historicism in the academy in the 
1980s and 1990s, feminist critics (particularly in history and in literature) have 
challenged and revised the separate spheres thesis, usually in the larger context of 
publicity. These critics claim that the separate spheres were never that separate.  
For instance, Diane E. Boyd and Marta Kvande contend that it is simplistic to see 
the terms “public” and “private” as functioning monolithically in eighteenth-century 
Britain. “Neither term had a simple, single definition; not only did the terms shift in 
meaning over the period, but they also could be used in multiple senses and contexts. 
While it has been common for scholars and critics to appeal to a separate spheres 
paradigm to show the way in which women were restricted to the domestic and the 
private, such a paradigm does not adequately account for the realities of social behavior 
and experience for women or for men” (19). Similarly, Joan Landes sees “mutual 
imbrications of public and private” and claims that the “line between public and private is 
constantly being re-negotiated” in the eighteenth century (Feminism, the Public, the 
Private 3). Michael McKeon claims that “the interpenetrative conflation of the public and 
the private” is “characteristic of modernity” and of the public sphere (48).  
Currently, feminist critics make use of the slippage between public and private to 
argue for political agency for women in eighteenth-century Britain. Linda Colley writes 




problematic and inaccurate if approached through the contemporary writings of women” 
in the eighteenth century (3).  She notes that during the eighteenth century, “at one and 
the same time, separate sexual spheres were being increasingly prescribed in theory, yet 
increasingly broken through in practice” (250). Some of the ways that women “broke 
through” to political agency were election canvassing, subscription campaigns, and 
patriotic activities such as clothing drives and collecting donations for the troops fighting 
on the Continent. Amanda Vickery lists additional arenas for female political agency in 
the eighteenth century, such as involvement in print culture, clubs and debating societies 
for ladies, community actions and parades, dissenting religion (in which women were 
sometimes allowed to preach), and in particular philanthropy. She lists these to back up 
her argument—made across a number of publications—that the idea of separate spheres 
in the eighteenth century, with the private assigned to women and the public to men, is a 
myth. She seeks to extend the “definition of the public sphere of politics further still to 
include the supposedly ‘private’ world of family connections and friendship networks—
fora in which political ideas were debated and new social practices played out” (Women, 
Privilege, and Power 3).  
However, Vickery acknowledges that it was mostly aristocratic or genteel women 
who participated in political activities in eighteenth-century Britain. That is, she is 
concerned with “the way rank, property, and inheritance [confers] de facto political 
power on privileged women,” and seemingly unconcerned about the lack of opportunity 
for middle and lower class women in the public sphere (Women, Privilege, and Power 2). 
My focus, by contrast, is bourgeois women, who had less opportunity for public 




were expected to conform to the separate spheres schema, which was largely the 
invention of bourgeois men. This includes men of the Commonwealthman tradition, who 
believed that the public practice of virtue was best left to bourgeois men, and bourgeois 
women could best serve the cause by raising conscientious children—which meant 
teaching them to conform assiduously to their assigned class and gender roles.11
 
 
However, according to Wollstonecraft, aristocrats and plebeians could not benefit from 
this dispensation; the public practice of virtue was impossible for them. This 
Commonwealthman understanding of separate spheres, in the context of Wollstonecraft’s 
writings, raises the same sort of critical issues as those that are involved in the 
Commonwealthman use of gendered rhetoric (discussed above). When it came to class, 
Wollstonecraft was a Commonwealthman; but when it came to gender she was a 
Commonwealthwoman—another way in which she was “the first of a new genus.” In any 
case, the thesis of separate spheres bears heavily upon Wollstonecraft’s understanding of 
sensibility, as praxis and topic of debate in the public sphere. This is quite clear in her 
second vindication. 
A Vindication of the Rights of Woman 
 
Wollstonecraft’s second vindication is often considered a sequel to the first. 
Wollstonecraft likely thought the same thing, as the similar title and her barely cloaked 
critique of Burke at the beginning of the second vindication would seem to indicate. As in 
her first vindication, in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman Wollstonecraft exposes the 
                                                          
11 This attitude, according to Barker-Benfield, was expressed in the writings of James Burgh and Joseph 





denigrating effects of chivalric sensibility on women. Mary Lyndon Shanley writes that 
“A Vindication of the Rights of Woman analyzed the ways in which patriarchy was rooted 
in what Wollstonecraft called ‘sensibility’ and social mores; its goal was the reformation 
of manners in order to reeducate the passions and undermine the habits that sustained 
patriarchy” (355). In making such a critique Wollstonecraft unremittingly attacked 
paternalistic sensibility. In the final chapter of the The Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft 
writes: “Another instance of that feminine weakness of character, often produced by a 
confined education, is a romantic twist of the mind, which has been very properly termed 
sentimental” (Vindication II 183). Wollstonecraft condemns such sentimental women, 
“who are amused by the reveries of the stupid novelists, who, knowing little of human 
nature, work up stale tales, and describe meretricious scenes, all retailed in a sentimental 
jargon, which equally tend to corrupt the taste, and draw the heart aside from its daily 
duties” (Vindication II 183). 
But the main brunt of her criticism in her second vindication is directed not at the 
“stupid novelists” of sensibility (presumably women) but rather at the more insidious 
books written by men that inculcated female subservience in the name of “improvement” 
and refined sensibility. Drawing a good deal of her ire was Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who 
was perhaps the most dangerous advocate of sensibility in Wollstonecraft’s eyes because 
he seemed—particularly in his republican politics—the most progressive. 
Wollstonecraft’s main issue with Rousseau is that he would “degrade woman by making 
her the slave of love,” by which Wollstonecraft means a slave of her super-refined, often 
tortuous, feelings (Vindication II 91). At certain points in her life, Wollstonecraft was 




had been half in love with Rousseau, and she praises him in a number of her reviews for 
the Analytical Review (Collected Letters 263).12
In her second vindication, Wollstonecraft’s critique of Rousseau takes up the bulk 
of the chapter entitled “Animadversions on Some Writers.” That chapter functions very 
much like the kind of book reviews she wrote for the Analytical Review—the book being, 
in this case, Émile—abstracting long passages, accompanied by her critical exegesis. She 
focuses not upon Émile but upon Sophie, Émile’s consort. Rousseau depicts her as a 
creature that is both complaisant and cunning, but only to the extent that her man wants 
her to be. Wollstonecraft quotes him:  
 However, in her second vindication 
Wollstonecraft is quite sparing in her praise for Rousseau. She concludes that his 
sensibility was not that much different than Burke’s. Though on the opposite end of the 
political spectrum, Rousseau like Burke was a philosophical rake. Both writers used the 
language of sensibility to seduce women into accepting what in fact degraded them, and 
did so on behalf of “social harmony.” Both writers made it seem reasonable to bar all 
women from participation in the public sphere, because their sex, and their sexuality, 
supposedly made them unfit for public debate.  
Hence we deduce [another] consequence from the different constitutions of the 
sexes; which is, that the strongest should be master in appearance, and be 
dependent in fact on the weakest; and that not from any frivolous practice of 
gallantry . . . but from an invariable law of nature, which, furnishing woman with 
                                                          
12 According to the attributions established by Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler in their collection of 
Wollstonecraft’s reviews for the Analytical Review, Wollstonecraft published six reviews relating to works 
by Rousseau (Confessions Part II), or works that deal substantially with Rousseau (such as the memoirs of 




a greater facility to excite desires than she has given man to satisfy them, makes 
the latter dependent on the good pleasure of the former. (Vindication II 78)  
According to Rousseau, then, women use their “feminine charms,” their beauty and their 
perceived weakness, to control men through the offering and withholding of sex. The 
cultivation of exquisite feeling is also the responsibility of women, and this too they 
supposedly use to attract and keep men. Rousseau asserts that girls should be taught how 
this hyper-emotional, sexualized and gendered system of sexual separate spheres works. 
Wollstonecraft argues that “these fundamental principles lead to a system of cunning and 
lasciviousness,” and that this kind of education—or rather false consciousness—is “a 
school for coquetry and art,” in which girls are taught to listen to compliments rather than 
instruction (78, 81). Thus, as Johnson puts it, Wollstonecraft’s “strategy in Rights of 
Woman is . . . to discredit chivalric sentimentality for conducing to an intolerable 
equivocality of gender and power. She exposes it as a ruse, in effect as a sort of drag 
show whereby queens perversely become tyrants, kings become queens, and men conceal 
the grossness of their power beneath the skirts of the beautiful” (34-35). 
Wollstonecraft suggests that, for Rousseau, mindless, unthinking women were 
more desirable than those who cultivate and use their reason. This, supposedly, is because 
thinking women—as opposed to feeling women—would abscond from their “natural” 
domestic role, which would threaten social order. For Wollstonecraft this is paternalism 
and Rousseau’s chivalric sensibility is integral to it. “Sensibility,” for Rousseau’s perfect 
woman, “is nurtured at the expence of the understanding,” making her weak and 
dependent (Vindication II 90). Wollstonecraft acknowledges that women should be 




“sensible” education for women—which includes instruction in the “wanton arts of the 
mistress, termed virtuous coquetry”—will achieve these ends (Vindication II 91). The 
separate sphere to which Rousseau designates women can only retard and blight their 
development into virtuous individuals. Without the development of reason, even if they 
are good wifely companions and mothers, women remain “immured in their families 
groping in the dark” (Vindication II 5). They can have no knowledge of civil affairs, and 
take no part in the public sphere; their super-refined sensibility leaves no room for such 
mental excursions and incursions. 
          Though their sensibility makes them unfit for participation in the public sphere, 
women must submit at all times to public opinion. Rousseau writes that women must 
“remain either under subjection to the men, or to the opinions of mankind; and are never 
permitted to set themselves above those opinions” (83). These are, Wollstonecraft argues, 
truly the “opinions of mankind”: women have no part in it. What is more, for 
Wollstonecraft, Rousseau’s public opinion is not the same as publicity. Rather than the 
product of informed and rational discussion in the public sphere, it functions much more 
like Burke’s prejudice. Habermas makes this distinction himself in his own discussion of 
Rousseau: “Public opinion had the form of common sense. It was dispersed through a 
people in the form of prejudices” (120). Wollstonecraft likens public opinion to 
Procrustes’s bed, “the iron bed of fate,” in which women are mentally (and physically) 
mutilated in order to fit the preconceptions of men (Vindication II 79). When it came to 
women, Rousseau’s public opinion was really public prescription, and its purpose was the 




In her second vindication, Wollstonecraft resisted opinion-as-prejudice, threw a 
wrench in the mutilating machinery of male-defined gender roles, and broke out of the 
immurement of women in the private and the domestic. The literature of chivalric 
sensibility epitomized by Rousseau encouraged super-refined emotionality, the 
cultivation of prejudice, strictly separate spheres and gender roles. It vouchsafed power to 
women, but only in the domestic realm (the kitchen, the nursery, the bedroom); women 
who tried to escape their silken fetters, who “unsex’d” themselves, were forcibly returned 
to their place or permanently removed from it. Wollstonecraft would have none of it. 
Raising children, and instilling in them patriotic values, was public work. Wollstonecraft 
writes in her dedication: “If children are to be educated to understand the true principle of 
patriotism, their mother must be a patriot; and the love of mankind, from which an 
orderly train of virtues spring, can only be produced by considering the moral and civil 
interest of mankind; but the education and situation of woman, at present, shuts her out 
from such investigations” (Vindication II 4).  
According to Wollstonecraft, then, to be a good mother and citizen a woman 
needs to engage publicity in some way; to fulfill this duty, she needs to be educated 
properly, reading books of history and science rather than novels of sensibility, and she 
needs to be able to participate in public debates that intimately concern her and other 
women. Wollstonecraft writes elsewhere in her vindication: “I have endeavoured to shew 
that private duties are never properly fulfilled unless the understanding enlarges the heart; 
and that public virtue is only an aggregate of private” (Vindication II 192). Women need 
understanding that “enlarges the heart,” or a rationalized, civic sensibility, which is 




entails no insurmountable division of the public and private spheres. . . .  The duties of 
maternity . . . do not block women from participating in civic life any more than the 
equally important duties of fatherhood customarily inhibit men’s circulation in the public 
sphere” (48). The public sphere as Wollstonecraft conceives it in A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman is not just where men go to use their reason to protect their domestic 
interests (including their wives and children), but a sphere where patriotic wives and 
mothers go to educate themselves and help shape their world. It is precisely because they 
are mothers, and educators of children, that women should be assigned a space within the 
public sphere.13
What Wollstonecraft proposed in The Rights of Woman was a civic sensibility for 
women. Women needed to cultivate their hearts and minds, rather than pamper their 
bodies and pander to their passions, as in novels of sensibility. Women should be 
encouraged to cultivate a sense of benevolence which is directed universally, rather than 
towards kith and kin—and paramours—exclusively. Sapiro contends that 
Wollstonecraft’s “brief to women was that they must not be embedded only in the family 
and domestic, particularist concerns because public spirit is the foundation on which 
private affections become truly virtuous. Their affections must be expanded outward to 
include ‘universal benevolence’” (178).  Mitzi Myers similarly claims that in her second 
vindication “Wollstonecraft aggrandizes, heroizes the maternal mission, elevating 
woman’s status by making her familial roles the linchpin of a new society. Although she 
does not suggest that woman’s only possible place is the home, motherhood provides a 
pervasive rationale for better education, as well as for civil existence and work” (“Reform 
   
                                                          
13 This claim is also, as Claudia Johnson points out, contra many of her allies in the dissenting reform 




or Ruin” 210).14 This makes Wollstonecraft’s civic sensibility an expression of British 
republicanism. It reflects Wollstonecraft’s adherence to the dissenting, 
Commonwealthman tradition, which idealized the republican, civil humanist values of 
the mid-seventeenth-century interregnum in Britain.15
Wollstonecraft’s republican civic sensibility needs to be distinguished from what 
Joan Landes calls “republican motherhood,” which derives from French 
republicanism.”
 
16 Landes writes: “According to the logic of republican motherhood, 
woman’s major political task was to instill her children with patriotic duty. It followed, 
then, that the home could serve as the nursery of the state” (Women and the Public 
Sphere 138). Novels of sensibility, needless to say, were unwelcome in the “nursery of 
the state.” Says Landes: “If women are to be good mothers and good household 
managers, old habits of sensibility must be destroyed. In this respect, Wollstonecraft 
shares Rousseau’s suspicions of women, though she aims to portray women as victims of 
false education rather than as inferior creatures of nature” (Women and the Public Sphere 
132). In her account Landes makes the case that republican motherhood was predicated 
on a strict separation of private and public spheres, and reflects republican ideology 
following the French Revolution.17
                                                          
14 In Romanticism and Gender, Anne Mellor makes a similar claim. She maintains that Wollstonecraft 
advocated rational, egalitarian “‘family politics’ as a political program that would radically transform the 
public sphere” by “invoking a new political program, one that would inexorably change the existing 
systems of patriarchy and primogeniture” (84). 
 Landes observes that the price of a virtuous public, 
15 What I call “civic sensibility” is a feminist version of civic humanism, as described by J. G. A. Pocock in 
“Civic Humanism and its Role in Anglo-American Thought” (chapter 3 in Politics, Language, and Time), 
and qualified by Isaac Kramnick in Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism. For civic humanism in the 
context of art, see John Barrell, The Political Theory of Painting from Reynolds to Hazlitt. Sapiro discusses 
Barrell and civic humanism in relation to Wollstonecraft’s first vindication, in A Vindication of Political 
Virtue, 208-210. 
16 Both French republicanism and British Commonwealthman republicanism enshrined the concept of 
separate spheres based on gender. On this topic see G. J. Barker-Benfield, “Mary Wollstonecraft: 
Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthwoman.” 




according to Rousseau, “is the silencing of women, their banishment to the domestic 
sphere” (Women and the Public Sphere 89). This republican separation of private and 
public spheres, Landes asserts, makes the public sphere inescapably masculinist. This 
might be true of French republicanism, and the French public sphere following the 
revolution, but it does not apply to Wollstonecraft, whose formulation of civic sensibility 
is based on very different models of republicanism and publicity.18
          Barbara Taylor has her own answer to the contention that Wollstonecraft hates 
women in her second vindication. Taylor claims that Wollstonecraft was targeting 
aristocratic women, not all women; in other words it was class rather than gender that 
motivated her critique of the kind of women found in many novels of sensibility. Taylor 
writes: 
  
The specific issue of Wollstonecraft’s misogyny is clearer [when] we see that it 
was the eroticized lady of fashion at whom her hostility was largely directed, as it 
was in the writings of most bourgeois moralists, male and female. Along with the 
ideological mileage to be gained by such sentiments, there were important social 
factors contributing to them. The first chapter of the Rights of Woman denounced 
the spread of “false refinement” from the aristocracy to the middle class, and 
particularly to newly affluent women who now, Wollstonecraft writes, “all want 
to be ladies,” that is, to ape the leisured lifestyle of the rich in place of the modest, 
work- and home-oriented lives of the traditional middling orders. (505). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sex education in the French Republic. In her dedication to Talleyrand-Perigord in A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft rebuts his proposal. Shanley notes: “The belief that men and women 
would (and, further, should) occupy separate spheres and perform wholly different tasks resulted in their 
receiving quite distinct educations, and led to the corruption that Wollstonecraft deplored” (356).  
18 For the view that Wollstonecraft is masculinist in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, see Mary 
Jacobus, “The Difference in View”; Mary Poovey, The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer (chapter 2); 
Cora Kaplan, “Pandora’s Box,” and, for the most strident (and borderline misogynist) formulation of 




Wollstonecraft seeks to counter this gentrification, and the role the literature of sensibility 
plays in it, in her second vindication. Distinguishing bourgeois from aristocratic women 
was vital to this effort.19
Orrin Wang would also likely contest Landes’s charge that Wollstonecraft was 
masculinist. In his deconstructionist reading of her second vindication, Wang 
convincingly shows that Wollstonecraft disrupts “the gendered identity of reason as a 
masculine identity defined by its difference from an emotional feminine alterity” (121). 
Instead, Wollstonecraft’s text “preempts” this gendered binary “by destabilizing the 
opposition between reason and the host of terms the text contrasts with reason” and doing 
similar things with sensibility (124). As such, he concludes that “the moral is the 
dialectical limit reason and passion impose on each other’s perceptual powers” (138). As 
we will see in my discussion of A Short Residence, Wollstonecraft continued to 
experiment with this practice of slippage until the end of her life. 
 
A Vindication of the Rights of Woman is often described as a treatise on female 
education, which I will not deny.20
                                                          
19 And what of those who claim Wollstonecraft is too feminine, or too sentimental, in The Rights of 
Woman? McCann writes that “despite its well documented attempt to repress the feminine, it remains, by 
its own account of flawed femininity, a persistently ‘feminine’ text, in its rehearsal of sentimental, proto-
Romantic language very similar at times to the sentimental ideology for which she so roundly criticized 
Burke in Vindication of the Rights of  Men” (151). Barbara Taylor agrees that “the Rights of Woman is 
often as florid as the ‘sickly’ writings it condemns—and as emotive in its readerly address” (52). However 
she goes on to say that “a romantic eloquence that is explicitly repudiated becomes Wollstonecraft’s 
implicit rhetorical strategy” (52). 
 But it is also a primer on civic sensibility. 
Wollstonecraft presses upon women the need to use their reason and aptitude for 
benevolence to inculcate in children their political and public duties, and to participate in 
public debates themselves. It was on behalf of this campaign that Wollstonecraft sought 
20 R. M. Janes points out that reviewers initially considered the second vindication “as a sensible treatise on 
female education,” and ignored its more controversial political positions. That is, they downplayed the 
work by categorizing it as a work of the domestic sphere, as opposed to a work of the public sphere. This 
was a politically motivated interpretation that I oppose in my own argument. See “On the Reception of 




to dismantle of gendered binaries, which prevented the unfettered praxis of publicity for 
both women and men. 
 
The Confluence of Sensibility, Publicity, and Romanticism in A Short Residence  
 
Letters Written During a Short Residence in Sweden, Norway and Denmark is a 
book of travels in the form of a series of sentimental letters supposedly written while 
Wollstonecraft was traveling through Scandinavia on business at the behest of her 
estranged lover, Gilbert Imlay.21
Wollstonecraft recognized that her social position and political ostracism placed 
constraints on her rhetorical power. Under siege and alone, she did what 
 In its day, the work was very popular and admired for its 
expression of sensibility. This is odd, because the moments of sensibility in the work are 
few and far between—brief interludes in a highly polemical text. Wollstonecraft opined 
and argued about many of the things she saw on her journey, comparing Scandinavia to 
more developed regions of Europe, touting the republican ideals permeating the 
hinterlands, chronicling the eclipse of the aristocracy, and warning of the corrupting 
power of commerce—which Wollstonecraft called “a species of gambling” (143). As 
Caroline Franklin points out, many of Wollstonecraft’s pronouncements were 
controversial, but neither she nor the work were considered as such (164). Mary Heng 
notes that the feminist republican Wollstonecraft should have drawn more criticism at a 
time (1796) in which political reaction was in the ascendant. Heng’s explanation: 
                                                          
21 Per Nyström gives the most comprehensive account of the business investigations and negotiations 
involved in the trip, which until his article in 1980 were generally not discussed (due to lack of 
information) in works on Wollstonecraft. Richard Holmes, in the introduction to his edition of Short 
Residence, gives perhaps the most readable summary of Nyström’s findings. For more see Nyström’s Mary 




nonconformist writers have long done: she went underground, and quite 
successfully. A Short Residence in Sweden essentially is a primer for subversive 
texts, in which the author not only escaped personal attack but also earned praise, 
notoriety, and social acceptance. (295) 
In other words, Wollstonecraft used a popular mode—sensibility—to obscure her politics 
and her criticism of “things as they are.” 
But Wollstonecraft was doing more with sensibility than just using it as a cover 
for her reformist politics during a reactionary period: she was attempting to separate 
sensibility from polemics, which actually makes A Short Residence quite polemical. She 
both attacks and recuperates some aspects of chivalric sensibility, and some aspects of 
civic sensibility. A Short Residence evinces a divided author and a divided book. 
However, Wollstonecraft was well aware of this division and for the first time embraced 
her “unsex’d” public persona. She saw the benefits of incorporating into her sensibility 
balanced binaries such as political and conservative, male and female, public and private. 
That is, in the last work she published in her lifetime, Wollstonecraft began to delineate a 
new hybridized kind of Romantic sensibility that, instead of assigning one kind of 
sensibility to the private sphere and the opposite kind to the public sphere, acted as a 
bridge between them. Instead of utilizing sensibility polemically, she suggested using it to 
heal the divisions of her time, avoiding the extremes of a reactionary domesticity and a 
contentious, dysfunctional publicity.  
As already mentioned, A Short Residence is both travelogue and epistolary 
narrative in the sentimental vein, making it, in terms of genre, a hybrid work. In that it is 




medium and publicity. Habermas notes that “in the age of sentimentality letters were 
containers for the ‘outpourings of the heart’” (49). He argues that as the basis of 
epistolary sentimental fictions, letters were an important part of the process by which the 
British bourgeoisie developed the subjectivity and critical reasoning skills needed to 
confront the state in the public sphere. Mary Favret claims that in the 1790s, “the letter 
had, in fact, become a phenomenally useful political tool, available to anyone with a pen. 
. . . What the individual writes, the masses read; experience is translated from the private 
to the public domain, and back again” (9). Elizabeth Cook argues that epistolary fictions 
show “how the thematic of the domestic and the erotic can be made to encode and even 
to regulate ostensibly public matters; in the inverted structures of epistolary narrative the 
private is thoroughly colonized by the public” (177).  Similarly, Moira Haslett remarks 
that “it is in epistolary fiction . . . that the paradoxical necessity that the ‘private’ be 
‘publicised’ is most apparent” (112). Where I differ with these critics is in regards to the 
public standing of the letter in epistolary fictions. Such correspondence facilitated 
communication between public and private, but it was not public or private per se; it 
inhabited and helped delineate a zone of negotiation between the two. 
The hybrid nature of the work, in terms of genre, medium, and publicity was 
likely a factor in the hybrid sensibility presented in A Short Residence. In his memoirs, 
Godwin extols this sensibility in Wollstonecraft’s work: “Perhaps a book of travels that so 
irresistibly seizes on the heart, never, in any other instance, found its way from the press. 
. . . If ever there was a book calculated to make a man in love with its author, this appears 
to me to be the book” (249).22
                                                          
22 Deborah Weiss makes a very strong case that Godwin’s sentimentalization of Wollstonecraft—his 
project in his memoirs of Wollstonecraft and in his edition of Wollstonecraft’s posthumous works—is 




Wollstonecraft’s complete and newly self-conscious return to the ethics and aesthetics of 
sensibility” (147). She continues: “In Letters in Sweden, Wollstonecraft is neither shy, as 
she is in Mary, nor equivocal, as she is in Rights of Men, about her allegiance to 
sensibility. She declares an end to the war she launches against it in Rights of Woman and 
emphasizes anew its psychological benefits” (148). Poovey, who cites Wollstonecraft’s 
previous forays into sensibility as evidence of false consciousness, contends that 
Wollstonecraft finally got it right in A Short Residence. In this work, “Wollstonecraft 
openly appeals . . . to her reader’s emotions because for the first time she openly 
acknowledges the primacy of her own feelings and the power of those feelings to engage 
and persuade” (83). What Godwin, Conger, and Poovey do not make clear is that 
Wollstonecraft’s re-engagement with sensibility was highly ambivalent. In her new 
appreciation of sensibility, she incorporated elements of both chivalric and civic 
sensibility—not in an effort to close the gap between them, to decide the matter once and 
for all, but rather in an attempt to transcend their differences.    
In an appendix to A Short Residence, Wollstonecraft admitted that her intention 
was to consider “the grand causes which combine to carry mankind forward, and 
diminish the sum of human misery” (198). That is, she was still motivated by universal 
benevolence, and civic sensibility. She notes that “the meliorating manners of Europe” 
have brought much improvement to the condition of the Scandinavian countries. 
However, “innumerable evils still remain . . . to afflict the humane investigator, and hurry 
the benevolent reformer into a labyrinth of error, who aims at destroying prejudices 
                                                                                                                                                                             
essentially chivalric (199-203). By focusing on her suffering and her super-refined emotionality, and 
downplaying her intellectual development, Godwin turns Wollstonecraft into the type of sentimental 
heroine that both Burke and Rousseau would applaud. As I argue in this section, however, Godwin’s 




quickly which only time can root out, as the public opinion becomes subject to reason” 
(199). This becomes a major motif in A Short Residence: cultural advancement takes time 
and reformers often make matters worse by being precipitate. No doubt she had the 
French Revolution in mind when reaching this conclusion. 
A Short Residence reveals other moments of ambivalence in regards to the effect 
of the French Revolution on the physical and moral improvement of Europeans. 
Wollstonecraft notes, for instance, that the Norwegians “love their country, but have not 
much public spirit. Their exertions are, generally speaking, only for their families; which 
I conceive will always be the case, till politics, becoming a subject of discussion, enlarges 
the heart by opening the understanding. The French revolution will have this effect” 
(103). But, in other passages, she has her doubts. In their general introduction to The 
Works of Mary Wollstonecraft, Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler reference Wollstonecraft’s 
approval of the pro-republican, pro-French sympathies of common Norwegians in the 
work. Wollstonecraft writes that “they sing, at present, with great glee, many republican 
songs, and seem earnestly to wish that the republic may stand” (103). Yet Wollstonecraft 
says of the same people that they are non-political, and “appear very much attached to 
their prince royal” (103). Todd and Butler write that Norway, as Wollstonecraft describes 
it, “is a country of smallholdings, which leads locally to a form of republicanism in which 
mayors and judges, [Wollstonecraft] notes approvingly, ‘exercise a form of authority 
almost patriarchal’” (20). Wollstonecraft does not use the word “republican” to describe 
these men, and her use of the word “patriarchal” suggests a friendlier attitude towards 
paternalism. Wollstonecraft does find impressions of “the cloven foot of despotism”—in 




Copenhagen, but this is offset by a more positive attitude towards aristocrats outside the 
major cities. In general, her message seems to be that the Scandinavians have the 
potential for an egalitarian society, republican government, and universal benevolence in 
the form of civic sensibility—but had not yet realized it. 
Wollstonecraft makes the case that the class most responsible for holding back 
Scandinavia was the one that should have led the charge: the bourgeoisie. That is because 
the Scandinavian bourgeoisie was obsessed with getting rich. Conger claims that in A 
Short Residence, Wollstonecraft “sees sensibility as the chief protagonist in a general 
struggle over the human spirit: it nurtures progress, the refinement of manners, the 
improvement of minds and social institutions. Its antagonist is sensuality, but sensuality 
now in the specific modern form of middle class commerce” (149). In the second half of 
her book Wollstonecraft repeatedly excoriates commerce and those involved in trade. As 
anti-commerce Cassandra, Wollstonecraft claims that “a man ceases to love humanity, 
and then individuals, as he advances in the chase after wealth; as one clashes with his 
interest, the other with his pleasures: to business, as it is termed, every thing must give 
way; nay, is sacrificed; and all the endearing charities of citizen, husband, father, brother, 
become empty names” (193). As commentators are wont to point out, Wollstonecraft 
condemned the business practices of republicans such as her former lover Gilbert Imlay, 
whose “business interests” (smuggling and gun-running) precipitated Wollstonecraft’s 
journey, and she implied that this was yet another way in which the French Revolution 
had gone off course. As her words above make clear, Wollstonecraft found commerce and 
civic sensibility to be profoundly incompatible. She even goes so far as to claim that “the 




It should come as no surprise, then, that in A Short Residence rank—or more 
generally aristocracy—is reappraised in positive terms. Indeed, Wollstonecraft seems to 
endorse certain aspects of Burkean prejudice and chivalric sensibility. Wollstonecraft 
writes that “the great [aristocrats], who alone travel, in this period of society, for the 
observation of manners and customs made by sailors is very confined, bring home 
improvement to promote their own comfort, which is gradually spread abroad amongst 
the people, till they are stimulated to think for themselves” (119). The person of the 
aristocrat circulating through the people communicates political, social, aesthetic ideas, 
rather than the rationalist bourgeois in the public sphere. This “trickle-down” conception 
of culture seems to reverse Wollstonecraft’s previous association of harmful prejudice 
with the aristocracy: now the benighted sailors and farmers of Norway suffer because of 
their ignorance, and the aristocrats, by means of a strategic use of prejudice, “enlighten” 
them. Wollstonecraft thus grants the aristocracy—at least the Scandinavian equivalent—a 
role in social advancement.  
At the same time, there is something nostalgic and melancholic about 
Wollstonecraft’s rendering of prejudice in A Short Residence, suggesting that the 
aristocratic hegemony in Europe was no more. In a number of passages, Wollstonecraft 
relates her tours of the abandoned residences of church officials, aristocrats, and royals in 
Scandinavia, suggesting that the ceremonial publicity of the state—a key component of 
chivalric sensibility—had become spectral.  For instance, after Wollstonecraft visited the 
Rosenborg palace in Copenhagen, she wrote: “This palace, now deserted, displays a 
gloomy kind of grandeur throughout . . . and I listen for the sound of my footsteps, as I 




superstition. Every object carried me back to past times, and impressed the manners of 
the age forcibly on my mind. In this point of view the preservation of old palaces, and 
their tarnished furniture, is useful; for they may be considered as historical documents” 
(175). As historical documents, Wollstonecraft suggests, the piles of the powerful have 
much to contribute to an understanding of the past, and to the arrangements of civil 
society in the present. But this only became possible after the aristocracy had lost its way 
and its sway, after ceremonial publicity had become mere pageantry, and chivalric 
sensibility an instructive kind of nostalgia. 
In A Short Residence, Wollstonecraft hails the republican sentiments of the plebs, 
condemns the greed of the bourgeois, and offers an olive branch to the aristocracy. This 
makes her seem ambivalent, and her text conflicted, particularly when compared to her 
more strident pronouncements in her vindications. She seems equally confused in regards 
to sensibility, finding fault with civic sensibility and discovering positive social uses of 
aristocratic ceremonial publicity. However, unlike in her vindications, Wollstonecraft 
seems well aware of her ambivalence and strives to make it productive. This ambivalence 
provides an inchoate discursive space, and a sensibility, that transcends the divisions of 
class, politics, and ideology and breaks down the public-private binary. In this way, 
Wollstonecraft embraces her hybrid nature, and a hybrid view of society, that is not just 
“unsex’d” but also “unclass’d,” and “unpubliciz’d.”  
Wollstonecraft does this most dramatically in her descriptions of the sublime and 
the beautiful in A Short Residence. A number of critics have focused on Wollstonecraft’s 
expropriation of ideas presented by Burke in A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of 




Short Residence. Todd, for instance, records that “Wollstonecraft’s letter writer [in A 
Short Residence] showed herself moved by Burke’s version of the sublime, the sense of 
mystery in nature, the obscure but definite affinity of the solitary searching soul with the 
animated wildness outside” (“Enlightenment Desire” 347). In Norway, Wollstonecraft 
engages the sublime when she visits a waterfall near Frederickstad. She writes: “The 
tumultuous emotions this sublime object excited, were pleasurable; and, viewing it, my 
soul rose, with renewed dignity, above its cares—grasping at immortality—it seemed 
impossible to stop the current of my thoughts, as of the always varying, still the same, 
torrent before me—I stretched out my hand to eternity, bounding over the dark speck of 
life to come” (153). Such passages also show Wollstonecraft’s debt to Burke’s version of 
the beautiful. However, she pointedly does not distinguish it from the sublime:  
What misery, as well as rapture, is produced by a quick perception of the beautiful 
and the sublime, when it is exercised in observing animated nature, when every 
beauteous feeling and emotion excites responsive sympathy, and the harmonized 
soul sinks into melancholy, or rises to extasy, just as the chords are touched, like 
the Aeolian harp agitated by the changing wind. But how dangerous is it to foster 
these sentiments in such an imperfect state of existence; and how difficult to 
eradicate them when an affection for mankind, a passion for an individual, is but 
the unfolding of that love which embraces all that is great and beautiful. (9) 
For Wollstonecraft in A Short Residence, the beautiful and the sublime are nearly 
interchangeable, and each melds into the other. Her sensibility is dependent on both, and 




Wollstonecraft also re-casts Burke’s aesthetics by degendering (“unsexing”) the 
sublime and the beautiful. A number of critics have discussed the “unsex’d” 
Wollstonecraft in A Short Residence, and particularly how she identifies with the 
masculine sublime.23
                                                          
23 Deborah Weiss notes “the prevailing tendency to separate feeling from philosophy in analyses of Short 
Residence,” and how these two categories are usually assigned to different genders (female and male 
respectively) (203 n8). She cites Mary Favret’s Romantic Correspondence in this regard, as well as Carol 
Huebscher Rhoades, who writes of Wollstonecraft’s “non-gendered” sublime. Weiss also mentions a more 
recent tendency to see A Short Residence as “unsex’d,” as combining (and vexing) masculine and feminine 
qualities. This tendency, it should be clear, characterizes this chapter. For more on this topic, see Frances 
Ferguson, Solitude and the Sublime; and Patricia Yaeger, “Toward a Feminine Sublime.” 
 According to John Whale, A Short Residence indicates 
Wollstonecraft’s “involvement with the masculine aesthetic of the Romantic sublime and 
its capacity to operate at the expense of woman” (170). Whale describes one nature scene 
in particular: “A reverie over the tranquil sea-scape of Tonsberg culminates in a sublime 
crescendo which is the type of the classic scene of subjection to the figure of the father…. 
Paradoxically, out of this sublime obeisance or subjection, Wollstonecraft announces a 
defiant new subjectivity, as she self-consciously identifies with the literature of 
sensibility” (172). However, I do not see obeisance to a masculine sublime in A Short 
Residence, but instead a male-female hybridity. That is, Wollstonecraft inflects the 
sublime with femininity, disassociating it from its strictly masculine Burkean sense; and 
she inflects the beautiful with masculinity, also reversing Burke’s categories. Then going 
further, Wollstonecraft relates this “unsex’d” beautiful/sublime binary to the 
public/private binary embedded in Burke’s chivalric sensibility, destabilizing this binary 
as well. These transpositions trouble the identification of sensibility with either privacy or 
publicity, with either chivalry or civic involvement. Aristocratic ceremonial publicity is 




of prejudice. Wollstonecraft has traveled beyond both chivalrous and civic sensibility to 
arrive at a compromise which utilizes elements of both.  
Along with Burke’s, the spectral presence of Rousseau can be discerned in A 
Short Residence. It is Rousseau the author of Reveries of the Solitary Walker, and the 
wounded sensibility he displays in that work, that engage Wollstonecraft in A Short 
Residence. Favret writes that “as another stage in Wollstonecraft’s lifelong dialogue with 
the works of Rousseau, the Letters from Sweden replay the themes of the solitary walker: 
the search for the source of human happiness, the stoic rejection of material goods, the 
ecstatic embrace of nature, and the essential role of sentiment in understanding” (104). 
Caroline Franklin notes that like Rousseau Wollstonecraft “paints herself as the 
melancholy genius whose extreme sensibility is too overwrought for repose” (160). In 
numerous places in her writings, Wollstonecraft condemns Rousseau for his super-refined 
sensibility, and for foisting it upon women. This, as you will recall, was the basis for 
Wollstonecraft’s claim that the republican Rousseau, like Burke, promulgated a form of 
chivalric sensibility. 
In A Short Residence, Wollstonecraft occasionally wallows in super-refined 
sensibility, suggesting that she had become a woman in the Rousseauvian mode, and a 
late convert to chivalric sensibility. For instance, Wollstonecraft writes: “Let me catch 
pleasure on the wing—I may be melancholy to-morrow. Now all my nerves keep time 
with the melody of nature. Ah! let me be happy whilst I can. The tear starts as I think of 
it. I must fly from thought, and find refuge from sorrow in a strong imagination—the 
only solace for a feeling heart. Phantoms of bliss! ideal forms of excellence! again 




disappointments which render the sympathy painful” (128-129). Reason cannot save her; 
she must flee from thought. In this passage, she seems equally skeptical of imagination, 
which she likens to phantoms and falsehood. Her feelings bring her pain, but try as she 
might she cannot escape them. She resembles the super-refined female slave that 
Rousseau describes. 
However there are other passages in the work that suggest that it is not really 
escape from feelings or from thought that Wollstonecraft seeks; rather she attempts to 
exploit the slippage between rationality and sentimentality to strike a balance between the 
two, to initiate dialogue. In Wollstonecraft’s most succinct articulation of this position in 
A Short Residence, she writes: “We reason deeply, when we forcibly feel” (171). 
Throughout the work she suggests that the converse is also true: “We forcibly feel, when 
we reason deeply.” Once again, as Wang says of Wollstonecraft’s second vindication, “the 
moral is the dialectical limit reason and passion impose on each other’s perceptual 
powers” (138). Such passages in A Short Residence indicate that an analytical self-
consciousness about feelings, combined with “the melody of nature”—a solitary 
immersion in the natural world that offers an opportunity for emotional catharsis—makes 
feelings much less pernicious in their capacity to oppress women.   
In her second vindication, Wollstonecraft berated Rousseau (in works such as 
Discourse on Inequality) for his claim that humans develop their true selves in solitude 
rather than in society (13-17). Her objection was based on Rousseau’s gendering of 
solitude and society, with men finding freedom in a state of nature, and women being 
forever subject to public opinion. This makes solitude integral to Rousseau’s version of 




to subscribe to Rousseau’s position. In her first letter, Wollstonecraft echoes Rousseau’s 
anti-social attitude expressed at the beginning of Reveries. Wollstonecraft writes: “How 
frequently has melancholy and even misanthropy taken possession of me, when the world 
has disgusted me, and friends have proved unkind. I have then considered myself as a 
particle broken off from the grand mass of mankind” (69). 24
But then, like Rousseau, she continues to aspire to community, in the form of 
Rousseau’s state-of-nature “golden age.” In a paean to the small farmers of Norway, she 
writes: “The description I received of them carried me back to the fables of the golden 
age: independence and virtue; affluence without vice; cultivation of mind, without 
depravity of heart; with ‘ever smiling liberty’, the nymph of the mountain.—I want faith! 
My imagination hurries me forward to seek an asylum in such a retreat from all the 
disappointments I am threatened with; but reason drags me back” (149).
  
25
In A Short Residence, Wollstonecraft attempts to show that solitude and civic 
engagement work in tandem. She claims to be “more and more convinced that a 
metropolis, or an abode absolutely solitary, is the best calculated for the improvement of 
 Once again, 
she seeks “asylum” from her “disappointments” but is dragged back by her reason. But it 
is important to note that in this passage imagination provides escape but is not an escape: 
imagination is an intermediary between private and public spheres, as well as between 
feeling and reason.  
                                                          
24 Compare Wollstonecraft’s statement with the one that begins Reveries of the Solitary Walker: “So now I 
am alone in the world, with no brother, neighbor or friend, nor any company left me but my own. The most 
sociable and loving of men has with one accord been cast out by all the rest. With all the ingenuity of hate 
they have sought out the cruelest torture for my sensitive soul” (27).  
25 Letter 9 and letter 1 also mention Rousseau’s golden age. In letter 1, as in letter 14 (quoted above), the 
reference is positive. In letter 9 she speaks of “Rousseau’s golden age of stupidity” to say that happiness is 
not found in “unconscious ignorance” but in “the high-wrought mind” (122). Wollstonecraft is clearly torn 
between Rousseau’s vision of community in nature and the refined society typically found in more 




the heart, as well as the understanding; whether we desire to become acquainted with 
man, nature, or ourselves. Mixing with mankind, we are obliged to examine our 
prejudices, and often imperceptibly lose, as we analyze them” (79).  Elsewhere she 
writes: “My thoughts fly from this wilderness to the polished circles of the world, till 
recollecting its vices and follies, I bury myself in the woods, but find it necessary to 
emerge again, that I may not lose sight of the wisdom and virtue that exalts my nature” 
(122). She finds solace by burying herself in the woods, but she finds virtue by 
frequenting “polished circles”: one is not possible without the other. In the state of nature 
there is no male or female; there is instead a sublime solitude of which all, of whatever 
gender, can partake. Like the sublime and the beautiful, Wollstonecraft “unsex’d” 
solitude and society. 
This might be interpreted as a movement from privacy to publicity, and back 
again, without disturbing the gendered associations affixed to these terms. But this, I 
maintain, is not generally the case in A Short Residence. Wollstonecraft might bury 
herself in the woods, but she would not immure herself in the family. The private sphere 
as limned in A Short Residence is not equivalent to the feminine domestic sphere, nor is 
the public sphere equivalent to a masculine zone of rational debate. Similarly, the 
distinction between chivalric and civic sensibility breaks down. What Wollstonecraft 
proposes is a sensibility that contains both, just as it contains both public and private. 
This sensibility is what I and other critics call Romantic. 
For Favret, the active ingredient in Wollstonecraft’s romantic sensibility is 
imagination, which knits together feminine and masculine, sensibility and reason. In A 




both the emotional and the intellectual progress of civilization” (122). Favret adds: 
“Traveling between the two spheres of ‘home’ and ‘business,’ the letter-writer claims 
allegiance to neither. Instead she appeals to an imagined and imaginative community, one 
which would free her from a domestic economy and provide a productive alternative to a 
capital-industrial-based society” (99). I would qualify Favret’s assessment by saying that 
Wollstonecraft did not replace sensibility or publicity with imagination, as Favret seems 
to suggest. Instead, imagination made possible a sensibility that could function in the 
inchoate zone between private and public spheres. In her other writings, Wollstonecraft is 
quite suspicious of imagination, which she sees as a pander to licentiousness. Imagination 
“debauched” Rousseau and perverted his sensibility, according to Wollstonecraft in her 
second vindication; the readers of his novels of sensibility, she asserts, were equally 
debauched (91). But in A Short Residence Wollstonecraft often had recourse to 
imagination as a mediator between feeling and rational analysis. Thus, in her schema of 
romantic sensibility, imagination works with rather than transcends reason.  
For Franklin, the active ingredient in Wollstonecraft’s romantic sensibility is self-
consciousness: “Wollstonecraft’s travel book is a seminal text for the development of 
British Romantic writing. It became the prototype for liberal writers in reflexively 
examining their own role as artists through meditative passages, in the course of 
traversing landscapes and cultural sites which allow them to reflect obliquely on the loss 
of their political hopes” (165). In this sense, Todd and Butler point out, Wollstonecraft 
resembles other Romantic writers who focused upon creativity and political 
displacement, particularly Lord Byron. They write “[A Short Residence] precedes Childe 




tragic and perhaps guilty passion, wandering off into desolate, dangerous places, is 
Wollstonecraft’s before it is Byron’s” (23). However, contra Franklin, Todd, and Butler, I 
maintain that Wollstonecraft’s self-reflexive romantic sensibility was not a retreat from 
reformist politics, nor an escape from society into the natural world. That is, in the end 
she disavowed the chivalric sensibility of Burke and Rousseau and began to develop 
instead a sensibility that would put a progressive construction upon a sensibility that 
contains both thinking and feeling, both solitude and society. 
The active ingredient in Wollstonecraft’s romantic sensibility, for Todd and Butler, 
is alienation and egoism. They even go so far as to claim that Wollstonecraft is as self-
involved as any male Romantic. They conclude that “the common modern critical 
assertion that subjective egotistical Romanticism is a male mode owes more to the 
sociology of reception over two centuries than to an authentic gap in the literary record” 
(24). They claim that Wollstonecraft exhibits in A Short Residence what Ann Mellor calls 
“feminine Romanticism,” which resists the masculine appropriation of feminine 
sensibility. My position is that Wollstonecraft was no longer, as in her vindications, 
concerned with fighting off male incursions or planting a feminine flag within a 
masculinist public sphere. In A Short Residence, her intention seems instead to breech the 
walls separating female and male, private and public, in an effort to establish a more 
inclusive public sphere and society. Her romantic sensibility is part and parcel of this 
effort. It is not a matter of masculine or feminine Romanticism, any more than it is a 
matter of masculine or feminine sensibility. Rather what Wollstonecraft proposes, albeit 
ambivalently—or perhaps” prematurely” is the better word—is a Romanticism that 




To be clear, Wollstonecraft’s (little “r”) romantic sensibility may infuse her (big 
“R”) Romanticism, but it does not completely define it. Wollstonecraft’s most significant 
contribution to Romanticism is arguably her conception of sensibility. This is not to say 
that Wollstonecraft’s ticket to the Romantic hall of fame was punched only after (and 
because) she abandoned feminism, society, and/or progressive politics. A Short Residence 
shows that she may have reconsidered her previous positions vis-à-vis sensibility, even 
acknowledging youthful errors, but in the end she resisted ideological gallantry and the 
divisions it fostered. She was no apostate; neither was she captive to the Romantic 
Ideology. She was “unsex’d” but not neuter: in reference to Wollstonecraft’s gender 
politics, it is not in the end a matter of “either-or” but rather “both-and.” Instead of 
abandoning one gender for the other, or the public for the private sphere, she attempted to 
establish a discourse in which such contraries could speak to one another. In this sense, 
Wollstonecraft embodied that strangely unpoetic phrase of John Keats, so often bruited as 
a definition of Romanticism: “negative capability.” It is only when she finished A Short 
Residence that she finally seemed “capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, 
without any irritable reaching after fact and reason”—or closure, in terms of enthroning 
male over female (or the converse), progressive politics over regressive (or the converse), 
publicity over privacy (or the converse) (Keats Letters I.193). At the end of her 
penultimate letter, after bewailing the evils of war speculation and the slave trade, 
Wollstonecraft exclaims: “Why should I weep for myself?—‘Take, O world! thy much 
indebted tear” (196).26
                                                          
26 In his edition of A Short Residence, Richard Holmes cannot find a source for this quotation. A quick 
search online suggests a possible source: Robert Burn’s 1786 song “A Farewell,” in which Burns writes: 
“Thee, Hamilton, and Aiken dear, / A grateful, warm adieu: / I, with a much-indebted tear, / Shall still 
remember you!” 




need of her pity. We reason deeply, when we forcibly feel, and vice versa. We also engage 
the world when we forcibly feel, as much as when we utilize reason. This epitomizes 




Chapter 5: William Blake, Antinomian Publicity, and the Tactics of 
Obscurity 
 
Allan Cunningham, one of the first biographers of William Blake, wrote of 
Blake’s Jerusalem the Emanation of the Giant Albion:  
It seems of a religious, political, and spiritual kind, and wanders from hell to 
heaven, and from heaven to earth; now glancing into the distractions of our own 
days, and then making a transition to the antediluvians. The crowning defect is 
obscurity; meaning seems now and then about to dawn; you turn plate after plate, 
and read motto after motto, in the hope of escaping from the darkness into light. 
But the first might as well be looked at last; the whole seems a riddle which no 
ingenuity can solve.1
Cunningham was not the first and probably not the last to complain about Blake’s 
“crowning defect” of obscurity. Contemporaries of Blake, such as Frederick Tatham and 
Henry Crabb Robinson, expressed their utter bewilderment when attempting to assess the 
meaning of Blake’s works. Since then obscurity has been a perennial complaint in Blake 
criticism.  
 
According to one of the latest critical trends, Blake’s obscurity is explained (at 
least in part) by his adherence to antinomianism, a radical religious movement that flouts 
religious and civil law. This chapter is intended as an intervention in this critical 
discussion concerning Blake’s antinomianism, as it relates to publicity. Like some of the 
critics who identify Blake as antinomian, I complement historicism with bibliography, 
and examine Blake’s book-making methods in cultural context. I make the case that 
                                                          
1 From the life of “William Blake” in Lives of the Most Eminent British Painters, Sculptors, and Architects, 




Blake consciously violated the laws of textual construction, making his texts obscure, as 
part of his antinomian media practice. At the same time I argue against the idea that 
Blake’s textual obscurity indicated alienation from the public sphere, and a retreat into 
privacy, by situating him within an antinomian public that had revived in the 1790s. That 
is, Blake utilized techniques typically used to preserve privacy to instead create coded 
texts that antinomians (and few others) could access. Thus the focus of the chapter is the 
tension between Blake’s antinomian media practice (textual obscurity) and antinomian 
publicity (public obscurity), at a time when antinomianism was under attack in the public 
sphere.  
I argue that the textual objects Blake created in the 1790s had more in common 
with letter bombs than belles lettres. That is, Blake’s “books” violated the codes of book-
making, in an attempt to subvert the rationalist hegemony in the public sphere of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which was enabled and authorized by the print 
book. Blake targeted religious books, particularly the Holy Bible, in his bibliographic 
crusade. As an antinomian, Blake was suspicious of the overweening power of scripture 
in his society, and its use by religious and political authorities to justify inequality and 
oppression. But as critical as Blake was of the Bible and the way it was used to prop up 
church and state, he was equally suspicious of attempts by deists and dissenters to 
rationalize the Bible, and supersede it with the dogmatic creed of science.  
Blake countered the abusive power of holy writ and the proselytization of 
religious and scientific exegetes with his antinomian Bible of Hell, which contained The 
Book of Urizen, The Book of Ahania, and The Book of Los. It is this biblical parody that I 




focused on the question of “difference” in The Book of Urizen, noting that none of the 
extant copies is the same and venturing various explanations for this. My explanation is 
that Blake the textual antinomian was attempting to destabilize the fixity of print and 
thereby undermine Enlightenment rationalism in the public sphere. I also discuss the 
ways Blake utilized the figure of the book in The Book of Urizen to support his critique of 
rationalized publicity. However, I contend that with his Bible of Hell Blake resisted a 
flight to privacy, in the form of public obscurity and ideological retreat, and was 
attempting to revive an embattled antinomian public—though in the end he decided his 
Bible was too dangerous to publish widely.  
The remainder of the chapter is devoted to a reading of Jerusalem. I consider this 
work as the final book of Blake’s Bible of Hell, his Book of Revelation. However, I 
argue that Jerusalem—composed and executed some twenty years after the other books 
in his Bible of Hell—fails as the final chapter of Blake’s anti-bible because it is too much 
like the books Blake assailed in the 1790s. In the end, instead of attacking rationalized 
scripture in the form of the print book, Blake created his own testament to the book, 
building Jerusalem into a bibliographic monument that resists critique (and 
comprehension) facilitating canonization and reflecting what seems to be a retreat from 
the public sphere. However, I maintain that Jerusalem also shows Blake’s ambivalence 
concerning canonization and privacy, indicated by a vestigial publicity that can be 
glimpsed in the poem. Jerusalem is haunted by the rationalist public of the 1790s, which 
had been suppressed at the end of the decade. This public is countered by another: an 
antinomian commonwealth of liberty that exists only in the imagination, in privacy, in the 




consciously courted public obscurity in the nineteenth century, using his antinomian 
tactics of textual obscurity to damn the public sphere of his day, rather than appeal to an 
antinomian public. He offered salvation instead to the public of futurity, the priesthood of 
believers willing to passionately engage and proselytize his texts. Thus, in Jerusalem, 
Blake engaged three different publics: that of the antinomian past, the rationalist present, 
and the utopian future. However I conclude that this inchoate, multi-vocal, carnivalesque 
publicity—instead of representing an escape from society—was the means by which 
Blake negotiated between private and public spheres, whose relationship he came to see 
as one of balanced contraries—an opposition that was true friendship.  
 
1790s Antinomianism as it Relates to Class, Media, and Publicity 
 
 As mentioned above, according to a recent critical trend Blake was a radical 
antinomian.2
                                                          
2 The most recent study of Blake’s antinomianism is William Blake and the Cultures of Radical 
Christianity (2007) by Robert Rix. A little less recent is William Blake and the Impossible History of the 
1790s by Saree Makdisi. Jon Mee discusses Blake’s antinomianism in Dangerous Enthusiasm, in the 
context of enthusiasm, but he focuses more exclusively on antinomianism in “‘The Doom of Tyrants’” and 
“Is there an Antinomian in the House?” In the posthumously published Witness Against the Beast, E. P. 
Thompson also writes about Blake and antinomianism. Thompson acknowledges that he was inspired by 
The Everlasting Gospel by A. L. Morton, which links Blake to the Ranters, who were commonly thought to 
be antinomian. I cite a few other shorter studies in the chapter.  
 Antinomianism was a heresy that originated in the early Christian 
communities, was reprised in Britain during the seventeenth-century Commonwealth, and 
again in the early 1790s. Briefly stated, in a Christian context antinomians hold that Jesus 
Christ died for the sins of humanity once and for all, so that believers are unconditionally 
forgiven forever and, since they are already saved, need not worry about adhering to any 
moral laws. Stephen Behrendt argues that antinomianism “contends that obedience to 




disobedience to the letter of the law can be—and generally is—regarded from the 
antinomian perspective as both salutary and entirely laudable” (“Bible of Hell” 42). 
According to Mike Goode, Blake’s illuminated books “constituted a tactical counter-
regulatory foil to the laws of churches, bibles, and states in Blake’s day, a foil that did not 
always address readers about the law so much as use them to undermine it” (7). A. L. 
Morton, one of the first critics to associate Blake with antinomianism, locates Blake in 
the tradition of the Ranters and claims that antinomianism “was a tradition of revolution” 
that was particularly active during the 1640s. He writes: 
The Seekers, Ranters and the rest flourished when England had overthrown the 
feudal order in a civil war and when it seemed to thousands that a new age was 
about to begin. Their ideas, fantastic as they sometimes appear to us, were a 
reflection of their hopes: in essence they were political ideas in a religious form. 
A new age was indeed beginning, but it was not the age they had expected. Even 
during the Republic they were often persecuted, and after the restoration of the 
Monarchy in 1660 they were driven underground, preserving their faith in little, 
obscure conventicles, treasuring subversive pamphlets in old cupboards, holding 
the ideas of the revolution, as it were, in suspension, until towards the end of the 
eighteenth century, the world seemed ready for them again. (35-36). 
Saree Makdisi claims that many of these “subversive pamphlets” were taken out of the 
old cupboards and reprinted during the revival of antinomianism in the 1790s, either as 
separate tracts or as part of ad-hoc anthologies (304-6). E. P. Thompson links Blake with 





 Historically, antinomianism was generally a phenomenon of popular, plebeian 
culture, and was often in conflict with ruling classes and institutions (e.g. the established 
church). This was certainly true in the 1790s, except that plebeian antinomianism 
confronted both the established hegemony of the British ruling class and the up-and-
coming cultural dominance of the British bourgeoisie. In the opening chapter of this 
study I discussed these eighteenth-century class distinctions, based on those theorized by 
Thompson in Customs in Common. In this chapter, I apply these distinctions to Blake, 
following the lead of those critics who affiliate Blake with the plebs.
 Thompson concludes that Blake was an antinomian “writing 
within a known tradition, using terms made familiar by seven or eight generations of 
London sectaries” (106). Jon Mee offers historical evidence that shows “that [Blake] was 
far from being the last antinomian” and that there was “a conscious revival” of 
antinomian ideas in the 1790s (“Antinomian in the House” 43). All this suggests that 
there likely was an antinomian public to which Blake might have appealed in the 1790s. 
4
                                                          
3 In “Recovering the Lost Moravian History of William Blake’s Family,” Keri Davies and Marsha Keith 
Schuchard convincingly disprove Thompson’s contention that Blake was a Muggletonian. However, they 
do not disprove that Blake was antinomian: they instead make the case that Blake was associated with the 
Moravians, who they acknowledge had antinomian tendencies. Besides, Thompson argues that Blake was 
antinomian in a more general sense, beyond Muggletonianism. Thompson writes: “[W]e must see that 
[Blake] is writing directly in this antinomian tradition, but also that he is employing its terms in original 
and idiosyncratic ways not sanctioned by any part of that tradition” (Witness 94). 
 As an artisan, 
Blake was plebeian, the social class that both competed and cooperated with patricians in 
eighteenth-century Britain, according to Thompson. While Thompson mostly excludes 
the British bourgeoisie from this binary system in Customs in Common, he makes up for 
this exclusion in his account of Blake’s mental combat with bourgeois rationalism in 
Witness Against the Beast. Thompson shows that the bourgeoisie, more so than the 
4 David Worrall is one of these critics, as shown in a number of the articles he has written or edited, 
particularly “Blake and the 1790s Plebeian Radical Culture.” E. P. Thompson, in Witness Against the 




patrician class, was the prime antagonist in Blake’s “mental fight,” as reflected in his 
Bible of Hell.  
This antinomian “mental fight” involved various forms of plebeian media, such as 
short pamphlets, chapbooks, and broadsides. The use of such ephemeral media tended to 
be regarded as illegitimate by cultural elites because they were cheaply and 
miscellaneously made. Antinomians were certainly guilty in this regard. Mee contends 
that many of the plebeian antinomian writers in the 1790s made use of bricolage in 
creating their miscellaneous texts. They “threw together anthologies of other people’s 
writings, and inserted their own verses wherever they were able. They appeared to offer 
no coherent body of work. . . . They seemed to be at one moment willing to dispense 
entirely with the ‘author function’, cutting up and reassembling whatever was at hand, 
while at another moment making shockingly presumptuous claims for the divine basis of 
their inspiration” (“Strange Career” 166). Similarly, antinomians were prone to parody in 
their writings and would, as a matter of course, use bibliographic means to undermine 
authoritative texts, even and especially scripture. All this, as we will see, is what Blake 
was attempting with his Bible of Hell. 
Plebeian media, as utilized by antinomians, were considered suspect to bourgeois 
rationalists because they were secretive, making them irrational in their lack of 
transparency. Antinomian texts also tended to be willfully obscure, strangely coded, and 
circulated through informal channels. The way antinomians spread their message was 
mostly via hand-written epistles distributed amongst members and published tracts by 
“prophets”—that is, by a mix of manuscript and cheap print (Witness 117). Antinomians 




spread the message of spiritual freedom from the law, but not in ways that would lead to 
their persecution or prosecution (much the same thing in eighteenth-century Britain). 
They used cheap print and non-print sources but cloaked their radical antinomianism with 
arcane symbols, bizarre images, and equivocal language largely adapted from authorized 
scripture—particularly the Book of Revelation in the Bible. Their texts resembled the 
many gospels, apocalypses, and apocrypha (“secret books”) that proliferated in the first 
few centuries of Christian history, before the New Testament canon was established and 
orthodoxy had gained the upper hand over heresy.5
Largely due to their tactics of textual obscurity, eighteenth-century antinomians 
also had a conflicted relationship to the public sphere. They were typically counter-
enlightenment and thus ill-disposed towards “the formation of the classical bourgeois 
public sphere whose own authority lay in its appeal to Reason” (Mee, “Doom of 
Tyrants,” 97). More importantly, antinomian publicity tended to incorporate rather than 
resist obscurity. Robert Rix cites nineteenth-century writer William Hurd, who claimed 
that the Moravians made it “their study to speak and write in order not to be understood” 
(8). Thompson notes that the Muggletonians, like other antinomians, were “anti-
evangelical. For they had survived the rational bombardments of the century by lying low 
and keeping their heads down” (Witness 88). Nor did antinomians worship publicly in 
churches or meeting houses, but rather met in taverns, private homes, the streets, the 
fields, and even in boats (Witness 68). In times of trouble, antinomians turned inward, 
 
                                                          
5 I am indebted to Elaine Pagels for my knowledge of early Christian history, as elucidated in The Gnostic 
Gospels and the recent Revelations: Visions, Prophecy, & Politics in the Book of Revelation. Pagels’s 
subject is ostensibly the Gnostics, but she makes it clear that the Gnostics were largely antinomian in their 




breaking into smaller groups, and avoided publicity in the larger society. They kept their 
radical critique of society to themselves, and appeared to be quietistic in politics.  
At the same time, antinomians depended on a secretive, conspiratorial publicity to 
propagate their beliefs and pass them on to the next generation. Melinda Alliker Rabb 
notes that in the eighteenth century, “the counterpart to the public sphere is not domestic, 
familial, or architectural, but often secretive, psychological, and textual” (8) Rabb refers 
to satire during the period, but she might just as well have been describing antinomian 
texts. These texts required encoding and decoding—which needless to say complicate 
publicity. However, antinomians did not abscond to the private sphere, hiding themselves 
from the gaze of the public. Rather, antinomians were “counter-public,” particularly in 
the ways they opposed the mainstays of society—law, state, church—and rationalist 
debate in the public sphere. To the bourgeois rationalist public, the antinomian public 
was spectral—ghostly, uncanny, disturbing; to the antinomian public, the contrary was 
true. All this should sound familiar in regards to Blake. If we accept the premise that 
Blake was associated with, or influenced by, one or more of these antinomian 
communities, his avoidance of mainstream publication and his quietistic tendencies are at 
least partially explained. It also helps explain his vexed attitude towards publicity, and his 
obscurity—both textual and public.6
 
 
                                                          
6 In “Inconvenient Truths,” Keri Davies and David Worrall register their dissent concerning Blake’s 
antinomianism, as part of their argument that Blake was associated with the Moravian sect. However, 
Davies’s and Worrall’s case is weak. For instance, they dismiss Blake’s antinomianism as an invention of 
Swinburne in 1868, completely ignoring the many allusions to antinomian thought in Blake’s writings, 
which critics such as Morton, Thompson, Makdisi, and Rix have shown to have been in abundance his 
whole life, not just in his works of the 1790s (see for instance Blake’s late poem “The Everlasting 
Gospel”). Besides, the bulk of their argument is designed to prove that Moravianism was not antinomian 
(despite the fact that in Blake’s lifetime they were generally considered as such), which is not the same 




Blake’s Battle with the Book in the Bible of Hell 
 
The first book in Blake’s Bible of Hell is The [First] Book of Urizen, composed 
and executed in 1794; the second and third books of Urizen, The Book of Ahania and The 
Book of Los, were both produced in 1795.7
Critics present various explanations for Blake’s practice of difference.
. Behrendt remarks that in these three books 
Blake “most visibly engages, subverts, and explodes the received Bible” (37). He does so 
by mimicking the bibles of his day: “the visual appearance of the texts recalls 
conventional printed bibles, right down to the double-column verbal text and the 
partitioning into chapters and numbered verses. Illustrated bibles routinely featured full-
page plates as well as both decorative and illustrative headpieces, tailpieces, and initial 
letters” (48). Despite these continuities, Blake’s biblical books are radically unstable as 
texts. This is particularly true of The Book of Urizen, of which eight copies survive, all of 
them different. This variability is, according to Steven Leo Carr, built into Blake’s 
production process: “each ‘copy’ of a work differs from all others. This radical variability 
is embedded in the material processes of producing illuminated prints, and thus always 
enters into the verbal-visual exchanges generated within each page. The characteristic 
variation of detail in Blake’s art challenges aesthetic beliefs deeply associated with 
conventional modes of producing books and prints” (182). In each of his illuminated 
books, Blake “extends and accentuates the play of differences. Variation is the necessary 
condition of the production of a work of illuminated printing” (185).  
8
                                                          
7 In my commentary on The Book of Urizen, I refer to Copy A at the 
 One of the 
most influential is that offered by Jerome McGann, in his article “The Idea of an 
Blake Archive. 




Indeterminate Text: Blake’s Bible of Hell and Dr. Alexander Geddes.” McGann argues 
that the variability of Blake’s Bible of Hell, particularly The Book of Urizen, reflects a 
“conscious response to the new developments in textual studies which we associate with 
18th-century German scholarship,” or “Higher Criticism,” which focused on biblical 
exegesis (303). McGann maintains that Blake drew upon new Enlightenment-based 
hermeneutical theories regarding the Bible, found within the works of the Scottish 
Catholic priest Alexander Geddes, who in the 1790s was employed in various capacities 
by the bookseller/publisher Joseph Johnson, who also employed Blake as a book 
engraver.9
McGann’s thesis does indeed explain Blake’s practice of bricolage in his Bible of 
Hell, but there is ample justification for contesting the association of Blake with the 
Enlightenment. As I show in my reading below, Blake’s Bible of Hell assails 
Enlightenment-based hermeneutics as part of his antinomian campaign to undercut the 
power of rationalist print. Besides, I argue that Blake was more concerned with fixity than 
 According to McGann, these hermeneutical theories—particularly Geddes’s 
“Fragment Hypothesis”—argued for a “Bible comprised a heterogeneous collection of 
various materials gathered together at different times by different editors and redactors”; 
that is, rather than being the inerrant word of God, the Bible was a very contingent and 
fallible collection of documents, haphazardly compiled (321). McGann claims that Blake 
mounted this attack upon the Bible “from the vantage of the late Enlightenment 
revolution in textual studies of the biblical deposits” (305). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
essays in Unnam’d Forms: Blake and Textuality, edited by Nelson Hilton and Thomas A. Vogler, deal with 
Derrida and deconstruction. Of these I recommend “Illuminated Printing: Toward a Logic of Difference,” 
by Stephen Leo Carr; and “The Book of Urizen and the Horizon of the Book,” by Paul Mann.   
9 Geddes published, with Joseph Johnson, his Prospectus for a New Translation of the Bible in 1786. The 
controversial newly-translated Bible appeared in several volumes from 1792-1800. Geddes also published, 
with Johnson, five pamphlets in the late 1780s and 1790s defending his work. Finally, Geddes was the 




difference: it was not so much a matter of Blake producing different versions, as 
subverting any definitive, authorized, canonized version. Elizabeth Eisenstein has put 
forth the provocative thesis that the printing press, using movable type, changed the 
course of history by establishing texts in fixed editions, which eventually enabled both 
the Reformation and the Enlightenment.10 Adrian Johns has countered that fixity was 
slow to develop after the invention of printing, and was the result of social practices, not 
the technology of print; in fact, he argues, early print production was buffeted by many 
contingencies that Eisenstein does not acknowledge.11
Goode claims that this is part of Blake’s practice of disintegrative bibliography, in 
that Blake’s “laborious process of ensuring the chromatic, iconic, and textual uniqueness 
of each copy of his illuminated books as a work of making sure that the books’ word-
picture integrations would produce different deflective or diversionary dynamics across 
copies” (21). In its ability to reify ideas, to authorize them and make them more 
permanent, print—particularly in the form of books—is hegemonic. In their commentary 
on The Book of Urizen, Kay and Roger Easson remark that “Blake thought the book, 
because of its abstract and static form, had become the vehicle of error, the adversary of 
transformation in culture” (88). John H. Jones, in “Printed Performance and Reading The 
Book[s] of Urizen” makes a similar point. In reference to eighteenth-century print 
technology, he writes: “Because of print technology’s ability to stabilize a text, print 
 Blake’s antinomian media practice 
in The Book of Urizen multiplies such contingencies, as a way of exposing the idea of 
fixity as fallacy.  
                                                          
10 See Elizabeth Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe, as well as Print Culture and 
Enlightenment Thought.  
11 See Adrian John, The Nature of the Book. Johns and Eisenstein aired their differences in an issue of 




began to take on connotations of increased authority” and “the medium itself began to 
take on the authority of truth. . . . Blake’s mechanical method of book production . . . 
undoes the fixity of traditional printing by making each copy of each book a new version 
or retelling of the same basic story, an new performance that differs from all other 
versions” (74). In assailing fixity, Blake was also assailing canonicity—the cultural 
authorization of certain literary works, genres, and media.    
Morris Eaves argues that Blake’s attack upon fixity, or rationalized print, was also 
an attack upon the “interchangeability” of the materials, technologies, components, 
laborers, and consumers of books (Counter-Arts 261). Blake objected to “rationalizing a 
mode of production by means of the venerable idea that the wild horse of inspiration 
must be broken; we want its energy but not its chaos” (Counter-Arts 178).12
                                                          
12 Makdisi also recognizes that Blake’s bibliographic practice in his Bible of Hell was intended to subvert 
fixity, and was inspired by his antinomianism. Makdisi cites the Bible of Hell as evidence of Blake’s 
resistance to the industrial rationalization of the book trade, and concomitant commodification of the 
image, in the late eighteenth-century. Makdisi urges us not to “dismiss the interpretive significance—that 
is, the broad cultural and political significance—of the variability built into Blake’s printing process. Blake 
developed a mode of production that necessarily produced heterogeneous products at precisely the 
historical moment when manufacturers—and not just those in the art world—were seizing on the potential 
offered by another mode or production that would, in order to spew out a stream of identical products, 
ultimately reorient not only the way in which people work but the entire cultural and political organization 
of societies all over the world” (201). Makdisi asserts that bourgeois liberals promoted these new modes of 
production, which they associated with freedom and individualism, and these same bourgeois liberals Blake 
resisted in his own book-making process (151).  
 In creating 
his illuminated books, Blake resisted the rationalized fixity that resulted from the 
assembly-line. He pointedly did not divide his various labors, and made sure every book 
he produced was an original work of art rather than a copy, preserving the “aura” of each 
book that issued from his printing press. I define “aura” as Walter Benjamin does in The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction. According to Benjamin, the aura of 
a work communicates its uniqueness, its originality, and its resistance to commodification 




its canonicity. I contend, however, that in the first three books of his Bible of Hell Blake 
was not as interested in preserving the aura and uniqueness of his texts as he was in 
dissipating the spectral aura and authority of print books, particularly that of supposedly 
sacrosanct “holy” books, via practices of textual disintegration. Destruction, not 
preservation, motivated Blake the antinomian book-maker in his attempt to free the spirit 
of prophecy from its bibliographic chains.  
The term I use for Blake’s antinomian bibliography is textual obscurity. One of 
Blake’s tactics in this regard was détournage, defined as the parodic re-purposing or 
remediation of texts.13 Blake’s détournage is distinguished by the ways he used it to 
confuse and contest the class affiliation of various media. For example, given the 
shortness of the work (27 plates total) and the octavo page size, The Book of Urizen could 
be produced as the kind of cheap pamphlet that circulated amongst plebeians. And if you 
removed full-page designs that seem to have little bearing on the narrative (such as the 
four elements designs; see below), it could appear as a chapbook, which was a cheap, 
plebeian medium of 24 or fewer small pages (about the size of Blake’s 16mo pages in 
The Book of Urizen), and was typically illustrated, as are Blake’s illuminated works. The 
other two, much shorter books of Blake’s Bible of Hell—The Book of Ahania and The 
Book of Los—are even better candidates as cheap pamphlets or chapbooks.14
                                                          
13 The situationist Guy Debord uses the term “détournement” to describe the re-purposing of works of art 
for partisan propaganda purposes (“
  
Users Guide to Détournement”). “Détournement” means deception, 
deflection, diversion, or hijacking. Détournage is the result of such hijacking. I should also note that, in my 
analysis, détournage re-purposes media, rather than just content. 
14 In my introductory chapter, I describe various plebeian media, including cheap pamphlets and 
chapbooks. Much of my knowledge of these forms comes from The Oxford History of Print Culture, edited 
by Joad Raymond. That study deals with cheap print in Britain and Ireland up to 1660. However, as 
William St. Clair points out in The Reading Nation in Romantic Period, plebeian media changed very little 
between the early modern and Romantic periods. After that, it changed very rapidly, such that chapbooks 




Mee discusses a related tactic of textual obscurity: bricolage, or the integration of 
different kinds of print media into one main text.15 But, once again, Blake’s textual 
obscurity was more about disintegration than integration. That is, a kind of planned 
obsolescence is built into Blake’s texts, reflecting a bibliography that is actually 
biblioclasm.16 For example, Blake inserted into his Bible of Hell full-page illustrations 
that might serve as detachable prints that hang as decorations upon the walls of home or 
workplace.17 One of these full-page illustrations, plate 18 of The Book of Urizen, draws 
upon the iconography of the Holy Family, an image found on the walls of many a humble 
cottage, though Blake inverts the image by using it to depict the “fallen” family of Los, 
Enitharmon, and Orc. Plate 3, which depicts a figure we might assume is Urizen, shows 
an old man with a long biblical beard and a halo, in chains (and in one copy at least, 
tears). This figure might refer to Laurence Sterne’s prisoner in the Bastille in A 
Sentimental Journey, a popular subject for engravers of prints; or, equally popular during 
the Revolution controversy, the Comte de Lorges, prisoner of the Bastille, representative 
of the injustice of the legal system under the ancien régime.18
                                                          
15 It was in Dangerous Enthusiasm that Jon Mee, borrowing from Claude Levi-Strauss, first applied the 
idea of bricolage to Blake. See in particular Mee’s introduction. 
 Another example would be 
16 I understand “biblioclasm” as the bibliographical equivalent of iconoclasm. While it has not been 
previously applied to Blake, the term itself has a history. The examples history affords, however, are quite 
different than the way Blake might be considered biblioclastic. Blake’s biblioclasm may denote an attack 
upon rationalism, but it is a far cry from the mass book burnings of Savonarola or the Nazis.  
17 William St. Clair notes that illustrations in chapbooks and on ballad sheets often served double-duty as 
prints to be hung on the walls and workbenches of those who could not afford more expensive, stand-alone 
prints (343). John H. Jones, in his discussion of Blake’s production methods in “Printed Performance,” 
asserts that the art-print engraving was the main media of access for most people in the 1790s: those who 
could not afford expensive books with engravings could buy a single-page print to hang on their walls (26). 
Eaves and Essick make the claim that in the 1790s there was a market for crude, single-page prints, which 
were affordable for low-income people; and that Blake issued separate prints of his book designs (but not 
for low-income people). See Jones, “Printed Performance,” 26; Eaves, “Introduction” (to Cambridge 
Companion to William Blake), 6; and Essick, William Blake Printmaker, 140.  
18 See David Bindman, Shadow of the Guillotine: Britain and the French Revolution, 37-42. The Comte de 
Lorges, it should be noted, was eventually proved to be fictional and a figure of propaganda. Bindman 





plate 25, which depicts a child begging and a dog howling. While some commentators 
associate this image with “the dog at the wintry door” of plate 26, it could easily be a 
stand-alone image that a pious, charitable Christian might hang upon the wall, thinking it 
depicted the plight of poor beggars in the metropolis. However, Blake the antinomian is 
more likely surreptitiously condemning than extolling such pious charity with this image; 
antinomians were dismissive of “justification by works.” Finally, there are four full-page 
designs (Plates 7, 15, 21, 23) that represent the four elements (water, air, fire, and earth, 
respectively). Such images were commonly issued as separate prints, or as illustrations in 
cheap print publications. But the main point to be made here is that by creating separable 
prints, Blake was encouraging and facilitating the disintegration of his texts. 
Another way Blake practiced textual obscurity was by removing (movable) print 
from his books. By featuring text disguised as handwriting, or print that pretends it is not, 
Blake offers a commentary and critique upon print culture and the processes of reification 
and rationalization that print technology demanded. In Blake’s works, as W. J. T. 
Mitchell points out, the conflict between manuscript and print is often symbolized by the 
contraries of the scroll and the book. Mitchell comments: “In the context of Romantic 
textual ideology, the book is the symbol of modern rationalist writing and the cultural 
economy of mechanical reproduction, while the scroll is the emblem of ancient revealed 
wisdom, imagination, and the cultural economy of hand-crafted, individually expressive 
artifacts. We might summarize this contrast as the difference between print culture and 
manuscript culture”—which Mitchell ties to “oral performance” (“Visible Language” 64-
65, 74). For Blake, the closer a work was to “oral performance,” the closer it was to 




engraving, the scroll is not represented visually by Blake in Urizen; instead only print 
books are depicted, representing a bibliographic monopoly controlled by Urizen.  
As in most of Blake’s illuminated works, there appears to be an antagonistic 
relationship between the text and the designs in The Book of Urizen, which is yet another 
tactic of textual obscurity. As readers have noted for some time, in his illuminated books 
Blake tends to place distance between his text and his designs, such that the image on a 
plate might illustrate the text inscribed on another plate. This is what Mitchell calls 
“visual-verbal independence” or (borrowing from Northrop Frye) “syncopation” 
(Composite Art 10). “The independence of Blake’s text and designs,” Mitchell writes, 
“allows him to introduce independent symbolic statements, to suggest ironic contrasts 
and transformations, and to multiply metaphorical complexities” (Composite Art 11-12). 
Thus Mitchell allows that Blake uses such syncopation critically, with designs offering 
satirical commentary upon the text, and upon the bibliographic construct of the book. 
Along with Goode, I would take this further, and insist that in his Bible of Hell Blake’s 
texts and designs are at loggerheads, which amplifies textual obscurity. In Goode’s 
words, Blake’s words and images “amplify the force of each other’s powers to 
deconstruct and disperse themselves” (21).19
Plate 24 of Copy A is a typical example of text-image antagonism in Blake’s 
Bible of Hell. On the plate we see Urizen meandering through the darkness “with a globe 
of fire lighting his / journey” (22:54-55). As my citation makes clear, the text for the 
design on plate 24 is found on plate 22 (they are separated by a full-page illustration in 
  
                                                          
19 In the recent article “The Joy of Looking,” Mike Goode critiques the “composite art” approach that he 
claims begins with Frye and continues with Mitchell, Viscomi, Essick, and others. Goode would rather 
“substitute the notion of an open, disintegrable text for a closed, composite book or art” (3). As I hope I 




Copy A). Likewise, the text of plate 24, which describes the birth of Urizen’s first four 
sons, finds its (full-page) illustration on plate 4. The designs of plate 24 and plate 22 both 
seem to offer ironic commentary on the text of the plates on which they appear. The text 
of plate 24 describes (in addition to the births of Urizen’s sons), a world that “teemed 
vast enormities / Frightening; faithless; fawning / Portions of life” (24:2-4); it is a 
teeming world that “Urizen sicken’d to see” (24:9). The design, by contrast, shows 
Urizen very eager to see, as he carries forth his lantern-sun into a dark, confined space, 
with none of the horrors mentioned in the text depicted. In fact, as in the design for plate 
28, the image on plate 24 shows Urizen pushing out the bounds of the page, trying to 
escape his confinement on the page. As he surveys his domain, Urizen seems distracted. 
His distraction may be due to the lion that he nearly stumbles over. It is equally 
distracting to the reader, since no lion is mentioned anywhere in The Book of Urizen.  
What does the lion signify? In his commentary to The Book of Urizen, David 
Worrall gamely cites some possibilities, but the lion seems to signify nothing of import 
and serves only to distract.  Turning to plate 22, we see in the design a young child, 
surrounded by a nimbus of flames, falling towards Earth. It refers to the birth of Orc, 
which is described on plate 19. The text on plate 22 does refer to Orc—but not the Orc 
we see in the design. The text describes a worm become human, a terrorizing rebel who 
needs to be chained, whose cries wake the dead. The design shows a harmless-looking 
child tumbling, unscathed, through flames. The design to plate 22, like that of plate 24, is 
much more playful than the text it is meant to illustrate. It dispels the atmosphere of 




In addition to this kind of ironic juxtaposition, ornaments invade the page from 
the margins. Plate 24, for instance, is embellished with a variety of squiggly figures 
which wriggle between the lines of the text. The central vine-like figure resembles a 
weed, the kind that as it grows splits rocks and pavement. It is not at all clear whether it 
originates in the text space on the plate, or the design space; it appears to hover rootless 
above Urizen’s head. There is also the suggestion of serpents and worms on the page 
(these figures can be discerned on other pages in Urizen), which are, again, figures that 
disrupt reading. The figure that wriggles through the middle of the right side of the plate 
could even be seen as a long-tailed sperm; such sexual innuendo is not unknown in 
Blake’s books.20
Blake’s battle with the rationalized book in his Bible of Hell goes beyond textual 
obscurity. He also represents this battle thematically. In the Bible of Hell, Urizen is 
obsessed with writing and books, and dogmatically subscribes to the Enlightenment 
 Worms, serpents, or sperm, they all evoke antinomian teachings, such 
as—respectively—the “illusion” and transience of the material form, the deceptions of 
false prophets, and free love. These figures illustrate some of the phrases in the text of 
plate 24: the children of Urizen are born of “monsters, & worms of the pit” (later, in the 
design of plate 26, we see that they are serpent-like); and Urizen “saw that life liv’d upon 
death” (more worms) (Pl. 24: 24, 31-32). The vines, the worms, the serpents: all of these 
figures represent agents of disintegration—they break down material form—and have this 
function in the page design as well, boring into and breaking down the page as a semantic 
unit.  
                                                          
20 Blake’s sexuality has been trending in academia recently, particularly in connection to the Moravian sect, 
which had a reputation for being “sex-positive.” The most comprehensive treatment of this subject is Why 
Mrs. Blake Cried: William Blake and the Sexual Basis of Spiritual Vision by Marsha Keith Schuchard. 
Craig D. Atwood, in “Christ and the Bridal Bed: Eighteenth-Century Moravian Erotic Spirituality as a 




rationality that subtends print and its attendant publicity. In this sense, Urizen represents 
spectral publicity, or Blake’s anxious projection of the public sphere. William Rowland 
argues that Blake “associated printed books with the ‘books formd of metals’ and the  
‘book of iron’ written by Urizen, the repressive god of reason in Blake’s mythology . . . 
while he conceived of his own engraved and hand-colored books as works of liberation 
rather than repression, in both form and content” (65). Robert Essick also notes that there 
is some “relationship, however deflected and transmuted, between Urizen, with his 
‘books formd of metals’…and Blake’s ideological contentions in his book[s] printed 
from metal plates” (202). Paul Mann would seem to agree, arguing that in the Bible of 
Hell, Blake deconstructs the “Urizenic and therefore potentially oppressive features of all 
bookmaking and book culture—the book’s historical power to ‘impose’” (49).  
Certainly religious scriptures, in book form, had the power to impose, but so too 
did the books of anticlerical rationalists. Blake’s Bible of Hell is replete with critiques of 
rationalist fundamentalism, beginning with the title page of The Book of Urizen. In the 
design, Blake introduces a gray-bearded patriarchal figure that we will come to know as 
Urizen, crouched upon a book, marking his place with his toe. Iconographically, he 
represents a biblical, Moses-like figure; but in the text we know him to be the primeval 
arch-priest of reason, “an abstract reasoning power that reifies itself into material nature” 
(Essick 200), the promulgator of “iron laws” which none can keep, a primordial scientist 
who vivisects existence with his “dividing rule” and “brazen quadrant” (Pl. 24:26, Pl. 
22:35,38). Mann argues that Urizen personifies the book: “The very insistence on books 
[on the title page] gives the book an eerie precedence, as if to say: to take on a body, 




holds a pen, in the other a graver, as he simultaneously inscribes two more books from 
the book he marks with his toe. Behind him are two stone tablets that refer to the 
Decalogue, symbolic of the crushing weight of the moral law, which antinomians 
deplore. Of note is the grotesque positioning of the figure, involved as he is in his various 
writing tasks. Blake does not always use such impossible gymnastics in his works for 
satirical effect, but that seems to be his purpose here.  
Part of the satire is the fact that Urizen is surrounded by different forms of textual 
transmission related to the production of print, particularly print books—on the one hand 
(literally), he writes the textual commentary, and on the other, he engraves illustrations to 
accompany the text, without looking at either, suggesting he consumes and transmits text 
blindly, uncritically. Urizen, the ultimately isolated figure, is here trapped within his own 
solipsistic mini-print culture, surrounded by excessive text, imprisoned by the very media 
he employs.21
                                                          
21 As Mitchell suggests, Blake here may be indicting his own role in the print culture of his time: engraving 
images for mass production (“Visible Language” 56).  
 This might be interpreted as the primal scene of hegemonic transmission, 
as the dictat of the ruling class (or the bourgeois class that would replace it) is filtered 
into and through the culture: from Urizen’s book of laws (which would include moral, 
juridical, and scientific laws; as well as “laws” of composition and medium), to the 
various tasks and technologies of the print shop, eventually to take the form of print 
books. Overseeing the process is the unwritten code of cultural hegemony, or the 
mystified relations of power and property, symbolized in the antinomian lexicon by the 
tablets, hovering in the background like stone-carved angel wings or tombstones. In other 




used by both political reactionaries and bourgeois radicals to sustain their power in the 
public sphere.      
The critique of the book represented by the image on this plate has a counterpart 
in that of plate 8, which depicts Urizen holding open a book, ostensibly the same book 
that he crouches upon in the title page. 22 Here we can see more closely the “text” printed 
upon the page. It is gibberish, indeterminate paint blobs in a hodge-podge of color, 
insinuating that the text is nonsensical, has no worth, or is a medley of madness. Urizen’s 
book has brown-colored pages covered with what might be described as ordure, an apt 
depiction of Blake’s antinomian critique of scripture as used by state religion, or 
prominent and venerated scientific works used to rationalize culture.23
There is one extended verbal portion of The Book of Urizen that deals specifically 
with books, although it is on a plate that has been struck from most extant copies. This is 
plate 6 of copy A, which presents the only first-person account of Urizen in The Book of 
Urizen. Urizen describes his isolation, and the products of this isolation: “Here alone I in 
books formd of me- / -tals / Have written the secrets of wisdom / The secrets of dark 
contemplation / By fightings and conflicts dire” (Pl. 6:24-27). He continues in the next 
verse: “Lo! I unfold my darkness; and on / This rock, place with strong hand the Book / 
Of eternal brass, written in my solitude” (Pl. 6:31-33). There are many things we can say 
about this plate vis-à-vis books. First, Blake associates books with darkness, occlusion, 
ignorance, isolation, and privacy. Secondly, books are clearly delineated as products of 
print, that is of metals (from which the letters of movable type are cast)—in this case, the 
  
                                                          
22 Hoagwood notes that, at least on one occasion, Blake printed this plate as a separate print—which 
underscores what I have been arguing in this section (109). Hoagwood also discusses a number of possible 
models for the design on this page, and other treatments by Blake of the same design (117-19). 
23 Mitchell discusses Blake’s use of excrement—or the “excrementitious”—in his works. See 




metal is brass, commonly associated with falseness and fraud (in its impersonation of 
gold), offering a powerful indictment of print books by analogy. Thirdly, it depicts the 
print book as a monolithically homogenizing, monologic force, suppressing diversity and 
dissent: “One command, one joy, one desire / One curse, one weight, one measure / One 
King. one God. one Law” (Pl. 6:38-40). Also: one book and one way of making books, 
according to rational criteria—which Blake the antinomian book-maker must resist. The 
illustration at the bottom of Plate 6 depicts a tormented figure, possibly mad, behind what 
look like the bars of a cage. This suggests the inner state of the person who has been 
infected with the viral load of Urizen’s “secrets of dark contemplation” (Pl. 6:26). 
Urizen’s book of brass has been the means through which the tormented figure has been 
“Sin-bred” with the “terrible monsters” of soul-killing state religion and rationalism, 
which now “inhabit” his “bosom,” a euphemism for a colonized consciousness (Pl. 6:28-
29). The tormented figure has been interpellated into Urizen’s spectral, rationalist public. 
Blake etched his Bible of Hell over the two-year period of 1794-95. This was at a 
time of intense class conflict and media war in the British public sphere, as bourgeois 
liberals attempted to scour the public sphere of plebeian influence, and loyalist 
reactionaries attempted to do the same to bourgeois liberals. With the suspension of 
habeas corpus in 1794, the arrests and prosecutions of the leaders of the London 
Corresponding Society that same year, and the passage of the “Gagging Acts” in 1795, 
dissent—whether bourgeois or plebeian, rational or irrational—had been more or less 
criminalized. William Willcox relates that political reactionaries “saw in every critic of 
the status quo a Francophile conspirator, and their alarm infected the government and the 




the press was . . . drastically curtailed: cheap newspapers were forced out of business by 
stamp duties, and printers were held strictly accountable for publishing anything that 
displeased the government. The rights of the citizen, in short, no longer included the right 
even to grumble at the established order” (201; qtd. in Chandler 68). This was 
particularly true of plebeian citizens like Blake. Whereas before the early 1790s plebeian 
printers were tolerated because their publications were cheap and ephemeral, after 
1794—and the publishing sensation that was Thomas Paine’s The Rights of Man in 1792-
93—it was their cheapness and ephemerality that made them suspect, because this made 
them available to the masses. This suspicion of radical plebeian publicity extended to 
prominent stakeholders in the bourgeois-dominated public sphere, such as Joseph 
Johnson.24
Plebeian religious writers, particularly those like Blake whose works exhibited 
antinomian tendencies, were “collateral damage” in this conflict. They were able to cloak 
political critique with biblical language and religious sentiments earlier in the decade. But 
this had become difficult at mid-decade, as antinomian “prophets” like Thomas Spence 
and Richard Brothers found themselves in jail or the madhouse, their religion and 
reliance upon the Bible no longer providing cover for their radical ideas.
 The fact that rationalist dissenters were considered suspect by the political 
establishment made them even more alacritous to distance themselves from the plebeian 
“mob.” 
25
                                                          
24 Johnson initially was the publisher of the first volume of The Rights of Man, but on the day of 
publication transferred publishing rights to the radical publisher Jeremiah Jordan, likely because its radical, 
plebeian appeal was too evident. In this Johnson was prescient. For more, see Helen Braithwaite, 
Romanticism, Publishing, and Dissent: Joseph Johnson and the Cause of Liberty, 106-110. 
 The 
25 On 4 March 1795 Brothers was arrested and charged under an Elizabethan law against false prophets; he 
was found guilty by reason of insanity and detained in a madhouse, where he remained until his release in 
1806. Paley contends that as religious writers Blake and Brothers were quite similar, and that Blake could 
very easily have been detained under the same statute against false prophets (“Prince of the Hebrews” 262). 




conservative religious atmosphere that was ascendant post-1794 explains why Paine, who 
was lionized after the publication of The Rights of Man, found a very different reception 
with The Age of Reason, which was published in two volumes in 1794-95. This work 
drew criticisms across the political spectrum, from the radical Joseph Priestley to the 
reactionary Hannah More (Worrall “Introduction” to The Urizen Books 23-24).26
Some critics contest Worrall’s characterization of Blake’s Bible of Hell parodies 
as being amongst his “most politically specific and historically topical works” (159). For 
instance, Eric Chandler rehashes the critical narrative that around 1794-95 Blake backed 
away from radical political commitment.
 Worrall 
remarks that the three books of Blake’s Bible of Hell, engraved 1794-95, “exhibit all the 
characteristics of having been produced amidst a debate fuelled by The Age of Reason’s 
threat to percolate infidelity down to the lower classes. . . . Against Paine was united an 
organized counter-revolutionary, anti-French establishment which was intent on 
consolidating religion into a means of social control” (24). Worrall argues that Blake’s 
Bible of Hell was his contribution to this controversy.  
27
                                                                                                                                                                             
antinomian tendencies had run-ins with the law around this time: Daniel Isaac Eaton was arrested in 1793 
and tried in 1794; Richard “Citizen” Lee was also arrested in 1795. On Spence, see Ian McCalman 
(chapters 6 and 7); on Eaton, see Michael T. Davis; on Lee see Mee’s “The Doom of Tyrants.”  
 Chandler claims that, irrespective of the 
polemical content in Blake’s Bible of Hell, the fact that Blake never widely published 
these works damns him as obscure and politically quietistic. “Blake’s refusal to publish 
anything new in the midst of England’s counterrevolutionary reaction does unflatteringly 
suggest that Blake watched out for his own skin despite his recognition of the call to 
26 Robert Essick discusses Blake’s Bible of Hell in relation to the The Age of Reason in “William Blake, 
Thomas Paine, and Biblical Revolution.” Essick focuses mostly on The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, 
which weakens his argument since Marriage was probably already complete when the first volume of The 
Age of Reason was published in 1794. 
27 Chandler admits this is a critical commonplace, and cites Marilyn Butler, Leopold Damrosch, and David 




action” (57). Chandler counters David Erdman’s contention that, despite his apparent 
abandonment of the public sphere, “Blake maintained his radical views—that Blake’s 
political viewpoint and the substance of his social criticism does not change; while the 
form becomes an experiment in secrecy and codes for the protection of the message, this 
message remains inviolable” (58). Chandler sees instead changes in Blake’s “aesthetic 
and ideology that resulted from his real fear of the reactive trends in the political climate” 
(58).  
With so much “harrowing fear rolling round” his “nervous brain,” Blake was 
clearly cowed and somewhat paranoid as he etched his Bible of Hell (Urizen Pl. 10:10). 
But given the political climate in which he labored, he was justified in his textual 
obscurity. Does this mean that Blake’s textual obscurity indicates public obscurity—a 
disconnection from publicity, as well as political activism, as Chandler suggests? Not 
necessarily. As adherents of the antinomian Blake point out, there was a plausible radical 
antinomian public to which Blake might have appealed in the first half of the 1790s. 
However, by mid-decade that public had been driven (back) into hiding. In short, while 
there is some credence to Chandler’s position regarding later works like Jerusalem, and 
though Blake’s fear of publication during the 1790s counter-revolution was certainly real, 
the lack of publication circa 1795 does not indicate that Blake had abandoned the 
struggle. Indeed, such circumspection (and circumlocution) characterizes antinomian 
publicity, whose “serpent wisdom” is invoked for the protection of simple, dove-like 
innocence.28
                                                          
28 Here I cite scripture, which—as Shakespeare points out—the devil is also wont to do. In the Gospel of 
Matthew, Jesus says: “Behold, I send you out as sheep in the midst of wolves; so be shrewd as serpents and 
innocent as doves” (Matt. 10:16). This phrase describes antinomian publicity well.(“The devil can cite 





The Publics of Jerusalem 
 
 
By the time Blake completed Jerusalem the Emanation of the Giant Albion 
around 1820, the antinomian public to which Blake might have appealed with his Bible 
of Hell could no longer be found. It had been driven underground, as Morton describes; 
the subversive pamphlets had been surreptitiously returned to the old cupboards. 
However, a vestigial form of antinomian publicity can be divined in the pages of 
Jerusalem. It was Blake’s bulwark against the rationalist public which had been 
suppressed in the late 1790s. There is a third public that engages Blake in his 
masterwork: the public of the future. This continued engagement with, and complication 
of, publicity calls into question the critical contention that in the nineteenth century Blake 
consciously courted public obscurity and in “fear and trembling” hid himself away in the 
private sphere. Jerusalem presents ample evidence that publicity remained one of Blake’s 
central concerns, and was something he was not yet willing to write off, even though he 
seemed even more reluctant to publish his illuminated works. As my reading below 
shows, the complex publicity that haunts Jerusalem suggests a zone of negotiation 
between public and private spheres. 
Blake’s appeals to an antinomian public and his remonstrations regarding the 
rationalist public sphere are, of course, closely connected. The appeal to one is a rebuff to 
the other. William Rowland remarks that “the profundity of Jerusalem is bought at the 
cost of willfully excluding contemporary readers,” by which Rowland means the 
rationalist readers of Blake’s time (73). “Blake was winnowing out his readers like the 




inaccessible to corporeal hearing. . . . Blake appeals to the fearsome version of the Christ 
who speaks in parables in order to damn his hearers. . . . Blake’s late work is not intended 
to save the reader, but to exclude him; Blake in effect invites the reader to be damned” 
(74). That is, “Jerusalem itself was intended to be ‘incomprehensible / to the Vegetated 
Mortal Eye’s perverted and single vision’” (Pl. 53:10-11) (73). According to this 
argument, Blake created “closed” texts which turned away rationalist readers and 
subverted rationalist publicity. 
Roger Easson is less damning of Blake’s supposed damning obscurity. Easson 
acknowledges that Jerusalem “is a sincere contention of friendship, and reading it 
requires entering the burning fire of thought” (310). This is not to say, however, that such 
a reader is enlightened; in fact, he or she may be too enlightened. Jerusalem, as an 
antinomian tome, is rebarbative to the rational mind. Easson writes: “Jerusalem’s reader 
is a citizen of a fallen world; his perceptual abilities are obstructed by the values and 
concerns of that fallen world. Each fallen reader approaches Jerusalem, initially at least, 
in the spirit of the Spectre—unloving, unbelieving, unforgiving, and reasoning” (310). He 
elaborates: “Sublime poetry terrifies the reasoning mind, because it denies the centrality 
and dominance of the reasoning faculty. And, in this way, it threatens to disorient the 
reader to overthrow reason, and to let loose the disintegrating forces of chaos” (316). 
That is, “Jerusalem mirrors the state of the reader; and if the reader is still dominated by 
the spectral reason when he attempts to thread his way through the verbal maze, then he 
will be led deeper and deeper into the enigma, into the darkness of Blake’s allegoric 
night” (314).29
                                                          
29 Mike Goode raises red flags about the elitism that attends many critical readings of Blake’s sublimnity, 





 This “allegoric night” is the result of what Blake calls “sublime allegory” (E730). 
According to Easson, “sublime allegory is poetry that speaks to the intellectual powers 
without penetrating the intermediate stage of the corporeal understanding. It is poetry that 
is, quite literally, beyond reason. . . . Sublime allegory is designed to arouse the 
intellectual faculties by its grandly manipulative obscurity so that the individual’s 
humanity may awake and cast off the dominance of reason” (316). On the other hand, 
Vincent De Luca argues against the correlation of the sublime and obscurity in Blake’s 
works, insisting that Blake’s sublime is “everything that [Edmund] Burke’s sublime is 
not; instead of obscurity, indefinite vastness, and threatening power, there must be 
determinacy, concentration, and intellectual play. It must provide an element of difficulty 
and awe without signaling man’s impotence or his diminished state” (5).  
Quite a few critics, besides Easson, contest De Luca’s assertion that Blake’s 
sublime allegory is determinate, rather than obscure—particularly when Blake’s 
bibliography is taken into account. Along these lines, Essick discusses his conception of 
the “bibliographic sublime” in the context of Jerusalem. Essick writes that “in the 
bibliographic sublime, the author perceives that conventional verbal representation, 
closeted in normative modes of publication, is inadequate to the task of signification. In 
response, the author is thrown back onto the physicality of the book, which in turn is 
manipulated into an alternative semiotic that ‘lets us see’ the ‘inadequacy’ of 
conventional forms” (“Bibliographic Sublime” 514). Blake’s sublime is bibliographic, 
and a means—a code—by which the antinomian sheep might be separated from the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
privileged few” (8). Goode argues that Blake’s illuminated books “supplement their elitist sublimity with 
what amounts to an unexpected transformation of the eighteenth-century aesthetic of the beautiful into a 





 Nicholas Williams further describes this divisive publicity: “To those who can 
understand his prophetic message, Blake’s poem appears an open gate, the gate which 
formerly was hid amidst a chaos of obscure reference and ‘backward’ syntax; to those 
deaf to his message however, Jerusalem will remain a forbidding wall, unassailable in its 
solid opacity” (187). There is a biblical precedent for such opacity: Williams points to the 
Gospel of Matthew (11:25), where Jesus praises God for hiding things from the wise but 
revealing them to the simple (187). This is, as Rowland put it, the “Christ who speaks in 
parables in order to damn his hearers.” Williams argues that a “‘hiddenness,’ a cunning 
backwardness, characterizes Blake’s relationship to his audience in Jerusalem, curiously 
circumspect and even duplicitous” (186). This is reflective of Blake’s antinomian 
publicity, and the fact that the antinomian public was now more legend than reality.  
 This bibliographic sublime suggests antinomian publicity in that such 
books are open to antinomians and closed to rationalists.  
In Jerusalem, Blake damns his contemporary rationalist readers (the public of the 
present), while at the same time acknowledging that his antinomian readers (the public of 
the past) remained only in the memory of a hidden remnant. There are, however, flesh-
and-blood readers that still might decipher Blake’s text: these readers comprise the 
utopian public of futurity. Michael Ferber enquires: “Why is Blake so difficult? To rouse 
our faculties to act, to raise us into a perception of the infinite” (Ferber 60). Ferber is 
clearly referring to present-day readers, whom Blake commissions in Jerusalem. Easson 
also seems to have the present-day reader in mind when he writes: “Jerusalem is a poem 
                                                          
30 Other critics who have written on Blake and the sublime are Steven Vine, “Blake’s Material Sublime”; 
David M. Baulch, “‘To Rise from Génération’: The Sublime Body in Blake’s Illuminated Books”; Morton 
Paley, Energy and the Imagination (1–60); David Simpson, “Reading Blake and Derrida—Our 
Caesars neither Praise nor Buried”; and most recently Mike Goode, “The Joy of Looking”; and Hélène 




about itself, about the relationship between the author and his reader. A grand allegory 
concealed by a rhetorical veil of error, Jerusalem may be read as a poem about the 
experience of reading Jerusalem; it is a poem that enjoins the reader to participate with 
its writer in the creative process” (309).  
This reader-response, “writerly” approach is characteristic of post-structural 
analyses of Jerusalem.31
It should be noted, however, that the “redemption” Dortort mentions is more work 
than play—more job than jouissance—for the reader. This seems to be the point that 
Molly Rothenberg makes in Rethinking Blake’s Textuality, when she writes: “The Blake I 
read cannot transform us into ‘better’ people or lead us through an apocalypse to a new 
Garden of Eden, but this Blake can provide us with extraordinary means of identifying 
and exposing the varieties of oppression we foster in the name of Universal Humanity” 
(4). In her post-structural reading, Rothenberg argues that in Jerusalem Blake is 
particularly self-reflexive, revealing his bibliographical machinery in order to make the 
 Fred Dortort’s is one of the more recent. He notes that it is only 
after they are “freed from the compulsion to search for a consistent, orderly path through 
Jerusalem [that] readers can begin to develop alternatives” (10). But they can only do so 
if they “significantly adjust their own internalized, yet consensually determined, 
strategies for problem solving and reality testing. In looking outward at Jerusalem they 
must also look deeply inward into the constituent factors determining the makeup of what 
appears to be perceptually and intellectually derived everyday reality. To a considerable 
degree these inward-directed efforts will transfer the arena of redemption from the page 
to the readers’ actual lives” (10).  
                                                          
31 My references to “writerly” texts (as opposed to “readerly” texts) and jouissance are taken from Roland 




reader question it (4-5). She continues: “Blake’s poem begins by problematizing the 
entire question of authority—divine, authorial, and interpretive; he consistently confronts 
the reader with his or her own tendency to read by attaching a traditional priority and a 
standard valence to ‘transcendent’ signifiers” (5). Such reading is hard work and was not 
really possible for Blake’s contemporaries. But it is possible for future readers who wish 
to participate in Blake’s utopian project, and are willing to put in the work this entails.  
Tilottama Rajan also writes of Blake’s “writerly” or “open” texts as part of a post-
structural reading. She asserts that in his early illuminated works, Blake “must keep 
putting things together differently, avoiding the homogenized vision of a text finalized 
for commercial publication. Blake’s method of production is in fact an attempt to avoid 
the alienation of labor: both ours and his” (214). In doing so, Blake is “creating a text that 
is open to revision from its readers” (214). However, she argues that Blake’s early works 
are more writerly than his later works. In his illuminated books of the early 1790s, Blake 
exhibits a “revisionary hermeneutics in which intertextuality replaces canonicity,” but 
this is reversed in Jerusalem (199). Jerusalem marks “Blake’s abandonment of the 
heuristic text in favor of the ‘work,’ admittedly conceived as ongoing labor, yet tending 
nevertheless to reify process as a product in itself. Jerusalem consolidates the later 
Blake’s commitment to a traditional hermeneutic, and in its discursive passages it 
provides exegetical principles for normalizing the earlier texts” (270-71). Thus, she 
concludes that Jerusalem is a “closed” canonical text. As my reading below shows, 
Jerusalem is certainly a conflicted text, showing Blake to be torn between canonization 




not completely closed and sealed. Blake leaves at least one such gate open a crack, 
ingress for future readers, who make up the utopian public of futurity.  
In his article entitled “William Blake and the Future of Enthusiasm,” Steven 
Goldsmith seems to refer to this utopian future public when he discusses some critics’ 
enthusiastic claims for Blake’s enthusiasm. These critics write  
as if enthusiasm itself were a continuously streaming counterpoint to modernity, a 
potentiality to be otherwise, a future waiting to be mobilized by an audience 
whose faculties will have been properly roused to act. The very desire to 
historicize enthusiasm, and thus to identify its difference from our own 
modernity, is indistinguishable from a desire to activate that difference anew, to 
put it to work in our still needy world. In Blake criticism, enthusiasm has been 
every bit as much about enabling the future as it has been about respecting the 
archive of neglected premodern radicals. (442)  
While Goldsmith suggests that the critics who focus on Blake’s enthusiasm tend to 
uncritically “express the enthusiasm they set out to describe,” and goes on to describe this 
in terms of the incorporation of emotion into the critical enterprise, he is also clearly 
arguing Blake’s relevance to present-day readers—the futurity that Blake beheld in his 
lifetime—and its ongoing utopian potential (441). What I would add to Goldsmith’s 
analysis is that it is not just Blake’s enthusiasm that enthuses his critics. Lately there is a 
similar excitement about Blake’s antinomianism, which shares many of the qualities of 
enthusiasm.32
                                                          
32 Jon Mee makes this eminently clear in Dangerous Enthusiasm, and in his articles on antinomianism since 





In Jerusalem Blake suggests that there are welcome and unwelcome readers, as 
well as welcome and unwelcome publics. The rationalists of Blake’s time damned him 
for his religious “mystifications,” which supposedly undermined reasoned inquiry and 
encouraged atavistic irrationality. Blake, in turn, damned them and endeavored that they 
would be unable to decipher his antinomian code. These readers were led astray by their 
rationalism—by their very effort to crack the code. For these readers, Blake intended the 
work to be Sisyphean. But for those who committed themselves to the hard work of 
reading with the middle (spiritual) eye, and had the wherewithal—the knowledge of the 
Bible and familiarity with esoteric, antinomian thought—to decode Blake’s text, there 
was a resting place at the bosom of the “Divine Humanity.” The antinomian public was 
no longer viable when Blake finished Jerusalem, but Blake also appealed to the 
spiritually enlightened readers who would come after him—his utopian public of futurity. 
When it comes to Jerusalem the book, many are those who take the wide road to 
damnation and few are those who enter the narrow gate to salvation—or even find it. It is 
a gate that can only be found in the past or in the future. 
 
Public Collision and Collusion in Jerusalem 
  
 Jerusalem the Emanation of the Giant Albion is not generally considered part of 
Blake’s Bible of Hell.33
                                                          
33 Searching for the word “moral” in 
 There are a number of discontinuities between Jerusalem and the 
David Erdman’s concordance of Blake’s works produces 34 results in 
Jerusalem, often qualified by the words “virtue” or “law.” All of these instances of the word are negative, 
which is consistent with the way Blake characterizes morality in his antinomian Bible of Hell, and the way 
that antinomians generally conceived it. Other words (besides “virtue” and “law”) associated with “moral” 
are justice, duty, sin, repentance, revenge, vengeance, reason, and rational. Words used to express the 





other books in the cycle. For instance, Jerusalem does not mimic the form of the Bible in 
the way that the books of Urizen, Ahania, and Los do: there are no dual-column pages or 
verse numbers in Jerusalem. And Urizen, the arch-priest of reason who presides over the 
proceedings in the earlier books, keeps to the background in Jerusalem. These 
discontinuities complicate any reading of Jerusalem as part of Blake’s Bible of Hell; but 
then discontinuity figures in all of Blake’s works, including the books in his infernal 
Bible, and should be no reason to exclude Jerusalem. Besides, there are also some 
significant continuities: namely, Blake’s antinomianism, his practices of textual 
obscurity, and the close resemblance of the work to a biblical book—in this case the final 
book in the Christian Bible, the Book of Revelation, also known as the Apocalypse.  
I argue that it is the continuities rather than discontinuities that are problematic in 
Jerusalem. Blake’s poem not only resembles the biblical Book of Revelation, it draws 
upon its canonical authority, its designation as the capstone and omega-point of Christian 
revelation. Blake continued his battle with the book in Jerusalem, but his campaign had 
become equivocal. Jerusalem is at cross purposes with itself: the centrifugal force of 
Blake’s antinomian media practice wars with the centripetal force of canonization, just as 
publicity wars with privacy. Typically in Blake’s works this war of contraries is not a 
stalemate but rather a productive tension, a balancing of opposites. This war is threatened 
by a peace understood as the conflation of contraries and the cessation of “public 
collusion.” Jerusalem offers this kind of Pyrrhic peace, one that tempted the Blake of the 
nineteenth century, and has tempted his critics since. 
As in the previous books in Blake’s Bible of Hell, Jerusalem shows the ravages of 




impact. Jerusalem parodies the Bible in a number of ways. It contains lists of places and 
people that mimic similar catalogues in the Bible, its language and cadences also evoke 
the Bible (particularly the King James version), and there are many ornaments that might 
be found in illustrated bibles such as the Biblia Pauperum. And with its four chapters, 
Jerusalem has the familiar four-fold form of the Christian gospels. This is supplemented 
by the many allusions to the biblical Book of Revelation. But Jerusalem differs from the 
earlier Bible of Hell in that it suggests that Blake was expropriating the Bible to grant 
authority to his work, and this expropriation functions more as homage than satire.  
In terms of détournage, Jerusalem remediates media associated with the plebs, but 
unlike the previous books in his Bible of Hell, Blake erases most of the traces that 
distinguish plebeian from elite bourgeois media in Jerusalem. If you remove the opening 
“epistle” of each chapter along with the full-page designs that begin and/or end each 
chapter, Jerusalem could be seen as an anthology of four short pamphlets or chapbooks—
a Bible in parts (popular in the eighteenth century), or a collection of gospels, which in 
the earliest days of Christianity circulated separately—except that the large folio page 
size would not accommodate such a scheme. The epistles (the addresses “To the Public,” 
“To the Jews,” “To the Deists,” and “To the Christians”) could comprise a separate 
smaller collection of single-page handbills. But the fact that critics do not take notice of 
such détournage in Jerusalem (unlike, say, The Book of Urizen) is witness to Blake’s 
success in sublimating—even abjecting—plebeian media under the aegis of the print 
book. 
Similarly, Blake works against his disintegrative bricolage in Jerusalem. This is 




There are, as in the previous Bible of Hell books, full-page prints which seem detachable, 
making the text unstable. However, they are not randomly placed, as in The Book of 
Urizen. Each serves either as a frontispiece to each of the four chapters, or, like plate 100, 
as an end-piece. In Jerusalem, these images have been tethered to the task of textual 
integration, rather than the biblioclasm that characterizes the other books in Blake’s Bible 
of Hell. Also serving textual cohesion is the length of the Jerusalem, which at a hundred 
pages offers a pleasing sense of completion. Jerusalem, as mentioned above, could be 
separated into epistles and gospels. This does not undermine this cohesion but rather adds 
to it. Readers should be familiar with, and think nothing of, this mix of epistle and gospel, 
since the Bible and its apologists had long since normalized this kind of textual 
heterogeneity. Neither would “scientific” exegetes of the Bible be bothered by this 
heterogeneity, since they too took it for granted. Blake, in other words, undercuts 
readerly alienation by making Jerusalem too much like the Bible, and he does so in ways 
that both orthodox and heterodox exegetes would consider a matter of course. 
The faux manuscript that we see in all of Blake’s illuminated books is certainly 
present in Jerusalem. But the sheer amount of such manuscript, particularly on the many 
pages that present nothing but text—what De Luca calls “walls of words”—nearly 
cancels out the critical effect of such text, and adds instead to the monumentality of the 
work. Instead of interrogating print, the sheer amount of compacted verbiage, along with 
the removal of images that would break its sublime spell, lulls the reader into a sense of 
complacency and dulls the alienating (dys)functionality of the text. It seems a nostalgic 





In terms of the text-design conflict seen in the earlier works, there is much less of 
it to contend with in Jerusalem. Instead of critical “chatter” between the words and the 
image, there are parallel verbal and visual narratives that are not conversant with each 
other. For instance, on plate 11 we see two designs, one on the top of the page and the 
other on the bottom with text in between. The design at the top shows a swan with the 
body of a woman seated in shallow water. The design on the bottom shows a naked 
woman swimming through water (though she also seems to be surrounded with fire). In 
his commentary, Paley mentions the resemblance of this woman to a Meso-American 
Indian, but then identifies her as one of Blake’s “finny beings” (146).  Neither of these 
identifications is satisfactory, but they are as good as anyone else’s guess. Water connects 
the two images, and brings the page together visually—there is a blue wash over the text 
to make it seem like it is underwater (the marginal fish enhance this impression). But 
there is a great disparity between the images and the words, which describe Los at his 
furnaces: “With great labour upon his anvils, & and in his ladles the Ore / He lifted, 
pouring it into the clay ground prepar’d with art” (Pl. 11: 3-4). Design and text inhabit 
completely different worlds. 
  The same might be said of the marginal decorations in Jerusalem. In earlier books 
in the Bible of Hell marginal decorations are quite intrusive; here they are less so. Rarely 
do they bore into the text or comment upon it, as in The Book of Urizen, but instead 
present a different, virtual reality. Four such parallel realities can be discerned in 
Jerusalem: Generation, Ulro, Beulah, and Eden. For instance, on plate 13 the marginal 
design shows insects and a vine with leaves, and then in the bottom half a man trying to 




comments that this image introduces a “grotesquely comic element” to the page (150). It 
also suggests how in one reality, such as Generation, a vine might be a picturesque 
symbol of fecundity, a black-winged creature might be just an insect, and a man might be 
as winsome as a child; whereas in another reality, such as Ulro, the vine might represent 
the trap of vegetative existence, the insect might be a spectre ravening for the souls of the 
dead, and the man might be violently contending with his own abstracted reason. But in 
any case, the images have nothing to do with the text on the page, which describes, in a 
series of biblical lists, the city of Golgonooza. Here and elsewhere in Jerusalem the 
design and the text are not antagonists, but neither are they on speaking terms. This 
distinguishes the work from the other books in Blake’s Bible of Hell. In Jerusalem, word 
and image evoke different but parallel realities, suggesting that Blake had called a truce 
in the war between design and text. 
Similarly, the representations of Urizen and the book are largely effaced in 
Jerusalem, and what representations remain evince Blake’s equivocation in relation to 
rationalized print. In Blake’s final poem, Albion and his sons seem to have taken the 
place of Urizen.34
                                                          
34 Though it should be noted that Urizen is mentioned in the text 23 times, according to Erdman’s Blake 
concordance. 
 But another reading is that Urizen is all the more prevalent in the work 
by being abstracted, in the form of the ubiquitous Spectre. “It is the Reasoning Power / 
An Abstract objecting power, that Negatives every thing / This is the Spectre of Man; the 
Holy Reasoning Power / And in its Holiness is closed the Abomination of Desolation” 
(10:13-16). Blake clearly links the Spectre not only to reason, but to the depredations of 
“moral virtue”: the Spectre is produced by the sons of Albion when they “take the Two 




them Good and Evil” (10:8-9). The sons of Albion are later more explicitly linked to 
Urizen, when they construct their dragon temples following the blueprint of Urizen the 
“Architect” (25:4, 66:4). 
 There are a few pictorial representations of Urizen in Jerusalem. Arguably, his 
image first appears on plate 39, which shows a white-bearded patriarch pulling back a 
bow—an object often associated with Urizen throughout Blake’s corpus. On plate 58 
Blake depicts Urizen’s skeleton, which is overshadowed by a monstrous spectre. A figure 
strongly resembling Urizen appears on plate 64 and again on plate 87. His head appears 
in one of the designs that emblematize the fall of the Four Zoas, on plate 92. In 
Jerusalem, there are two depictions of Urizen in particular that seem to extend Blake’s 
critique of print in ways consonant with the other books in his Bible of Hell. Plate 64 has 
designs at the top and the bottom of the page which together show the conflict between 
prophecy and print. At the top of the page there is a recumbent, haloed, entranced scribe, 
who is writing upon a scroll. At the bottom, there is another recumbent figure that most 
commentators associate with Urizen, peering censoriously at the figure at the top, while 
holding his place in a book with his finger. In his commentary on plate 64, Paley cites 
Mitchell’s distinction between the prophetic scroll and rationalist book which I cited 
earlier in this chapter. In my reading of plate 64 of Jerusalem, the Urizen figure is 
attempting to curtail prophetic activity by pointing out its divergence from his “book of 
laws,” which govern Urizen’s spectral, rationalist publicity.  
Plate 41 does not show Urizen, but it does depict a conflict between scroll and 
book. The design depicts a despairing giant Albion, with his hair flowing down to his 




book upon which he looks to be imprinting his face. Mitchell writes: “His head is buried 
so deeply in the center of his book that it seems about to break through the spine” 
(“Visible Language” 65). At the same time, Albion sits upon a scroll: “The scroll is 
beginning to ‘grow’ on Albion, become one with his garments” (“Visible Language” 65). 
There is “an elfin scribe writing what Erdman calls a ‘merry proverb’ in reverse 
engraver’s writing” (“Visible Language” 65). What the elfin scribe writes is: “Each Man 
is in / his Spectre’s power / Untill the arrival / of that hour, / When his Humanity / awake 
/ And cast his Spectre / into the Lake.” The sentiment is antinomian and apocalyptic, in 
that it evokes images from the biblical Book of Revelation. It is also clearly an emblem 
of the liberation offered by prophecy (on the scroll), opposed to the despairing activity of 
rationalist book production.  
Offsetting these negative representations of rationalized print and Urizen are 
images that suggest Urizen’s role in Blake’s economy of salvation. This is based on 
identifications that, to my knowledge, only I have made. I maintain that the designs 
featuring a long-bearded patriarch on plates 96 and 99, at the apocalyptic end of 
Jerusalem, represent Urizen. They both show a Urizen-like figure embracing a naked 
female. In the Blake Trust edition, Paley claims that these two identical figures are, 
respectively, Albion and Jehovah. Iconologically, that is in terms of Blake’s typical 
depiction of Albion and Jehovah in Jerusalem and other works, this makes little sense.35
                                                          
35 In his commentary to the Blake Trust edition, Paley identifies the first instance of the figure on plate 96 
as Albion, noting that “we are free to imagine Albion as either this patriarch or the athletic youth of [plate] 
95, since human forms are no longer time-bound” (292). This is quite a stretch: why would Blake depict a 
youthful, beardless, rising Albion (on plate 95) and an old, bearded hovering Albion (on plate 96), on 
opposing pages—especially when in all other depictions of Albion in Jerusalem he is shown as the younger 
figure? Paley identifies the figure on plate 99 with Jehovah, agreeing that the image resembles his mis-
identified Albion on plate 96, but refusing to identify him as such, choosing instead the arbitrary 
association of the figure with Jehovah, who is not otherwise depicted in Jerusalem. 
 




designs in Jerusalem depict figures that seem to have no bearing on the text. Identifying 
the figures on plates 96 and 99 as Urizen indicates a redeemed Urizen, re-united (as in 
The Four Zoas) with his emanation Ahania.36
The best piece of evidence in this regard is Jerusalem seen as a whole. Blake’s 
tactics of textual obscurity are in play, but their critical effect is overshadowed by, if not 
buried under, the great bibliographic edifice that is Jerusalem the book. Instead of 
encouraging distancing and a querulous attitude towards the work, Blake confronts the 
reader with a bibliographic sublime that discourages critical engagement with the text. 
Instead of destabilizing fixity, Blake creates a book that is a monument. Instead of 
attempting to dissipate the aura of the book, he cultivates it. As Mann writes of 
Jerusalem: “One could argue that one of Blake’s fundamental purposes was to produce 
the most intransigent aura—perhaps, strictly speaking the only aura—in English 
literature” (22). Its intransigence, its obscurity, is an integral part of its aura. Ferber adds 
that “aura and difficulty are independent if mutually enhancing effects” (65). The 
bibliographic aura of Jerusalem thus reverts to the cultic, to reverence and worship. If, as 
Benjamin claims, mechanical reproduction “emancipates the work of art from its 
parasitical dependence on ritual,” dissipating its aura and bringing it into the realm of 
politics, Blake’s hand-crafted holy book seems to reverse the process (216).   
 The apotheosis of Urizen and Ahania 
suggests a declaration of peace, a mystical conflation of contraries, which implies that 
Blake had in the end abandoned his critique of reason in the form of the print book, and 
the rationalist publicity it empowers. 
                                                          
36 I also identify the figure of the old patriarch and young woman riding the monstrous chariot of plate 46 
as Urizen and Ahania, rather than Albion and Jerusalem. This identification follows my rejection of the old, 




In his address “To the Public” in Jerusalem, Blake writes that everything is 
“studied and put into its place.” Given the disturbing chaos of the text, most 
commentators scoff at this assertion, but I argue that the work coheres despite itself. 
More so than in his other illuminated books, there is a method—a system—to Blake’s 
bibliographic madness. On plate 12, Los exclaims: “I saw the finger of God go forth / 
Upon my Furnaces, from within the Wheels of Albion’s Sons: / Fixing their systems, 
permanent: by mathematic power / Giving a body to Falsehood that it may be cast off 
forever” (10-13). This is what Blake does bibliographically in Jerusalem: his book gives 
“a body to Falsehood that it may be cast off forever.” Broadsides, cheap pamphlets, 
chapbooks, and other ephemera cannot do this; the only medium with the authority and 
longevity to do this is the print book. However, the print book might also give Falsehood 
a body that cannot be cast off and that, in fact, lives forever. For the Blake of the 1790s, 
such a book would be the Bible, which is why it needed to be countered by a Bible of 
Hell, an anti-book; but the Blake of the nineteenth century is more than willing to risk 
preserving falsehood between the covers of a new Bible, the most magisterial of books, in 
order to promulgate a message that would survive the vagaries of time. In 1793, Blake 
wrote: “The Labours of the Artist, the Poet, the Musician, have been proverbially 
attended by poverty and obscurity; this was never the fault of the Public, but was owing 
to a neglect of the means to propagate such works as have wholly absorbed the Man of 
Genius” (E692). In the 1820s he learned that the means to propagate his works was not 
illuminated printing per se, but rather the medium of the print book.   
In the case of Jerusalem, its pseudo-biblical literary form enhances its 




of the form of Jerusalem, and in his commentary Paley notes some of them.37 Paley 
himself argues that, in form, Jerusalem closely resembles the biblical Book of 
Revelation, or Apocalypse. In particular, he shows how seventeenth-century exegetes of 
the Book of Revelation provided a reading that seems to explain some of the supposed 
idiosyncrasies of Jerusalem (124-125, 285-289). In Unbuilding Jerusalem, Steven 
Goldsmith also argues that Blake’s works, including Jerusalem, are influenced by the 
biblical apocalypse, the Book of Revelation.38
                                                          
37 Jerusalem is modeled after an “encyclopedic anatomy” (W. J. T. Mitchell), the prophet Ezekiel (Harold 
Bloom), the Synoptic Gospels (Joanne Witke), and Milton’s Paradise Regained (Stuart Curran) (284).   
 For Goldsmith, apocalypse as a form was 
not conducive to Blake’s radical politics, or his antinomian bibliography. He writes: 
“Apocalypse is a ‘bookish’ phenomenon, not just in that books feature prominently 
within the visions themselves, but also in the fact that apocalyptic revelation often comes 
indirectly through a book. Classical prophecy is typically (though not invariably) spoken; 
the word passes from Yahweh to the prophet without mediation . . . and the result of such 
inspiration is speech rather than text” (28). The result of a book of apocalypse, by 
contrast, is both the end of history and the end of prophecy, in the form of a book. 
Goldsmith argues that the canonized Apocalypse of John of Patmos (the Book of 
Revelation) “contributed in no small measure to the West’s idea of the book. More to the 
point, it helped set the two in opposition, helped create the tradition whereby the book 
came to be conceived as a space into which history did not significantly enter, a space, in 
other words, where history [and subsequently political amelioration] came to an end” 
(48). Michael Farrell adds that “canonical texts . . . are models of authority and represent 
a standard by which to judge all other texts and how they are to be read,” which means 
38 In this, he follows in the footsteps of not only Paley, but also Northrop Frye, Harold Bloom, and Jerome 




that “the canonization of texts potentially results in the institutional control of 
interpretation” (35). 
Goldsmith points out an inherent contradiction in the canonization of religious 
texts: “John wrote the Book of Revelation on the cusp between an internally diverse 
religious movement and its subsequent consolidation as an institution. His vision of the 
end of history at once preserves the antinomian impulse of prophecy and the antithetical, 
stabilizing imperatives of ‘official’ prophecy, canonical prophecy” (82). Goldsmith 
extends this analysis to Blake, contending that Blake resisted this kind of canonicity, 
undermining it with self-reflexive production practices and radical political ideology. In 
his defense, Goldsmith cites Rajan, who claims that Blake “encourages canonical 
reading, while at other times stimulating resistance to it” (197). However, Rajan makes it 
clear that it in his earlier works Blake stimulated resistance to canonicity, but in his later 
works he encouraged canonicity. She claims that Jerusalem exhibits “self-canonization” 
and uses “the biblical paradigm to limit reading” (198). It is about “the creation and not 
the interrogation of a system,” such as we see in Blake’s earlier books (271). 
 Like Rajan I see Blake divided by the exigencies of prophecy and canonization, 
but, unlike Rajan, I contend that this struggle continues in Jerusalem. I concur with 
Goldsmith’s argument that the literary form of apocalypse lends itself to the privileging 
of the print book and canonical reading, but I am less convinced that Blake systematically 
resisted this privileging on the level of bibliography. The literary form of Jerusalem is an 
apocalypse that resists canonization, but its media form (the book) embraces such 
canonization. Unlike the other books in Blake’s Bible of Hell, Jerusalem is decidedly a 




illustrations (a number of them single-page designs), including silver and gold leaf; and 
large, octavo-size pages. In Jerusalem, Blake concedes to the exigencies of time: in order 
to preserve and promulgate his prophetic message, he needed to present it in a medium 
that would last, that was not ephemeral. This suggests that Blake had abandoned the 
public sphere of his day in order to appeal to the public of futurity.  
Blake’s alienation from the public sphere is dramatically on display at the very 
beginning of Jerusalem. In Blake’s address to “The Public” on plate 3 a number of words 
and even entire lines are missing. Paley remarks that “at some point Blake attacked the 
copper plate, gouging out words and entire passages that suggested intimacy with the 
reader” (11). Some of these missing passages have been reconstructed by Erdman, 
amongst others. For instance, there is this passage, with Erdman’s reconstructions added 
in parentheses: 
“Reader! [Lover] of books! [Lover] of heaven. 
And of that God from whom [all books are given] (E145) 
The mutilated, gouged words indicate that Blake was, to say the least, conflicted about 
books and readers. “The only explanation for such battery upon the plate,” Paley 
explains, “is that Blake received a rebuff from a potential buyer, one that so enraged him 
that he wanted to remove all traces of personal intimacy and spiritual communion with 
his readership” (11).39
                                                          
39 In his commentary to the Blake Trust edition, Paley lists a number of possible reasons why Blake had 
become alienated from the public: 1. Blake’s failure to land the commission to engrave his own designs to 
Blair’s Grave in 1805; 2.Robert Hunt’s unfavorable review of Blake’s Grave designs in The Examiner in 
1808; 3.the failure of Blake’s exhibition, and another bad review in The Examiner, in 1809; 4. Blake’s 
contention that his former “corporeal” friend [first name] Stothard had stolen his idea for his painting/print 
on the Canterbury pilgrims, in 1811; 5. the bewildered reception of Robert Southey when Blake showed 
him some samples from Jerusalem in 1811; and 6. the little-seen exhibition at the Water Colour Society of 
“Detached Specimans” from Jerusalem in 1812.  
 But this is not the only explanation. Another is that Blake received 




decade of the nineteenth century, Blake finally had to acknowledge that his antinomian 
public no longer existed in the time and place in which he lived. However, ghostly 
vestiges of the antinomian public haunt Blake’s Jerusalem. 
 In contradistinction to Blake’s address “To the Public,” the other addresses in 
Jerusalem (to the Jews, the Deists, and the Christians) can be read as epistles, in that they 
resemble the pastoral letters that come after the gospels in the Christian Scriptures. Like 
these epistles, Blake’s engage specific religious communities in a religious public sphere. 
However, I do not agree that Blake’s epistles were meant to preface the chapters that they 
immediately precede, as was once commonly assumed. The epistles address religious 
communities; the chapters do not. Blake addresses the Jews, Deists, and Christians of his 
own time with his epistles, but there are also ancient controversies within Christianity 
that motivate Blake. For instance, in his address to the Jews, Blake takes the reader into 
the distant past, when the Jews were Druids, and England was “the Primitive Seat of 
Patriarchal Religion” (4-5). But then the Jews, once transported to the Holy Land, 
apostasized, choosing “cruel Sacrifices” and law rather than “Forgiving trespasses and 
sins / Lest Babylon with cruel Og, / With Moral & Self-righteous Law / Should Crucify 
in Satans Synagogue!” (Pl. 27: 110, 41-44). The antinomian, freed from such a law and 
such a synagogue, offers spiritual liberty and the Divine Humanity to the Jews, exhorting 
them to “Take up the Cross O Israel & follow Jesus” (115).  
When Blake addresses the Deists, he clearly references debates of his own day, 
taking “Voltaire Rousseau Gibbon Hume” to task for their skepticism (Pl. 52: 38). But, 
once again, he fixates upon the ancient origin of this skepticism, identifying it with 




Worship of the God of this World by the means of what you call Natural Religion and 
Natural Philosophy, and of Natural Morality or Self-Righteousness, the Selfish Virtues of 
the Natural Heart” (Pl. 52: 33-36). Here Blake the antinomian evokes the struggles of 
Christians and pagans at the dawn of Christianity. Similarly, in his address to the 
Christians, Blake writes in the spirit and tone of early Christian controversialists. He 
urges orthodox Christians to reclaim their prophetic and apostolic gifts, to “cast out devils 
in Christs name / Heal thou the sick of spiritual disease / Pity the evil. for thou art not 
sent / To smite with terror & with punishments / Those that are sick” (Pl. 71: 71-75). As 
an antinomian, Blake confesses: “I know of no other Christianity and of no other Gospel 
than the liberty both of body & mind to exercise the Divine Arts of Imagination 
Imagination the real & eternal World of which this Vegetable Universe is but a faint 
shadow & in which we shall live in our Eternal or Imaginative Bodies, when these 
Vegetable Mortal Bodies are no more. The Apostles knew of no other Gospel” (Pl. 71: 
17-22). He urges the Christians to “expel from among you those who pretend to despise” 
this gospel (Pl. 71: 37-38). It may be that in his epistles Blake is attempting to speak to 
some of the religious controversies of his own time, but he does so by bringing it back to 
the time when antinomian Christianity was a viable alternative to Judaism, paganism, and 
orthodox Christianity—that is, to the first centuries of the common era, before it became 
the official religion of empire in the fourth century CE. It was the publicity of the past 
that concerned Blake, much more so than the publicity of the present. 
Albion is often characterized in commentaries as representing the public sphere of 
Blake’s time. For instance, Mitchell calls Albion “the English-reading Public or 




Jerusalem, at the apocalyptic ending Albion is resurrected. However, Albion-as-public in 
the nineteenth century remained in the stony sleep of death. I have already mentioned that 
the antinomian Blake may have addressed some of the religious controversies of the early 
nineteenth century in Jerusalem; I have also discussed how Blake’s debate with 
Enlightenment rationalism continued in the form of the surreptitious Urizen and the 
Spectres, who control the sons of Albion. But, as with the previous books in his Bible of 
Hell, Blake chose to produce Jerusalem in small quantities rather than publish it widely. 
Thus what might have been a contribution to the public sphere of Blake’s time—what 
may have brought Albion back to life—instead functions as spectral publicity. Deprived 
of a public platform, these figures become ghostly. They haunt the text because they are 
trapped there, with no outlet. That is, in Jerusalem there is no way into the time-space 
continuum of nineteenth-century Britain. That gate is sealed. 
The gates that open to the past and the future, however, remain unsealed. The 
public of futurity, like the public of the past, is present in spectral form in Jerusalem. 
This public of futurity has now become a public of the twenty-first-century present. Blake 
used his tactic of textual obscurity to gain a circle of adherents who have passed along to 
subsequent generations the “secret book” that is Jerusalem. Taking his cue from the 
biblical Book of Revelation, Blake utilized the obscurity of Jerusalem—its riddles, its 
sublimity, its uncanny resemblance to Scripture—to give it an afterlife that continues to 
this day. That is because, unlike previous books in his Bible of Hell, Blake promulgated 
his book of revelation in the form of a deluxe, magisterial book. He chose a perennial, 
rather than an ephemeral, form to evangelize his antinomian gospel. In this sense, Blake’s 




but his entire corpus is in the form of a print book. Take away Jerusalem and there is 
nothing left in Blake’s corpus that resembles a book as we have come to know it; instead, 
there are a number of texts that mix together ephemeral media associated with plebeian 
popular culture (such as the broadside, the cheap pamphlet, the chapbook) that Blake 
calls books. Jerusalem is arguably the one true book Blake produced, and it secured his 
place in the canon.  
And yet there are indications that Blake meant to resist canonization in Jerusalem. 
The infamous obscurity of the work is part of this. Blake hid his meaning and his 
intentions from the public sphere of his day; at the same time, he provided clues and 
reading instructions for future readers—his public of futurity. In Jerusalem, as Eason 
points out, Blake may be “the trickster poet who has recognized that in the fallen world 
‘deep dissimulation is the only defence an honest man has left’” (311 [J 49:23]). But it 
may also be the case that Blake expected that his future readers would be able to tease out 
of his text a profound significance, a deep simulation, and created a text that would make 
this possible. That is, Blake offered in Jerusalem a canonical text that would continually 
undermine its own canonicity, by encouraging critical reading of both the content and 
construct of the work. Adherents of the “writerly” Blake, by advocating guerilla tactics 
that would continue Blake’s un-holy war, have taken up Blake’s challenge. These readers 
have inherited both Blake’s utopian vision and his ambivalence concerning bibliographic 
cohesion and canonicity. 
Canonizers and biblioclasts alike claim Blake as a Romantic, but at issue is how 
this relates to bibliography and publicity. Does Blake’s Romanticism denote an escape 




engagement with an embattled public sphere without hope of resolution, a “negative 
capability” at the level of publicity? I subscribe to the latter position, despite the “severe 
contentions” posed by a monumentalized Jerusalem. Even in this work the contraries of 
private and public remain precariously in balance, indicating both the evils and the 
efficacy of “public collusion” (Pl. 90:65). This balanced contrariety, rather than the 
apocalyptic conflation of opposing terms, makes Blake Romantic. According to this 
formulation, Blake’s Bible of Hell is not Romantic, for it renounces privacy and appeals 
to an antinomian public that existed when he composed it. But when this public 
disappeared into irrelevance and utter obscurity, when antinomians disappeared from 
public view, when Blake receded from the public sphere without retreating to the private 
sphere, he showed himself to be Romantic. In the inchoate space between public and 
private, in the inchoate time between past and future, Blake laid down the golden string 
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